FEUILLETON: 25 years of NATO bombing of Serbia (15): Dissatisfaction of General Short

By Dragan Bisenic for Kosovo Online

This strategy suffered its first blow in the Balkans when the first "stealth" aircraft was shot down in Cortanovci, undermining the entire pyramid of superior technology and "virtual war" that Vorden had built. America never again attempted to achieve political goals through air strikes. Neither Afghanistan nor Iraq were planned or conceived without ground troops. Both operations were led by Colin Powell, who never fully embraced the views of "Mad Joe." He carried this nickname alongside the nickname "Turnaround." If any officer refused to accept his idea, he would immediately turn around and go to the next superior to present the same idea, as long as someone was willing to listen.

General Lieutenant Colonel Alan G. Peck, and NATO Air Commander General Michael Short were among Vorden's "students." General Peck was a key planner for the air strikes on Serbia, serving at the Combined Air Operations Center in Vicenza as the head of combat planning, and Michael Short was the key executor of his ideas.

General Peck earned his degree after graduating from the US Air Force Academy in 1975. He served as commander of an F-15 aircraft, a pilot instructor, and a flight examiner for standardization and evaluation. He commanded an air operations group in Germany, an air expeditionary wing in Saudi Arabia, and the Air and Space Expeditionary Forces Center. He also served as the commander of the Air Forces component at the USCENTCOM's combined air operations center during the major combat operations of Operation Iraqi Freedom. During the subsequent tour as the deputy commander of the air component of Combined Forces, he supervised the planning, tasking, execution, and assessment of coalition air operations for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. He was a command pilot with over 2,700 hours in the F-15, including more than 300 combat hours.

He continued his mission at the Maxwell Air Force Base, which "provides a complete range of education, research, and work at all levels through professional military education, professional continuing education, and academic degree award." He leads the intellectual and leadership center of the Air Force, where more than 50,000 resident and 120,000 non-resident officers, regular and civilian staff, graduate annually. In addition, he is responsible for officer engagement through the Officer Training School and the Reserve Officer Training Corps.

On the official website of the Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, where General Peck was the commander after everything, it is stated that "strategic vision is key" and reminds of the old military saying that "brilliant tactics cannot overcome a wrong strategy." The Maxwell Air Force Base considers Kosovo in 1999 as a rare example of an exception to the rule. Despite the poorly conceived strategy imposed by NATO leaders, aviators managed to overcome it with their professionalism, creativity, and competence.

General Short also had his criticisms. After the war, Short emerged as a sharp critic of two key aspects of NATO's conduct of the war: political demands that influenced target selection and NATO's focus on attacking Serbian forces deployed in Kosovo. Dismissively calling the latter "tank stuffing," Short advocated instead the need to "go for the head of the snake" and attack the main strategic targets in Serbia itself.

"You go for the head of the snake, you stab the enemy's heart, and you use all the force under your command," explained Short. Asked if this happened during the bombing of Serbia, General Short denied it. However, he offered an interesting view of the events within NATO in which he was involved.

"Many of our leaders entered this conflict believing that Milosevic only needed, I quote, 'a few nights of bombing,' and then he would accept NATO's terms. Personally, I doubt that all of our leaders confronted the possibility of prolonged air operations... They thought that once Milosevic saw our decision, he would change his mind, and everything would be fine," Short said.

He described, "We revised the plan several times, planning only for US air forces. We checked between 250 and 300 valid, solid military targets. On three separate occasions between January 1 and the moment the first bomb fell, we returned that proposal to General Clark. For political reasons, the plan was not an acceptable alternative. So, from that point, we stood at hitting about 90 targets in the first three nights. I constantly received instructions: 'Mike, you'll only be allowed to bomb for two, maybe three nights. That's all Washington can handle, and that's all some alliance members can bear. So you only have 90 targets. This will be over in three nights.'

I generally believed that Milosevic conveyed to the NATO alliance: 'If I want to keep my job, I can't accept your terms unless you cause me some harm. So you should bomb for two or three nights. Then I'll go to my people and say that I want to maintain control of Kosovo as much as any of you, but as your leader, I can't bear the pain and agony that NATO's air efforts are causing you. So I'll accept NATO's terms.'

I didn't believe we would be dropping bombs until 24 hours before the first bomb fell. I personally saw Milosevic retreating from the edge in October. I felt like I had seen a master playing on the edge.

I quickly realized that Milosevic wasn't going to back down, not even after the first strikes on Belgrade. We hit some bridges over the Danube and some power plants, parts of Belgrade were in flames, and Milosevic didn't even talk to us. Then it seemed to me that he was in it for the long haul, that he had assessed that NATO wouldn't hold out, that we weren't determined."

Strategic targets included "supply routes, bridges, fuel refineries, command centers, [and] radio relays," while General Short argued that strategic targets should be the focus of air strikes. "I would turn off the lights," Short said. "I would knock down bridges over the Danube. I would hit five or six political-military headquarters in the center of Belgrade. Milosevic and his friends would wake up the next morning and wonder what the hell is going on."

Publicly, alongside Short, stood the leading journalist of The New York Times, Thomas Friedman, but in a more aggressive manner. The leading journalist of The New York Times then and now, Thomas Friedman published his column during the bombing of Serbia on April 23, 1999, which remained unmatched in its war-mongering journalism in terms of threatening tone, brutality of messages, and outdated ideas. Friedman, who gained global fame when Saudi King Abdulaziz personally pulled out and showed him his 9 mm Browning during the Gulf War, proposed that NATO change its tactics in Serbia.

"In this war, it's time to change our game," wrote Friedman, calling on NATO leaders to "immediately stop striking Serbian forces in Kosovo and start bombing strategic targets in Serbia." "In Belgrade, they should wake up every morning wondering where we will hit them next," wrote the journalist.

"They should not be sure whether they will have electricity, water, or transportation to work...We must make every day seem like the last day in their miserable lives, terrorizing them from dawn until dusk, and sometimes even after dusk."