Gogic: Some Self-Determination voters will vote for the LDK, while the hard core of nationalists will always stand by Kurti

Political scientist Ognjen Gogic assesses that in the upcoming elections in Kosovo, a number of Self-Determination voters will vote for the LDK for several reasons, but he also points out that Albin Kurti has a hard core of nationalists within his electorate who will remain with him despite everything.

“In larger cities in particular, such as Pristina and Prizren, he was also supported by more educated voters who primarily expected better relations with the West, the EU, and the United States. Those voters are potential LDK voters and are the target group that the LDK can win over now that Vjosa Osmani is with them,” Gogic told Kosovo Online.

Regarding messages from Self-Determination that they can win 60 percent of the vote and from the LDK that they aspire to come first, he says these are typical campaign messages, because all parties promise victory to their voters and motivate them to go to the polls in that way.

“No one will say, ‘we will do poorly’ or average, but those are overambitious and unrealistic messages. However, specifically both Self-Determination and the LDK have many reasons to send such messages, because a redistribution of votes from one side to the other is expected. A number of votes, and therefore mandates, will move from Self-Determination to the LDK because they shared part of the electorate to a certain extent,” he points out.

In his opinion, it is very likely that support for Self-Determination will decline, especially compared to December, because that result was largely achieved thanks to the diaspora, which came to Kosovo in large numbers at the time, something that will not happen again in June.

“A certain number of their voters will probably vote for the LDK for several reasons. First, because they are disappointed with Kurti’s unprincipled stance, which prevented Kosovo from getting institutions in a timely manner, and these are people who expect stability and institutional order. On the other hand, there are voters who sympathized with Vjosa Osmani and voted for that list because of their support for her. There are not many of them, but one should expect some protest votes because Kurti did not support Osmani, and out of solidarity with her they may vote for the LDK,” our interlocutor states.

He adds that the LDK can be expected to improve its rating relatively, but that it is difficult to predict whether that will be enough to surpass the PDK and become the second strongest party.

“One can expect relative growth for both the Democratic League of Kosovo and the Democratic Party of Kosovo, but it is difficult at this moment to predict who will take second place. Kurti is expected to be the relative winner of the elections despite a drop in votes, but the battle for second place will be fought between the LDK and the PDK,” he states.

According to him, the PDK’s trump card is the trial being conducted in The Hague against Thaci and others, because the party mobilizes its supporters, among other things, on that platform.
Even if both the LDK and the PDK win a larger number of mandates this time, according to his assessment, that does not necessarily mean that forming a government will be easier, because, he recalls, last year the Albanian opposition parties PDK, LDK, and AAK together had more mandates in the Assembly than Albin Kurti.

“Those parties could mathematically, with the support of the Serb List or deputies from other communities, have formed a government, but at no point did they consider the possibility of cooperation and forming a government. It is a big question whether this time will be any different. Even if all three groupings improve their result and are mathematically stronger than Kurti, they probably will not be able to form a government independently without the support of minority communities, but that support can be obtained. Minorities, somehow, everywhere tend to follow the dominant trend within the majority population. In theory, mathematically, they will be able to form a government, but the question is whether the political will exists,” he points out.

As he adds, the question is whether this time they will discuss forming a government because everyone is aware that the election of the president of Kosovo will come onto the agenda and that Kurti will probably be able to block that process, bring down their government, and push Kosovo into new elections.

“Calculations regarding the government will depend on how those parties collectively stand when it comes to electing the president of Kosovo. Whether, with the support of minority parties and without Kurti, they will be able to elect the president of Kosovo. If they cannot do that, if the president of Kosovo cannot be elected without Kurti’s mandates, it is very likely that those parties will not even attempt to reach an agreement on a government, or they may perhaps form a government temporarily in order to go into future elections from that position,” Gogic concludes.