Extension of EULEX’s mandate: Why is this mission a thorn in Pristina’s side?

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Source: eulex-kosovo.eu

"Kosovo no longer needs EULEX"—this is the phrase commonly heard from Pristina whenever the mandate of this mission is due for extension. That sentiment has echoed once again as EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Kaja Kallas, announced the extension of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) until June 2027. According to analysts speaking to Kosovo Online, the objections stem from the fact that EULEX still holds certain executive powers and underscores that Kosovo does not enjoy absolute sovereignty.

Written by: Dusica Radeka Djordjevic

The EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, launched in 2008, last had its mandate extended on June 5, 2023, set to expire on June 14 this year. The EU Council is responsible for deciding whether to extend it again.

During her recent visit to Kosovo, Kaja Kallas also visited EULEX and stated that the mission contributes to strengthening security.

“You help strengthen security, the rule of law, and reconciliation among local communities. Whether it’s monitoring sensitive cases daily, advising rule-of-law institutions on better serving their communities, or your forensic work in clarifying the fate of the missing and bringing perpetrators to justice,” Kallas said.

It didn’t take long for Burim Ramadani, former chief inspector of Kosovo’s Intelligence Agency, to respond, saying: the more EULEX, the less sovereignty.

“We don’t need EULEX. Extending its mandate until 2027 diminishes Kosovo’s sovereignty. Kosovo has sufficient police capacities to maintain public order. EULEX is unnecessary,” Ramadani wrote on Facebook.

As early as 2020, during Hashim Thaçi’s presidency, it was said that all of EULEX’s powers should be transferred to local institutions. Still, Thaçi agreed to a “technical extension of the mission’s mandate.” In 2018, then-Justice Minister Abelard Tahiri claimed Kosovo’s judiciary was capable of functioning independently, while back in 2013, the Kosovo Assembly adopted a resolution asking for EULEX’s mandate not to be extended due to dissatisfaction with its role in investigating and prosecuting war crimes.

At its peak, EULEX had 2,000 staff members. Today, it has fewer than 400. The mission was launched to support the development of an effective, apolitical judiciary, but opinions on its success remain divided.
Currently, EULEX’s mandate includes monitoring selected criminal and civil justice cases—particularly related to property and privatization—advising the Kosovo Police Regional Directorate for the North and four police stations under its supervision, and serving as the second-tier responder in Kosovo’s security architecture (with the Kosovo Police as the first, and KFOR as the third).

Dusko Celic, an assistant professor at the Faculty of Law in North Mitrovica, told Kosovo Online that EULEX’s presence remains important. The mission’s unpopularity among Kosovo politicians, he says, likely stems from the fact that it retains certain executive powers, albeit significantly reduced.
He points out that both EULEX and UNMIK are “a thorn in the side” of Kosovo’s Albanian leadership, primarily because both missions originated from UN Security Council Resolution 1244. He notes that UNMIK’s role was essentially reduced to that of an observer in 2011, while EULEX inherited part of its executive powers—powers it still holds today.

“EULEX acts as the so-called second security layer. If it’s assessed that the Kosovo Police lacks the capability or logistics to resolve a security issue, then EULEX steps in. That’s one aspect of its executive authority. The second, and perhaps most important right now, is that EULEX executes the orders of the Specialist Chambers in The Hague regarding war crimes committed in 1998–1999. EULEX serves as the logistical police arm of the Specialist Chambers, not the so-called Kosovo Police,” Celic says.

The third function, he adds, is EULEX’s supervisory role over more complex criminal cases, including war crimes tried in local courts.

“Truth be told, EULEX has not shined in this area. We’ve seen random arrests, numerous indictments, and trials of Serbs for alleged war crimes based on the testimonies of witnesses who suddenly recall events after more than 25 years,” he says.
From the Serbian community’s perspective, he notes, EULEX’s significance lies in the fact that it is the only international mission with even limited executive powers.

“From the standpoint of Serbian political interests, these powers are minimal, and the Serbs would prefer those powers to be far broader—beyond merely supervising selected cases deemed interesting for the rule of law. Another important aspect is legal: EULEX emerged from Resolution 1244, and its continued presence serves as a reminder that Kosovo and Metohija is not the independent state Albanians in Pristina claim it to be,” Celic concludes.

Milos Pavkovic, a fellow at the Center for European Policy in Belgrade, told Kosovo Online that as long as EULEX exists, it signifies that Kosovo’s institutions are not yet strong enough, that full sovereignty is lacking, and that an external body continues to monitor their work—a major irritant for the government in Pristina and many officials.

Kosovo politicians, he says, would like to see EULEX go because it would mean less oversight, greater sovereignty, and freer rein—especially concerning the Serbian community.

“EULEX is absolutely essential because it performs several critical functions. First is security: the mission has 105 police officers who act as a secondary police force supporting the Kosovo Police, which is formally responsible for security and public order. The second is monitoring police work, which has proven necessary given recent incidents and the frequent unprofessionalism of the Kosovo Police,” Pavkovic emphasizes.

The third function, he adds, is supporting the judicial system, such as training judges and prosecutors and enabling translation services in the north. The fourth, he notes, is its role in international cooperation—with Interpol, Europol, and Serbia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs through document and information exchange.

“In light of all this, and considering the crisis in dialogue and the lack of communication between Pristina and Belgrade, EULEX is a necessary bridge, and I expect its mandate will be extended without any issues,” Pavkovic says.

He notes that the EU Council—not Kosovo’s politicians—decides on the mandate extension or termination.

Valdet Hoxha, former Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Kosovo, told Kosovo Online that EULEX has played a key role since 2008 in supporting Kosovo’s institutions in building an independent, professional, and efficient judiciary.

In his opinion, Kosovo’s institutions and justice and security mechanisms are already well-established, functioning at full capacity, and face no operational barriers in carrying out their constitutional and legal duties.

Regarding Kaja Kallas’s announcement about extending EULEX’s mandate until June 2027, Hoxha says, “Her proposal should be interpreted in the spirit of international support and cooperation aimed at ensuring a peaceful and safe environment for all.”

“Every international investment or form of support that positively affects security should be considered, but naturally without infringing on the constitutional powers of the institutions of the Republic of Kosovo,” Hoxha concludes.

As for EULEX’s current mandate, he notes that besides being the second line of security response after the Kosovo Police—particularly in the north—it also plays an advisory and partnership role in relation to justice institutions, especially regarding the implementation of the Kosovo–Serbia judicial agreements, and acts in a support capacity without executive authority.