FEUILLETON: 25 Years since the NATO Bombing of Serbia (Part 14): Over 40 Bombing Plans

Written for Kosovo Online by Dragan Bisenic

Today, we are in a position to know who the military figures were, alongside General Wesley Clark, who played decisive roles in the conceptualization, planning, and execution of the NATO attack on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999. Clark's air component commander was General (USAF) John P. Jumper, serving as the commander of the United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE). The operational commander of NATO was Admiral (USN) James O. Ellis, who served as the commander of Allied Forces Southern Europe, the supreme commander of U.S. naval forces in Europe, and the commander of Joint Task Force "Noble Anvil." His headquarters were located in Naples, Italy. Ellis was subordinate to Lieutenant General (USAF) Michael C. Short, commander of Allied Air Forces Southern Europe and commander of the 16th Air Expeditionary Wing, based in Aviano, Italy. U.S. air assets were engaged in the Allied Force operation in three ways: General Jumper had operational control over B-1, B-2, B-52, F-117, E-3C, KC-135, and reconnaissance aircraft while providing tactical control to General Short. General Short had operational control over other aircraft, organized within the 31st Air Expeditionary Wing, the 16th Air Expeditionary Wing, and the 100th Air Expeditionary Wing, all based in Aviano, Italy, and Mildenhall, United Kingdom, respectively. Additionally, the Joint Special Operations Task Force controlled U.S. and NATO aircraft dedicated to combat search and rescue.

NATO countries provided operational or tactical control over their forces to Admiral Ellis as the operational commander of NATO. The following NATO allies contributed their forces: Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Admiral Ellis managed air missions for conventional aircraft through the air tasking order prepared by NATO at the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Vicenza, Italy. Furthermore, the 16th Wing of the Air Force prepared the air tasking order specifically for U.S. stealth aircraft.

Every military operation begins with a plan, and Operation "Allied Force" began its life as NATO OPLAN 10601. Official history states that the preparation for 10601 began in response to a NATO directive in June 1998. In reality, General Wesley Clark, who served as both the SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) and the Commander in Chief (CINC) of the United States European Command, ordered General John Jumper, who commanded U.S. Air Forces in Europe, to begin developing options for an air war a month earlier, in May. In other words, American planning for what would become Operation "Allied Force" began before and continued separately from planning efforts within NATO. This tendency toward "U.S. only" planning expressed a greater propensity of Washington to use force, affirmation of American prerogatives as the dominant partner in the North Atlantic community, and the complicated relationship of Clark, as the theatrical head of the U.S. European Command, with his subordinates in the air war.

As part of American efforts to portray the U.S. role as "support [rather than] lead" in NATO's effort, attempts were made to portray the separate track as existing only to the limited extent dictated by operational security. But even as the conflict began, separate NATO and "U.S. only" tracks continued, with alliance members denying details of American missile strikes and operations of B-2 and F-117 stealth aircraft.

Between the summer of 1998 and March 1999, NATO and American planners explored a range of alternatives, from limited air responses to a robust "U.S. only" option called "Nimble Lion," and even to "forced entry" ground operations. Planners found themselves responding to continually shifting "commander's intent" from General Clark, who gave guidance on which targets would, and would not, be struck in Yugoslavia.

Initially, Clark asked for a plan that focused on five key radio relay sites, then for an unlimited operation, then for strikes limited to 44 degrees of north geographic latitude, then for an operation using only cruise missiles, and then for one to be carried out solely by American and British forces. Throughout, however, certain key requirements remained fixed: minimize collateral damage, avoid any friendly losses, and preserve Yugoslav civilian infrastructure.

According to General Clark, shifts in military priorities expressed a lack of political consensus. "There simply wasn't a consensus on the part of the member states to execute a whole range of military options," General Clark later testified.

In some ways, therefore, from the outset, the perspective of escalation was implicit in every "plan." Alliance members determined to use force were prepared to sacrifice military realism to secure political unity, believing that once military action began, NATO would have no choice but to expand operations according to circumstances. If just a show of force failed, the parties involved were persuaded to agree to do more.

