FEUILLETON 25 years of NATO bombing of Serbia (12): Ambiguity of the Russian position

Written for Kosovo Online by Dragan Bisenic

In January 1999, the Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, General Dragoljub Ojdanic, and the Commander of the Air Force and Air Defense, General Spasoje Smiljanic, met with the Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian Army, Valentin Korabelnikov.

Information emerged in the media that the generals clashed over who was deceiving whom regarding the procurement of the S-300. In the end, the hope that the Russian generals would persuade Yeltsin to deliver the S-300 proved to be a delusion. However, NATO countries were not entirely convinced that Moscow hadn't delivered something to Belgrade.

Six days before the aggression, an interesting dialogue took place in the office of General Smiljanic. "Do you have the S-300?" was the last question Colonel John Pemberton, the US military aviation attaché, asked then-Commander of the Air Force and Air Defense Spasoje Smiljanic on March 18, 1999.

"You'll find out if you attack us," Smiljanic told Pemberton.

They got their answer in less than a week. However, that wasn't the end. On the third day after the start of the war, an air defense expert delegation led by Major General Mladen Karanovic went to Moscow. They outlined Yugoslavia's need for two more S-300 divisions. The Russians informed them that they had informed our delegation that most of the requested equipment was near Moscow and that there would be no problems with the delivery "if Yeltsin approves it." At that time, the Air Force and Air Defense Command even planned to accept the equipment and train personnel. However, there were no results this time either. A new visit took place on April 4, and the military delegation met with the First Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian government, Maslyukov, who told General Karanovic that Russia would not militarily assist the FRY and that there was nothing to gain from an alliance with Russia and Belarus.

On April 10, General Karanovic informed Milosevic about the unsuccessful visit in the presence of Zoran Lilic. Milosevic, upon Karanovic's statement that there would be no S-300 delivery, said that Lilic "has new data." In line with this, a group of officers was sent to Russia for training on S-300, "Tor," and "Buk" systems on April 30, 1999. The group returned to Yugoslavia in mid-June 1999. The war was already over.

Former Commander of the Yugoslav Air Force and Air Defense, General Spasoje Smiljanic, when asked if the state leadership of the 1990s was late in procuring the S-300, said: "The recommendations of the military were justified, but the state leadership was in a very complex situation when it came to the material condition in the country, when it came to the ability to buy such weapons, that's one negative aspect of the whole story, and the other aspect is the situation in Russia, which was even worse than ours. And political relations between the state leadership of Serbia or Yugoslavia and Russia at that time were not very fraternal, as we constantly say, especially since Yeltsin was at the helm of Russia, who was under complete influence, even control, of the American administration. Therefore, it cannot be said that timely warnings were given about the necessary modernization, primarily of the air defense system and the procurement of the S-300, nor can the state of the country in relation to Russia and the state of Russia, and especially Yeltsin's stance towards FR Yugoslavia, be denied," Smiljanic assessed.

To the question posed by General Smiljanic at the end of his book: "Why didn't the country's state and military leadership and the Government of the FRY react in 1997 and take measures to procure and modernize the air defense system?" retired general adds:

"It was such a situation where it took a lot of will and understanding on both sides to realize that. We didn't have the money to buy one S-300 division, which costs around 150-160 million dollars. Therefore, there was also... It was necessary to allocate over a billion dollars for a better defense than what was expected." When asked if it was realistic to acquire the system and how things would have been different if it had been acquired in 1999, Smiljanic adds: "If we had the S-300 before the aggression, it wouldn't have happened. This confirms the fear and uncertainty of the American side about that system. In a short time, British military envoy Peberton sought talks with me three times in the hope of extracting the truth or data from us about whether we have the S-300."

The procurement of these missiles, however promising it seemed for Serbia, was not at all straightforward, as General Smiljanic says, nor was it straightforward for Russia itself.

