What does the indictment against Thaci and others contain (IV): The KLA was well organized; the leaders asked about everything and knew everything

The over 300-page indictment of the Special Court for KLA Crimes accuses former Kosovo President Hashim Thaci and three other KLA commanders and leaders, Kadri Veseli, Jakup Krasniqi, and Rexhep Selimi of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including illegal detention, torture, murders and disappearances from March 1998 to September 1999.

The 10 counts of the indictment detail the crimes committed in 43 illegal KLA detention centers in Kosovo and Albania against approximately 407 detainees, of whom at least 102 were killed. In the amended indictment, in early March, the prosecutors announced the identity of 75 victims, 51 of whom were of Serbian nationality. 23 Albanians and one Rom died in KLA custody. The identity of another 27 victims will be disclosed during the trial.

The trial in The Hague began on Monday, with the presentation of the prosecution's opening statements, which accuse Thaci and three other former KLA leaders of supporting and aiding crimes as members of the Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE), and even personally participating in some of them.

The accused leaders of the KLA and their lawyers based their defense on two claims, that they had not been members of a joint criminal enterprise, i.e. that the crimes had been committed by individuals, not the leadership of the KLA, and that the KLA had not been a well-organized army, and therefore there had been no clear command responsibility. In other words, they said that there had been no army and that they had not been leaders. They admitted that there had been crimes, but that they had not committed them.

However, in the indictment, the prosecution presents a number of arguments against these claims.

An obvious intention to carry out the objective of a joint criminal enterprise

Thus, the prosecution states that the evidence indicates that the suspects "acted as part of a common intention to commit the crimes they are accused of, from imprisonment, torture, persecution to killing people, which were included in the common goal of the JCE".

It is stated that their intent had been obvious based on the personal statements of the suspects, the public statements of the KLA Headquarters or the leadership of the Provisional Government of Kosovo, as well as the regulations, structures, directives, and orders drawn up, issued or approved by the suspects, and also based on their individual actions.

The Prosecution also claims that the goal of the JCE was to "seize and exercise control over the whole of Kosovo through illegal intimidation, abuse, violence against opponents and their removal". In addition, according to the prosecution, due to the organized way of implementing the JCE, especially the pattern of intimidation, imprisonment, abuse, and killing of opponents, every criminal offense from the indictment was an objectively foreseeable consequence of achieving the common goal of the JCE.

The supporting material indicates that the suspects could have foreseen that any of the criminal acts charged in the indictment could be committed while achieving the common goal of the JCE. Among other things, the indictment states, "the suspects maintained or had knowledge of intelligence and police structures that were in charge of identifying, investigating and neutralizing opponents." In addition, the indictment further claims, "the suspects were willing to take the risk that criminal acts might be committed, which can be inferred from their knowledge that KLA recruits are assigned to positions even though they have received minimal training with negligible or no information on obligations based on international humanitarian law".

"Although it was common knowledge that crimes were committed against opponents in Kosovo, the accused continued to support violence against opponents and personally participated or contributed to the commission of criminal acts. And there is a well-founded suspicion that Thaci, Veseli, Selimi, and Krasniqi committed criminal acts from of the indictment since they could foresee that these criminal acts were a possible consequence of achieving the common goal of the JCE," the indictment says.

It is added that the heads of the KLA had gad means of communication, such as couriers, walkie-talkies, and satellite phones, thanks to which they had been in daily contact with members of the KLA in the operational zones. All of the above took place during the incriminated period, the indictment further states, in a situation where it was common knowledge that members of the KLA were abusing civilians, including kidnappings, imprisonments, beatings, and murders. Also, it is stated that Thaci had several meetings with representatives of the international community where he was explicitly warned about the crimes committed by members of the KLA. It follows that Thaci knew or had grounds to know that his subordinates intended to commit criminal acts or had already committed them, according to the prosecution.

The Prosecution also cites evidence that, although the KLA initially functioned like a guerrilla organization, during the period for which the suspects are accused of crimes, it was "an organized armed group with a sufficient level of organization to control the territory, plan and carry out armed attacks and other defensive and offensive military operations”.

"The KLA had a General Headquarters; it was organized into operational (sub)zones, and issued political declarations and announcements in which it presented its policy. At least since April 1998, even during the period covered by the indictment, KLA members managed locations - many of which were long-established bases and strongholds - in and around which hundreds of opponents were detained, harassed, and killed by members of the JCE. Since at least June 1998, the KLA has had an official spokesperson and various written rules and regulations," the amended indictment says.

