Return of support for PDK - what was the deciding factor?

The resurgence of support for the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) in the recent elections can be attributed to multiple factors, but the primary determinant appears to be economic promises. According to political analyst Artan Muhaxhiri, the crucial factor for the increased electoral support for PDK was their candidate for prime minister, Bedri Hamza, promising a 50 percent increase in salaries.

In the context of the ongoing economic crisis, the promise of improved financial well-being and higher wages played a significant role in influencing voters' decisions. Many, who had previously supported the Self-Determination Movement (Self-Determination), turned their backs on the movement, as stated by Hamza, who also emphasized that the current prime minister presented the elections as a referendum on himself but failed to achieve his goal of obtaining 500,000 votes.

Furthermore, Hamza highlighted the differences between PDK and Self-Determination, criticizing the latter's desire for absolute power and lack of a concrete program. This contrast in policy and leadership may have also contributed to PDK's appeal. Hamza, an economist and the former mayor of South Mitrovica, is seen as a responsible individual and "the most suitable person for Kosovo today," according to PDK president Memli Krasniqi.

This combination of economic promises, leadership qualities, and a clear differentiation from Self-Determination likely influenced the electorate's decision, leading to a significant increase in votes for PDK compared to previous elections.

Artan Muhaxhiri highlighted that the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) had previously increased salaries on two occasions, which helped build a level of trust among the populace that they could do it again. This, he believes, was likely the most critical factor contributing to the increase in votes for PDK, as he explained to Kosovo Online.

At the same time, Muhaxhiri thinks the opposition could have better capitalized on the fact that Albin Kurti had not completed any major economic projects and has had poor relations with the USA and EU.

Dusan Prorokovic, a senior research associate at the Institute for International Politics and Economy in Belgrade, also sees potential fuel for PDK's push in the dissatisfaction among citizens with the current Self-Determination government's approach to economic, social policy, or their social status issues.

Prorokovic suggests that there was significant economic and social dissatisfaction, implying that Kurti's government did not adequately address some crises that emerged in the system, as reported by Kosovo Online.

He adds that broader sociological research, expected in the coming months, will likely reveal why there was a redistribution of votes among the Albanian political parties. This redistribution reflects a shifting landscape in Kosovo politics, where economic and social grievances play a significant role in voter behavior.

Dusan Prorokovic points out that not only did Hashim Thaçi's party, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), make a significant positive change, but Albin Kurti experienced a considerable decrease in voter turnout and votes. The lower voter turnout could be attributed to unrealistically inflated voter lists, as the actual population in Kosovo and Metohija is smaller than reported in statistical data. This situation suggests a level of dissatisfaction that led voters to seek alternatives. According to Prorokovic, the crisis felt in Kosovo and Metohija over the past years is evident and not solely tied to this election. He emphasizes that in Serbian media, the focus is often on Serbian-Albanian relations, which is not the sole factor determining Albanian voters' preferences for specific parties.

Prorokovic notes that it is also crucial to consider from whom Kurti captured the most voters in the 2021 elections. He believes that Kurti mainly drew voters from Thaçi's base rather than from the traditional voter body of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), which has been loyal but shrinking from one election cycle to another since the time of Ibrahim Rugova.

Marko Milenkovic, from the NGO "New Social Initiative" interprets the rise in support for the PDK as a shift of certain voter groups from Self-Determination to PDK, particularly those aligned with European values and integration and those who consider the broader picture of international relations. He highlights that Kurti's relations with the international community were a major point of criticism, positioning PDK as a potential top partner for the new U.S. administration. Meetings between PDK leaders and the new U.S. administration likely contributed to swaying the electorate towards them, leading to their growth in voter base.

Milenkovic notes that PDK, as the opposition party with the most voters, will likely have the opportunity to form and lead a new government with other opposition parties, including the Serb List, although this remains to be seen.

Artan Muhaxhiri also speaks to the theoretical possibility of PDK uniting with other opposition parties to form a government without Self-Determination. If all opposition parties, including the Serb List, come together, it could be a rational option given the significant challenges Kosovo faces internationally, especially in the dialogue concerning the Community of Serb Municipalities. Such a government could complete all unfinished tasks, meet the demands of the international community, and regenerate relations with the U.S. and EU. Muhaxhiri warns that Kosovo may face considerable difficulties if Kurti continues his current approach towards the U.S.