Twelve years since the Brussels Agreement and still no CSM: Is the EU truly powerless?

What the European Commission saw twelve years ago as a historic agreement paving the way for Serbia and Kosovo’s progress in European integration is today a document viewed in completely different ways by Belgrade and Pristina. From Belgrade’s perspective, the formation of the Community of Serb-majority Municipalities (CSM), which the Brussels Agreement defined as Pristina’s obligation, is a prerequisite for beginning genuine normalization. For the current government in Pristina, however, the CSM is not a central topic in bilateral relations. The EU maintains the official stance that the CSM “should be established without delay,” but each new delay seemingly causes little concern in Brussels.

Written by: Dusica Radeka Djordjevic

Explaining how the agreement of April 19, 2013 came to be, former EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton said last year that she asked both parties how the Serbs in northern Kosovo would establish relations with Pristina and have a voice once Belgrade withdrew its presence from the north. The response was the idea of the Community of Serb-majority Municipalities.

This idea was translated into the First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations between Belgrade and Pristina, signed by then Prime Ministers Ivica Dacic and Hashim Thaçi.

In June 2013, the establishment of the CSM became an international obligation for Kosovo, as its parliament ratified the Brussels Agreement. Yet the reminders from Brussels over the years that the formation of the CSM is a legal obligation for Pristina lacked force, while in Kosovo's public discourse the CSM has consistently been portrayed negatively.

Slobodan Zecevic, Director of the Institute for European Studies in Belgrade, told Kosovo Online that the authorities in Pristina had no interest in implementing the Brussels Agreement because their goal was for Serbs to gradually leave Kosovo. According to him, Kosovar Albanians would have been compelled to establish the CSM had the EU exerted more pressure.

Zecevic emphasizes that the main reason the CSM was never created is not only that it was presented in Pristina as a kind of "Republic of Srpska."

"The issue is that the CSM is a foundation for Serbs to remain in Kosovo, especially in the north where they are compactly settled. That was not in their interest. Their goal was for Serbs to gradually leave Kosovo and move toward Serbia. Kosovo Albanians had no interest and no desire to implement the agreement," he states.

He adds that had the European Union been more assertive and exerted more pressure on the Albanians, they would have had to consider implementing the Brussels Agreement and forming the CSM.

"Since they saw the EU would not impose strong sanctions, they used the situation to achieve their goal. I believe their long-term political aim is akin to what Franjo Tudjman once said—having less than 3% Serbs in Croatia; in this case, less than 2–3% Serbs in Kosovo, thus solving the 'problem.' Both the Albanians and the EU are to blame for the failure to implement this agreement. Serbia bears the least responsibility, as it accepted a very difficult and unfavorable compromise by relinquishing the north of Kosovo to a future CSM that was never formed," he concludes.

According to Marko Milenkovic from the NGO New Social Initiative, the Brussels Agreement did create momentum on the ground. He recalls that the Serbian community, though reluctantly, accepted integration into the Kosovo system over the years, but the CSM has been missing the entire time.

The CSM, he adds, was meant to ensure additional mechanisms for the Serbian community in terms of self-governance and organizing healthcare, education, and other institutions functioning within Serbia’s system. Since these mechanisms were never implemented, the integration process was never completed.

Due to the obstructive behavior of Pristina, particularly under the previous government of Albin Kurti and the numerous unilateral steps taken in recent years, as well as the failure to establish the CSM, Milenkovic believes both the dialogue and the integration process achieved after the Brussels Agreement have been eroded.

Afrim Hoti, professor of international relations at the University of Pristina, says that while Belgrade and Pristina signed agreements in 2013 and again in 2015 (confirmed by the Ohrid Agreement), the reality revealed a lack of willingness by both sides to implement the provisions.

"Kosovo’s institutions have not formed the CSM, while the Serbian side organized campaigns against Kosovo’s recognition and engaged in other activities. Each side’s actions seem to have been used as justification by the other not to implement the agreement. That, in my opinion, is the main reason why we’re where we are today," Hoti told Kosovo Online.

He believes the EU has learned a lesson from this situation and expects the new institutions in Brussels to now take serious steps toward implementing the agreement.

Speaking on public attitudes in Kosovo toward the CSM, Hoti says, "Kosovar society agrees with the implementation and creation of such an entity."

"Kosovo’s leaders, including the current prime minister, gave their consent to an agreement that includes the CSM. Accordingly, Kosovar society also agrees with the creation of such an entity, since all sides, including Self-Determination’s leader, gave their consent," he explains.

However, political analyst Visar Imeri recently stated that Self-Determination has portrayed the CSM as a “monster” through its opposition. He believes Kosovo should not fear the CSM, as it would not be destructive, but acknowledges that it will take time to shift the public perception of the CSM as a threat.

Zecevic argues that such a shift won't be possible as long as Albin Kurti remains in power, as his political agenda seeks to reduce the number of Serbs in Kosovo.

"The CSM was deliberately made out to be a monster in the Albanian public to unify the Albanian nation against the Association—and by extension, against the survival of Serbs in Kosovo and against a multiethnic Kosovo. That perception might change if Kurti is no longer in power and a different government emerges that tells the Albanian people it's not such a terrible thing after all. Still, even a new government would need pressure from the EU to justify forming the CSM in front of the public, arguing that it's something the EU demands and they must comply," Zecevic concludes.

According to Milenkovic, any change will require a new approach, primarily from the international community, with a more concrete influence on political actors—especially those from Pristina—in order to bring about a shift in the deeply entrenched and toxic narratives.

“The agreements reached through dialogue—above all the Community of Serb-majority Municipalities (CSM)—have been tainted by Pristina, and I believe that process is irreversible. For any other political option in Pristina, it will be difficult to form the CSM, not because it is a mechanism that would strip the Albanian part of society of any rights, but because the very term ‘Association’ has been poisoned and misused, carrying many negative connotations within Kosovo society. A similar thing has happened with the entire Serbian community. The whole narrative around Kosovo Serbs has in a way been contaminated, triggering many negative reactions within Kosovo society. A fundamentally different approach is truly needed here,” Milenkovic points out.

Notably, in addition to the CSM—which was supposed to have a president, vice-president, assembly, council, and full oversight over areas such as economic development, education, healthcare, urban and rural development—the Brussels Agreement also foresaw the integration of the police in the north into the Kosovo Police, as well as the integration of Serbian judges and prosecutors into the Kosovo judicial system, which the Serbian side eventually fulfilled.

Furthermore, under the agreement, the regional police commander for the four northern municipalities with a Serb majority (North Mitrovica, Zvecan, Zubin Potok, and Leposavic) was supposed to be a Kosovo Serb.

A major shift occurred on the ground in November 2022, when Serbs employed in these institutions resigned en masse from Kosovo institutions in protest of Pristina’s policies toward their fellow Serbs.