Coordinated operations, and provided help and moral support to criminals

The Prosecution also presents some specific events in which KLA leaders participated.

"In June 1998, Thaci and Veseli personally took two opponents to the KLA headquarters, who were arrested, interrogated, and, in one case, severely beaten by members of the JCE in the headquarters in Drenovac. Selimi was also present. Those people were never seen again or heard about," the indictment reads.

In July 1998, immediately after the attack by KLA units on Orahovac and the surrounding villages, during which Serbian civilians were captured, several members of the KLA General Staff, including Thaci, Veseli, and Seljimi, were present, participating and coordinating the operations.

"After certain detainees were abducted in and around Orahovac and other locations, they were transferred to the former police station in Malisheva at the end of July 1998, it was identified that Krasniqi was present at the scene and that on one occasion he visited the room where the detainees were imprisoned," the indictment says.

In August 1998, Selimi was present during the interrogation of an opponent detained in Likovac, according to the indictment. It is added that "at the beginning of September 1998, in the operational zone of Dukagjin, Thaci, and Selimi, took steps to intimidate and confirm their dominance over units associated with the LDK, including the 'Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo' associated with the government in exile".

"In October 1998, in Jablanica, Selimi threatened a journalist and human rights activist, accusing him of criticizing the KLA," the indictment reads.

 The Prosecution believes that the suspects are criminally responsible for assisting in the commission of criminal acts, that is, that "the actions and omissions of the suspects represented practical assistance, encouragement or moral support in the commission of those criminal acts".

"Specifically, the suspects participated in formulating and approving public statements of the KLA General Staff as well as regulations, structures, directives, and orders directed against the enemy, personally participated in some of the criminal acts, and visited numerous locations where crimes were committed, and provided various forms of practical and moral support. Since all four suspects were in high leadership positions in the KLA and members of the KLA Main Staff, whose authority was widely recognized, their aforementioned contribution had a significant impact on the execution of criminal acts," the indictment states.

It is also said that KLA leaders had been in charge of political, logistical, financial, and military support that they had regularly sent reports to the KLA Main Staff and maintained regular contacts with zone commanders, as well as meetings with representatives of the international community.

Numerous pieces of evidence of the command responsibility of KLA leaders

In the case of Hashim Thaci, the prosecution recalls that he was one of the founders of the KLA General Staff and its member during the entire incriminated period.

"The General Staff was a body with a very small number of people and it functioned according to the principle of division of duties and responsibilities among the members. From about June 1998, Thaci was also the head of the KLA Directorate for Information and the KLA Directorate for Political Affairs based on the Regulations on Discipline in the KLA, the heads of directorates essentially had the same powers as the commanders in the highest positions. After the establishment of the Provisional Government of Kosovo, at the end of March 1999, Thaci became the Prime Minister, after the zone commanders gave their approval. As Prime Minister, Thaci was also the supreme commander of the KLA and in that capacity on June 21, 1999 he signed the KLA Statement on Accepting the Demilitarization and Transformation Obligation," the indictment states.

The supporting material indicates that according to the regulations on discipline in the KLA, as head of two directorates, Thaci had the formal authority, among other things, to issue praise, promotions, reprimands, introduce and revoke disciplinary measures (including detention for up to 25 days) or dismiss duties of members of the KLA. He directed the deployment of KLA recruits in Kosovo in the spring of 1998, issuing orders to commanders on behalf of the KLA General Staff regarding operational matters (such as coordination of the arms and ammunition supply chain) or other civilian and administrative matters.

"Thaci personally intervened, along with other members of the KLA General Staff, when resolving disputes between commanders about the division of responsibilities and participated in the appointment of commanders. The supporting material also indicates that it was evident that Thaci was in a leading position of authority in the KLA and that other members of the KLA Main Staff sided with him when making decisions," the indictment states.

According to the supporting material, Thaci, in his capacity as Prime Minister, had the authority, among other things, to appoint persons to key positions in the government, such as the Minister of Defense (directly subordinate to the Prime Minister), the Chief of Staff of the KLA, the Commander of the National Guard and the Chief of the Intelligence Service (directly subordinate to the President government).