Until the moment the bombing began, NATO went through more than 40 versions of the air operation plan. The version that actually started on March 24 included three combat phases. Phase 1 would establish air superiority over Kosovo and degrade command and control throughout Yugoslavia. Phase 2 would attack military targets in Kosovo and Yugoslav forces providing reinforcements to Kosovo south of the 44th parallel. Phase 3 would expand air operations against a wide range of military and security targets throughout Yugoslavia, including the capital city of Belgrade. If Phase 1 fails to compel the Serbian leadership to comply, Phases 2 and 3 would be more forceful.

Within each phase, there were significant disagreements both within the U.S. military and NATO regarding strategy and priorities. Those involved in planning Nimble Lion struggled with numerous constraints: targets within Montenegro were limited, and critical command and control nodes—especially telephone exchanges—remained off-limits due to concerns about collateral damage, as did power stations and television transmitters. One effect of these restrictions was to prevent concentrated efforts in the first 48 hours to neutralize Yugoslav air defenses. The alleged priority at the outset of hostilities would be to establish air supremacy, but the restrictions actually worked against that goal.

Looking beyond the 48-hour "demonstration" bombing, General Clark and his air warfare commander, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Michael Short, essentially disagreed on the proper design of the extended operation. Should it concentrate on "strategic" targets in Yugoslavia or "tactical" targets across Kosovo? Short believed that "body bags returning home from Kosovo did not bother Milosevic, nor did they bother the leadership elite."

The air operation plan itself was elaborated in two variants: 1) a plan for strikes on the territory of Kosovo (limited-scale air operation – LAO), which envisioned missile strikes with the possibility of using combat aviation; and 2) a plan for strikes on the wider territory of Serbia (wide-scale air operation, radical variant – RAO), which encompassed missile strikes and aviation engagement. The plan also identified targets for missile and air strikes in Serbia, classified into three zones: Zone 1. Kosovo and part south of the 44th parallel (line: Zajecar – Ljubovija); Zone 2. part of Serbia south of the 44th parallel, excluding Kosovo; Zone 3. part of Serbia north of the 44th parallel.

According to Koen-Shelton's statement, "On Kosovo" before the U.S. Senate, it was planned to carry out NATO air force operations in five phases: "The deployment of air forces across Europe represented phase 0. Phase 1 referred to establishing air superiority and gradually weakening command throughout the FRY. Phase 2 involved attacks throughout the FRY and against forces located south of the 44th parallel, which provided reinforcements to Serbian forces in Kosovo. Phase 3 expanded the operation from the air to a very large number of military objects and forces throughout the FRY. Phase 4 envisioned the redeployment of forces if necessary. Cruise missiles were planned to be the primary strike weapon throughout the first phase." In the third phase, action was planned against support objects for the "repression forces" located in and around Belgrade. These were politically sensitive targets according to NATO: main headquarters, communication and television stations, presidential residences and shelters, electronic systems, and others.

Clark, applying what the naval commander of NATO called the "perspective of the ground commander," Vice Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, had other ideas. He wanted Yugoslav forces to bear the brunt of NATO's attacks. His focus wasn't just on the ground-level perpetrators of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, but also on special police and paramilitary forces across Yugoslavia.

Among military officers, the understanding that wars are ultimately decided on the ground is part of the belief in military power. But if Clark was influenced by bias in service, other things also weighed on his mind. He, not General Short, was directly responsible for translating political guidance into operational plans. He, not his air warfare commander, appreciated how fragile and changeable the consensus within the alliance in support of any military action was. "If commanders became too insistent on demanding a more aggressive approach to the use of force, they would undermine that consensus and – without firing a shot – hand Slobodan Milosevic a victory," observed William Arkin.

Thus, from his perspective in Belgium, Clark concluded that his political masters would never agree to open-ended warfare with a blanket air attack on Belgrade in the style of Desert Storm. Advocating only the most modest bombing operation allowed Clark to persuade those alliance members in the hope that Milosevic might quickly change his mind. It seemed to also signal that NATO military chiefs didn't even see the need to consider the possibility of a ground invasion, an option that several alliance members were not willing to accept even as a theoretical possibility.