Mlecin conveys the opinion of the Russian military leadership: "Only a few missile launchers will not change the situation. NATO air strikes are led by long-range E-3A aircraft for radar detection and control. They lead bombers to their targets, warn of enemy presence, direct fighter combat, and show their planes how to avoid enemy air defense zones. Therefore, NATO can attack Russian missile launch positions with its full strength and destroy them. For example, cruise missiles that can be launched from land, surface ships, or submarines.

The cruise missile flies below radar range, above the treetops. It plots its route by comparing maps stored in the computer's memory with the terrain and is capable of making sharp turns to avoid encounters with air defense installations.

Therefore, in addition to the S-300, it would be necessary to send Tor-M1 air defense missile systems to Yugoslavia, which are intended for destroying cruise missiles. But NATO could attack anti-aircraft guns with combat helicopters. Therefore, it would be necessary to deploy Buk-M1 air defense missile systems. They are very effective when targeting low-flying targets.

All this weaponry needs to be integrated into a unified air defense system and interact with fighter aircraft. However, the Yugoslavs have old aircraft; they need to transport new multi-role fighters Su-35 and Su-37 from Russia. They can withstand the most advanced American aircraft.

But, it's unlikely that the Serbs immediately mastered such a system, meaning we would have to send our combat crews, specialists, military advisors, staff officers, and protect them. So we will have to send some ground troops and reinforce them with tanks. And immediately think about how to organize a continuous airlift for the delivery of ammunition, spare parts, and fuel.

Yugoslavia would turn into a real battlefield. After a few days of tank battles, the country would look like war-torn Bosnia. To help the Serbs repel the attack, a large number of tanks had to be urgently transferred to Yugoslavia.

And most importantly, it would be a direct conflict between Russia and NATO. Why spill the blood of Russian young men? How would this help the Serbs, they asked in Moscow. Russian commanders understood that isolated supplies of S-300 systems would not contribute at all to improving the performance of the Yugoslav army. To truly make it effective, it is necessary to establish a system and practically create a new Yugoslav air defense system. All this would put Russia in the position of a warring party, which Russia absolutely did not want," Mlecin described.

"Discussions about possible weapons deliveries raised false hopes among the Yugoslav leadership that Russia would indeed provide military assistance or even engage in a face-to-face battle with NATO. This reinforced the hesitation of the Yugoslav leadership to seek a political solution," Mlecin stated.

At the same time, he noticed that "reasonable voices were rare," but that "the new Secretary of the Security Council, Vladimir Putin, attracted attention. He said that there was no need to get involved in Yugoslavia, we have enough problems of our own. We must think about protecting our own interests, but we are being pushed towards confrontation, towards an exchange of blows..."

In his thoughts and assessments, Mlecin is on the side of those who wanted to extract Russia from involvement in the Balkan conflict. He says that individuals in this war only wanted political capital for themselves and were not sorry for Serbian or Russian boys whom they were willing to send to die. With what ease those people, who personally were not in danger, were ready to drag our country into war! They provoked the youth and called on them to volunteer for Serbia.

"The youth didn't remember that Afghanistan started slowly. Initially, they only sent weapons. Then they had to send advisors to teach the Afghans how to use weapons. And then for ten years they couldn't escape from there; 15,000 young men perished for no reason," Mlecin reminded.

Russian politicians who express unconditional solidarity with the Serbs should not forget that Russia is also an Islamic country. The President of Tatarstan, Mintimer Shaimiev, reminded of this. And the sympathies of Russian Muslims were not at all on the side of the Serbs. The whole Muslim world, perhaps for the first time, did not rush to condemn the NATO bombing because it supports the Kosovo Albanians. On the contrary, Israel and American Jews opposed the bombing because they highly value the role Serbs played in the fight against fascism during World War II.

Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic could have stopped the bombing at any time. It was enough for him to stop the military-police action in Kosovo. And Russian diplomacy would have helped the Serbs the most if it had continued to seek a compromise together with the West. But the Russian government fell into a trap. Moscow did not want to push Milosevic towards compromise for internal political reasons. Nor could it influence the West, as it was perceived as Milosevic's ally.

Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak and military representative to NATO General Viktor Zavarzin were recalled from Brussels for consultations – this is a very sharp step in diplomatic practice. Deputy Minister of Defense, Lieutenant General Leonid Ivashov, said:

If NATO takes any action in Kosovo, Russia will consider it aggression against Yugoslavia.

The words sounded so threatening that the press secretary of the Russian president, Dmitry Yakushkin, was ordered to rectify the situation and publicly advised "not to pay attention to the statements of some military personnel about the possibility of any assistance to Belgrade."

General Ivashov was responsible for international military cooperation at the ministry. "My colleagues and I," wrote Deputy US Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, "considered this appointment a joke. As far as we knew, Ivashov was fully dedicated to opposing any progress in this direction."

And in the State Duma, there was serious discussion about how and what kind of military equipment should be sent to Yugoslavia. "If NATO implements its military plans," Gennady Zyuganov proposed, "it is necessary to completely break off relations with NATO, organize military supplies to Yugoslavia, and address the issue of volunteers."

The Russian army showed solidarity with Yugoslavia. Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service Vyacheslav Trubnikov participated in negotiations with Milosevic – which is unprecedented. At the reception at the Embassy of Yugoslavia on the occasion of the Army Day, not only the Chief of the General Staff, Anatoly Kvashnin, and the Commander of the Airborne Forces Georgy Shpak came, but also the Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate, Lieutenant General Valentin Korabelnikov.

During the events preceding NATO's aggression on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, discussions and activities between Russian and Yugoslav military officials had a significant impact on the political situation. In these discussions, Russian military intelligence provided Yugoslavia with information about NATO's military activities in the region, including information about the Kosovo Liberation Army. This may have been partly an expression of psychological support, but it could also have had practical significance in defense planning.

Mlecin's analysis points to profound changes in the political stance of Slobodan Milosevic during those events. He emphasizes that Milosevic initially rejected the peace plan, forcing Bosnian Serbs to accept the Dayton peace plan - on worse terms than they could have had. The same happened with Kosovo. Milosevic rejected the peace plan and plunged the country into a devastating war. And then he agreed to what was asked of him,” Mlecin stated.

Mlecin concluded that at that moment Kosovo was "lost for the Serbs." "During years of Milosevic's rule, the territory where Serbs could feel free and confident constantly diminished. Before Milosevic, they were the most prosperous people in the Balkans, but at the end of his rule, they found themselves with nothing - with a sense of wounded national pride and bitterness over constant defeats and failures. The Serbs were left alone, almost completely isolated. Now, not when Milosevic spoke at rallies, it became clear that Kosovo was lost for the Serbs. Many Albanians perished in military-police operations, 850,000 fled Kosovo – and they fled, of course, not from NATO bombing, but from the Serbian army, from the police, and simply from some gangs – and no longer want to live under Serbian control. And Kosovo Serbs became refugees because they fear retaliation. All previous versions of the agreement only envisaged autonomy for Kosovo Albanians. But how can Europeans now prevent Albanians from demanding complete independence," Mlecin wondered.

When international forces entered Kosovo, they did not encounter Serbian guerrillas, who, as feared, would try to retaliate against NATO, but Albanian militants. The Kosovo Liberation Army was disbanded, but Albanian fighters united in the Kosovo Defense Corps.

"Kosovo militants continued to secretly kill Serbs, mostly to intimidate them and prevent coexistence. International forces were unable to protect them. Now, 200,000 Kosovo Serbs have become refugees. It's terrible to return. And a normal life in Kosovo was never restored, there are no jobs, nothing to live on.

Kosovo Albanians were happy. The more Serbs leave Kosovo, the better. Serbia lost influence over the situation in Kosovo. It could only count on international community assistance. At that time, the international community ensured that Kosovo remained part of Serbia. The overall goal was to create conditions for economic development. It hoped that over time Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians would overcome old enmity," Mlecin concluded.