"It shows that Thaci had a real opportunity to prevent the commission of criminal acts and punish his subordinates at the time those acts were committed. The supporting material indicates that he was present at multiple locations where the alleged criminal acts were committed, including in the periods specified in the revised indictment," the document said.

He was also a witness when KLA members abused victims in the field. Thaci also had knowledge based on information from other sources, according to the indictment. For example, as a member of the KLA General Staff and Supreme Commander, he met with the commanders of operational zones in the field. Reports were also sent to the KLA Main Staff, including Thaci, and regular contact was maintained with zone commanders.

"As a member of the KLA General Staff, head of the Directorate for Information, head of the Directorate for Political Affairs, as prime minister or supreme commander of the KLA, Thaci was obliged to prevent the commission of criminal acts at the locations specified in the indictment and to punish subordinates for the criminal acts they committed in the incriminated period. However, there is nothing in the supporting material to indicate that he took the necessary and reasonable measures that he was required to take as his superior. On the contrary, he occasionally approved the actions of his subordinates by his presence on the spot and by not taking measures when he was an eyewitness to the abuse of victims by members of the KLA," the indictment states.

Therefore, the prosecution states, there is a well-founded suspicion that Thaci bears the criminal responsibility, as a superior, for crimes against humanity and war crimes.

Veseli participated in crimes in at least three locations

In the case of Kadri Veseli, the prosecution presents similar evidence, according to which he bears the responsibility as a superior for the crimes committed. It is stated that as one of the founders of the KLA General Staff and a member of the KLA Directorate for Political Affairs, and after the establishment of the Provisional Government of Kosovo and the head of SHIK, the intelligence service of the KLA, Veseli had the same powers as commanders in the highest positions.

"Like Thaci, he could issue praises, promotions, reprimands, introduce and revoke disciplinary measures (including detention for up to 25 days), or relieves members of the KLA from their duties. He led the deployment of KLA recruits in Kosovo in the spring of 1998, conducted investigations, decided on the transfer and release of prisoners, and participated in resolving the demand that Ramush Haradinaj be disciplined for the way he treated his soldiers," the indictment claims.

The supporting material also indicates that Veseli, as a person in a high leadership position, had power and prestige in the KLA.

"This shows that Veseli had a real opportunity to prevent the commission of criminal acts and punish his subordinates at the time when those acts were committed. The supporting material indicates that he was present at several locations where criminal acts were committed, while he personally participated in the execution of those acts in at least three locations," the indictment says.

He was also an eyewitness to the abuse of victims by members of the KLA in the field. He also had knowledge based on information from other sources.

"For example, as a member of the KLA General Staff, Veseli met with the commanders of the operational zones in the field. Reports were also sent to the KLA General Staff, including Veseli, and regular contact was maintained with the zone commanders. It is important to point out that as the head of the intelligence service, Veseli, together with other members of the General Staff, had immediate access to information regarding the identification of opponents that came directly from members in the operational zones. Furthermore, in July 1998, Veseli, together with Thaci, attended a meeting with representatives of the international community at which explicitly warned of the crimes committed or committed by members of the KLA," the indictment claims.

The Prosecution also says that Veseli not only did not take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent crimes or punish the perpetrators, which he was obliged to do as a superior, but "occasionally approved the actions of his subordinates by his presence on the spot and by not taking measures when he was an eyewitness to the abuse of the victims by members of the KLA".

 Selimi personally approved the abuse

In the case of Rexhep Selimi, the Prosecution states that he was also one of the founders of the KLA General Staff and remained a member of it throughout 1998 and 1999. From July 1998 he held the position of Chief Inspector of the General Staff, and in early April 1999, Thaci appointed him as Minister of Public Order in the Provisional Government of Kosovo.

"As a chief inspector, Selimi was in charge of evaluating the operational readiness of KLA units as well as determining whether there was a deficiency in discipline, which he reported to the competent commander. In general, Selimi was always considered a person of authority in the KLA, who most often visited commanders in the field and is one of the few members of the KLA General Staff who remained in Kosovo until the end of the armed conflict, when most of the others were in Albania," the indictment states.

Among other things, Selimi had the authority to introduce and abolish disciplinary measures or relieve members of the KLA, to participate in the appointment of commanders, to participate in investigations related to disciplinary issues, to conduct investigations into the reasons for the arrest and disarmament of individuals, and to make decisions on the release of prisoners. He also worked to consolidate the political authority of the General Staff. In addition, Selimi participated in the formation of structures within the zones, coordinated between the operational zones, participated in the recruitment and training of soldiers, and submitted reports to the General Staff on the events in the zones.