Arkin argues that "NATO began the war without any consensus on what the alliance would do if hostilities lasted more than 48 hours." "Although the fact that it was a 'phased' operation that allowed for escalation, the alliance deferred any decision on what that escalation would entail. Clark and his civilian masters would play it by ear: if Milosevic did not quickly give in during Phase 1, there would be an opportunity for escalation and adaptation to alternative approaches," Arkin explained.

Assessing the Navy's contribution to the operation in Kosovo, although it was "low profile," it was still "very significant," said Admiral Daniel Murphy, primarily due to the action of Tomahawk missiles, as Admiral Murphy controlled and was responsible for launching these missiles. "Tomahawk missiles alone destroyed almost 50 percent of the fixed target list in key categories such as Serbian military and police headquarters. ... We were able to maintain 9 Tomahawk operators in the capsule. Those 9 maintained the air operation in the first few weeks when laser-guided bomb droppers couldn't find targets due to bad weather. And if it weren't for those 9 operators, we would have had to stand down," explained Admiral Murphy.

Admiral Murphy noted that the aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt arrived 14 days after the start of hostilities. Nonetheless, with only 8 percent of the total aircraft allocated by NATO, it was attributed with 30 percent of confirmed hits against forces deployed in Kosovo. Therefore, he believed that the participation of aircraft carriers from the first day would have made a significant difference.

Since there was a conflict between two conflicting demands, especially in the first month of the war, the presence of aircraft carriers would have helped reduce or overcome that rift, according to Admiral Murphy.

"The ATO (authority to operate) process, with a large number of aircraft, is a procedural, sequential, rigid process. It cannot react within 24 hours and is simply a resource management tool. We had nearly 900 aircraft, including tankers and support aircraft, ... and you have to make sure that all these aircraft don't bump into each other. All of this leads to a significant reduction in capability.

Aviation doctrine is very clear about what happens after the start of an air operation, and ATO is really intended to serve a pre-planned campaign. It does that very well. However, when the enemy does not behave as the air campaign predicted, the wheel can fall off," explained Admiral Murphy.

A special role in this was the fact that NATO failed to destroy the Yugoslav air defense system, which is the first goal of every air operation. "We never neutralized the IADS [Integrated Air Defense System]. We weren't any safer on day 78 than we were on day one. Air Force doctrine calls for neutralizing the IADS before moving on to targets. Well, if we had followed that doctrine to the end, we wouldn't have targeted anything but the IADS for 78 days. So, Michael Short did, of course, the reasonable thing and deviated from strict doctrine," assessed Murphy.

The aircraft wing of the Theodore Roosevelt had 74 aircraft. When something needed to be hit on the same day – the target was chosen in the morning and was to be hit at some time that day – two systems could do that: the carrier's air wing and the Tomahawks.

Murphy specifically cited the example of the operation against the Podgorica airport. "Podgorica threatened to introduce the Operational Hawk Helicopter Group of the U.S. Army into Albania because it was only about 30 miles across the border. It was a Serbian airbase and the Serbs had transferred a significant number of air-to-ground aircraft... to that airport. When we discovered that move, General Clark said that morning, 'I have to remove that airport immediately. We can't afford an attack, not even an inefficient one, against the Operational Hawk. He turned to General Short and said, 'Can you do it?' and General Short said, 'The Navy can.' This was on a video teleconference. He [Clark] turned to me and said, 'Dan, can you do it?' and I said, 'Yes, we can.' That afternoon, we launched 48 aircraft and destroyed the entire airport, including the underground tunnel complex where there were 26 aircraft, and we destroyed every one of them," Murphy described.

The Navy had 9 Tomahawk platforms moving across the Adriatic. Almost all static targets were planned in advance, but then targeting of mobile targets began, such as missile locations and SA-3 crews. Data on where they were located came from electronic reconnaissance. The Tomahawk hit rate was 85 percent, said Admiral Murphy.

Vorden never became a general, but ended up as an instructor at a military school where his cadets were those who later operated in Kosovo. As the operation in Kosovo progressed, it became increasingly clear that this Vorden idea didn't quite work if the enemy had even a moderately respectable military force. If victory was to be tasted, infantry had to be engaged. "Only infantry guarantees the taste of victory," commented future Secretary of Defense Les Aspin.