Anniversary of the Agreement on the Path to Normalization - same target, same distance

The Agreement on the Path to Normalization between Kosovo and Serbia, reached a year ago on February 27, 2023, in Brussels, did not fulfill the main expectation - to at least contribute to the stabilization of the situation in Kosovo, as significant convergence of views between Belgrade and Pristina on issues where they have drawn red lines in this period was certainly difficult to imagine.

Summing up after 12 months, Kosovo Online interlocutors say that only a few issues have been resolved, such as the use of license plates, while most of the problems that existed then still exist today. The Community of Serb-majority Municipalities, which some consider to be the main lever of the agreement, has still not been formed, and the position of the Serbs in Kosovo is becoming increasingly difficult. Some blame the European Union for the agreement remaining only on paper, as the mediator who was supposed to ensure that what was agreed upon was implemented.

The agreement, as a reminder, consists of 11 items, which are stated in the text of the document as agreed upon by the parties. The European Union published it after a meeting held in Brussels on this day between representatives of Belgrade and Pristina, Aleksandar Vucic and Albin Kurti, with the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell and the representative for the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, Miroslav Lajcak.

Of these 11 items, the fourth has been singled out as the most problematic for Serbia, which states that Serbia will not oppose Kosovo's membership in any international organization, which may include the United Nations, while in Kosovo, the most controversy has been sparked by item 7, which speaks about ensuring an adequate level of self-governance for the Serbian community in Kosovo, including the possibility of financial support from Serbia.

Even the implementation annex agreed upon in Ohrid on March 18 did not give impetus to the implementation of the agreement, just like the document from February, and neither the Ohrid one were signed. At the end of last year, Serbia sent a letter to Brussels stating that it considered the Agreement on the Path to Normalization and the annex for its implementation acceptable only in a context that did not imply de facto or de jure recognition of Kosovo.

Stefan Surlic, the Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade, says for Kosovo Online that he fears the Agreement on the Path to Normalization is experiencing the fate of documents never implemented on the ground.

"Some items related to the use of documents and license plates have been partially implemented, but there has been no implementation of the substantive points of this agreement, as well as the Ohrid annex. This places these documents in line with the previous Brussels Agreement and other agreements between Belgrade and Pristina for which there is no political will to truly implement them in practice. I am primarily referring to the Community of Serb-majority Municipalities," Surlic says for Kosovo Online.

As he adds, after a year, it is evident that this document was presented as an agreement under clear international pressure. The idea, he says, was that the situation on the ground would significantly change, and there would be a minimal level of trust between the two sides, which would make it easier for political leaders and negotiators in Belgrade and Pristina to implement even some painful points to which Belgrade committed.

"However, the situation is entirely different. We see that there is a race against time, and what happens by April will be the benchmark for whether this agreement has been implemented or not. After that, we have elections for the European Parliament and elections in the USA, and I do not believe that at that stage there will be any pressure for Belgrade and Pristina to make concessions for the sake of some final agreement. Second, it is important to bear in mind that the only concrete outcome of this agreement and the Ohrid Annex will be insisting that their provisions be included in Chapter 35 and changing the negotiation framework for Serbia, thereby binding a new administration in Brussels to pressure Belgrade and demand implementation of that agreement. This is the only thing that is now seen as a concrete outcome, and it is expected that Germany and other leading EU countries will insist on it. However, when it comes to changing the situation on the ground, Belgrade and Pristina have not come any closer, and the position of the Serbs in Kosovo is becoming increasingly difficult," Surlic points out.

Through Chapter 35, he emphasizes, that the agreement will be binding for Belgrade if it remains firmly on the path to EU accession, while Kosovo does not have the practical ability to be conditioned on its European path simply because it is not recognized by five EU members.

"There will be other channels of influence on Pristina, but it is evident that they have not been functional so far. So, the CSM is once again waiting for some new political moment to be implemented and to unlock an already long-standing deadlock in the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina," Surlic concludes.