This shows, states the prosecution, that Selimi had a real possibility to prevent the commission of criminal acts and to punish his subordinates at the time when those acts were committed.

"Actually, it was believed that Selimi had been present on the ground, including in the areas of Dukagjin, Drenica, Pashtrik, Nerodimlje, Salja, and Lab. Selimi admitted that he had known that members of the KLA had been detaining non-combatants, at least in the period before November 28, 1998, although he had not known the exact place where they had been imprisoned. He was also an eyewitness to the abuse of victims by members of the KLA in the field or approved such abuse while participating in interrogations," the indictment states.

And not only did Selimi not take the necessary and reasonable measures that he was obliged to take as a superior, but, according to the indictment, he also "occasionally approved the actions of his subordinates by his presence at the scene and by not taking measures when he was an eyewitness to the abuse of victims by members of the KLA".

Krasniqi received reports about the prisoners

Jakup Krasniqi was a member of the KLA General Staff from the end of 1996 or the beginning of 1997, and during 1998 he was a member of the KLA Directorate for Political Affairs, head of the Directorate for Local Self-Government, and from June of that year, he was the official spokesperson of the KLA. In November 1998, Krasniqi was also officially appointed as deputy commander of the KLA. When the commander was absent, he replaced him and assumed all powers and duties. At the same time, he continued to be one of the political representatives of the KLA and its spokesperson. In these positions, according to the rules and organization of the KLA, he essentially had the same powers as commanders in the highest positions, according to the prosecution.

"Krasniqi was in charge of transmitting all orders, instructions, and information on behalf of the General Staff, and accordingly, the zone commanders were in contact with the General Staff and coordinated their work through Krasniqi because he was the only member of the General Staff who was known in the public. The prominent position of Krasniqi, as the only well-known member of the KLA General Staff, ensured him the respect and appreciation of KLA members and representatives of the international community," the indictment reads.

According to the prosecution, Krasniqi also had the same powers as the other defendants, including "issuing an order for the arrest of a member of the KLA, issuing an order to release prisoners, and participating in decisions on the appointment of commanders and other high-ranking officials." This, it is stated in the indictment, gave him a real possibility to prevent the commission of criminal acts and to punish his subordinates at the time when those acts were committed. Also, there is evidence that he was also present at several locations where the criminal acts for which he is charged were committed.

Supporting material, the indictment states, indicates that he personally visited multiple locations in KLA-controlled areas, including Likovac, Jablanica, Malisheva, Klecka, operational zones Salja and Lab, as well as Kukes, in Albania. In addition, Krasniqi participated in several meetings of zone commanders with members of the General Staff, where orders were given to imprison collaborators and establish prison facilities for those purposes.

"Krasniqi received reports from zone commanders on the outcome of military operations, including on captured persons or how to deal with them. He was also personally warned that criminal acts were being committed, including kidnappings, murders, and disappearances. In addition, as a member of the KLA General Staff and considering the special role he had as the KLA spokesman, he met and maintained close contact with the commanders of operational zones on the ground," the indictment states.

Even for Krasniqi, according to the prosecution, there is nothing that indicates that he took the necessary and reasonable measures that he was obliged to take as a superior to prevent crimes and punish the perpetrators. On the contrary, like the other accused, Krasniqi occasionally approved the actions of his subordinates by his presence on the scene and by not taking measures when he was an eyewitness to the abuse of victims by members of the KLA.

"Krasniqi also attended a series of meetings between zone commanders and members of the General Staff, where it was ordered to detain collaborators and to establish prison facilities for that purpose," the indictment states.

The Prosecution recalls the fact that the leadership of the KLA introduced police and intelligence structures with the aim of discovering opponents and conducting investigations about them. Some of the opponents were mentioned in the statements of the KLA General Staff, and some were put on the lists of alleged collaborators and suspected persons, and measures were taken against them accordingly.

"In addition, the KLA officers who had the authority to release prisoners and decided on their release based on the information they received from their subordinates who directly participated in the arrest, i.e. the detention of persons. The suspects were aware that violence was being perpetrated according to a certain pattern. In addition, in some cases, they personally participated in arresting and imprisoning opponents or were present at places where opponents were abused,” the indictment concludes.