Political scientist Albinot Maloku says that the main topic of the agreement between Kosovo and Serbia reached a year ago was the Community of Serb-majority Municipalities, which has not yet been implemented, and that this issue is hindering the implementation of the agreement. 

When the Agreement on the Path to Normalization was reached a year ago, he says, there was hope that it would have a concrete impact and that citizens would feel it. As something that has been fulfilled, he also mentions the acceptance of license plates from Kosovo in Serbia and vice versa.

Maloku points out that Serbian Prime Minister Ana Brnabic stated that part of the agreement would not be fulfilled, while on the other side, the Prime Minister of Kosovo sometimes forgets that the main leverage of the agreement was the CSM.

"In general, I hoped that the European Union, which facilitates this dialogue, would take this process seriously, but now I have the feeling that the EU lacks vision for the concretization of certain things, that is, for what was agreed in Brussels and Ohrid to be accepted so that eventually there would be signatures that would give additional weight to these documents," Maloku says for Kosovo Online.

The lack of vision of the EU, as he adds, gives room for the parties not to apply what was agreed in Brussels and Ohrid.

"This suits Aleksandar Vucic, and at the same time, it also benefits Prime Minister Kurti, who does not have a special willingness to implement the CSM. I think the EU should have a sharper vision, treat both sides equally, and be balanced to be accepted by both sides and to move forward with reviving the Franco-German plan," Maloku says.

Expectations for the agreement, according to Dragisa Mijacic, Coordinator of the National Convention for Chapter 35, were that the situation in Kosovo and in relations between Kosovo and Serbia would normalize, calming tensions and attempting to find solutions for accumulated political problems. Unfortunately, this did not happen.

He reminds that soon after, in April, the Serb List boycotted local elections and that the current mayors were elected with a "dubious number of votes."

"This introduced new political instability and new security problems that persist to this day. So, we cannot say that anything has been implemented from what was agreed on February 27, nor when anything will be applied in the foreseeable future," Mijacic notes.

When asked about the fate of the agreement considering that Serbia objected to certain parts concerning de facto and de jure recognition of Kosovo, as well as resistance in Pristina to the part concerning self-governance of the Serbian community, i.e., the formation of the CSM, Mijacic says that the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrell, stated that both sides had agreed and that there would be no need for further amendment of the text.

"Therefore, the European Commission has been instructed to amend negotiation Chapter 35 for Serbia, which is now in progress, and when completed, which will be very soon, regardless of whether Serbia agrees or not with certain parts, it will be an official condition for Serbia toward further EU membership. There has been a lot of noise in the communication and statements of Serbian officials about what they want or do not want to accept, but what was agreed upon in Brussels and Ohrid is understood by international partners as accepted, and they will insist on the implementation of all of that, including the Community of Serb-majority Municipalities, which has been Pristina's obligation since 2013. Pristina will not be able to escape from it, especially if it wants to further approach the EU or Euro-Atlantic integrations," Mijacic emphasizes.

The non-implementation of the agreement, according to political scientist Dimitrije Milic from the New Third Way, raises the question of the credibility of the European Union in terms of whether it can be a guarantor of certain agreements if they remain dead letters on paper, that is, if both sides have certain doubts about the agreement and are unwilling to implement it.

But, he points out that the EU has the ability to pressure the parties by incorporating the points from the agreement into the negotiating framework, thereby largely conditioning the European path of each side on those points.

"I believe that will eventually happen. However, it is currently of greater significance for the Kosovo side, which is in the earlier stages of European integration and has much greater ambitions to legitimize itself as an independent actor through European integration than Serbia. Progress in European integration is much more important to them than it is to Serbia at this stage," Milic says.

However, he also points out a perhaps crucial fact - that neither side has an interest in implementing the agreement except for certain points.

"For the most controversial points, neither side has an interest in implementing them, unless under significant Western pressure. Without Western pressure, I assume that further escalation is possible," Milic says.