Will the abolition of the Special Envoy affect Germany’s policy toward the Western Balkans?

With the formation of the new German government and the abolition of the Special Envoy position, it may appear at first glance that Germany is shifting its focus away from the Western Balkans. However, interlocutors of Kosovo Online stress that this change does not signal any real policy shift—Germany remains firmly engaged in the region, including through greater involvement in efforts to advance the Belgrade–Pristina dialogue.

Written by: Djordje Barovic

The Western Balkans has both lost and gained something with the arrival of Germany’s new government.

Budget cuts have led to the elimination of 25 special envoy positions, including that of the Special Envoy for the Western Balkans, a role held until recently by Manuel Sarrazin.

This change aligns with the new coalition agreement between the CDU/CSU and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), which stipulates that all future envoys and coordinators will be appointed solely by government decision or by decree of the Chancellor.

On the other hand, the new Foreign Minister, Johann Wadephul, is considered a well-versed expert on Western Balkan affairs. As the long-time chair of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group on foreign affairs in the Bundestag, Wadephul had been a vocal critic of former Chancellor Olaf Scholz, particularly in regard to his handling of Western Balkan policy and the Belgrade–Pristina dialogue.

In a 2022 Bundestag debate on the Western Balkans, Wadephul criticized Scholz’s visits to Belgrade and Pristina as unsuccessful and dismissed the then-Chancellor’s statements on the necessity of Kosovo’s recognition as “amateurish.”

Earlier this April, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić met with Wadephul to discuss the need for a “new chapter in Serbian-German relations.”

Kosovo President Vjosa Osmani, in a congratulatory message to the new Chancellor Friedrich Merz, said that Germany’s leadership is “more important than ever” during a time critical for Europe’s unity and security.

Shifting Competence to the Chancellor's Office

Veteran Serbian diplomat Zoran Jeremić emphasized that eliminating the Special Envoy for the Western Balkans should not be interpreted as Germany withdrawing from the region. Rather, it reflects a reallocation of foreign policy responsibilities to the Chancellor’s Office.

“This is first and foremost a strong indicator that Germany is not abandoning the Western Balkans. On the contrary, by transferring authority back to the Chancellor’s Office, the region gains strategic weight, signaling Berlin’s intent to assert influence—either through EU enlargement policy or via deeper investment ties and efforts to align EU accession candidates with Union policies, particularly concerning Russia and Kosovo,” Jeremić explained.

He added that Chancellor Merz aims to continue Germany’s existing foreign policy in a more direct manner, reducing dependency on U.S. influence and better integrating with European strategic priorities.

“This is an effort to recalibrate the entire process in a direction that suits Germany and ties in with the EU’s enlargement agenda for the Western Balkans,” he noted.

Jeremić also warned that the coalition agreement makes only two brief references to the Western Balkans and explicitly notes that EU enlargement in the region will not be among the new government’s top priorities.

“This sheds light on the scope and intensity of future cooperation, though it remains clear that the German government still places strong emphasis on maintaining a presence in the region,” he said.

The abolition of the special envoy roles, he added, is part of broader austerity measures introduced under Chancellor Merz’s leadership—resulting in the elimination of 27 envoy positions across various domains.

More importantly, this restructuring also aims to align the Foreign Ministry’s activities with the Chancellor’s strategic objectives—a coordination that, Jeremić argues, had been lacking for decades.

“For the past 60 years, the Foreign Ministry has been held by various coalition partners—from the Liberals to the Greens—which often resulted in tension and dual-track foreign policy. The Ministry has historically been more exposed to U.S. influence. With a CDU minister now in charge, foreign policy is returning to the Chancellor’s control, which is standard in countries with a chancellery system,” Jeremić explained.

He concluded that Chancellor Merz is now asserting a decisive role in both domestic and foreign affairs.

“Germany is scaling back the influence of external actors, particularly the EU, and restoring the Foreign Ministry’s function as an extension of the Chancellor’s authority,” he said.

Jeremić also predicted expanded roles for embassies and NGOs funded through the Foreign Ministry.

“This marks a more centralized and coordinated foreign policy—not a German withdrawal from the Balkans, but rather a more focused and assertive presence, especially regarding Serbia and the Kosovo issue,” Jeremić concluded.

Stability and Strategic Interests

Political analyst Shkëlzen Maliqi believes that Chancellor Merz is not seeking to destabilize the Western Balkans, but rather to “complete the region’s stabilization.”

“Germany has invested heavily in the Serbian economy, and that will likely continue. But Berlin is also focused on ensuring regional security and stability. Merz would not want to see the Western Balkans become a source of renewed instability for Europe or NATO,” Maliqi said.

He added that the war in Ukraine and other global hotspots have complicated international relations.

“But this global crisis has actually pushed Europe to unite in defense of Ukraine and of Western values,” Maliqi stated.

As an example, he cited the shifting stance of newly re-elected U.S. President Donald Trump, who has recently eased his demands on the international stage, especially in negotiations with China.

“Germany will likely be next in line. It will try to secure strategic gains, including in defense and diplomacy. Past U.S. administrations—Obama, Biden—have already urged Europe to invest more in its own defense and not rely solely on American forces,” Maliqi said.

On how these dynamics might affect Kosovo, Maliqi had no doubts: Kosovo will remain a strategic U.S. interest.

“Regardless of any cooling in EU relations, Kosovo remains central to U.S. interests. Washington will maintain its presence—Bondsteel is not going anywhere. They are also building a NATO center in Albania and maintaining a complementary air base in Aviano. The U.S. won’t cut back on its role in the Balkans,” Maliqi affirmed.

He expects a replacement for Manuel Sarrazin to be appointed soon.

“Transitions of power often lead to changes in envoys. The UK has just appointed its own envoy. So this trend will continue. It will also depend on Brussels and the EU’s overall strategy for the normalization dialogue,” Maliqi noted.

Berlin’s Continued Focus

Petar Curcic, a researcher at the Institute for European Studies in Belgrade, affirmed that the Western Balkans remains a priority for Germany’s new government.

“Germany continues to be present and highly engaged in the Western Balkans. The abolition of the special envoy role does not change that, especially given that the new Foreign Minister, Johann Wadephul, has shown particular interest in this region,” Curcic said.

He interpreted the decision as a rationalization of government expenses.

“This is not just about the Western Balkans envoy—roles tied to feminist foreign policy, climate diplomacy, and even transportation logistics have also been cut. It’s a broader streamlining effort,” he explained.

Curcic recalled that the Special Envoy role for the Balkans was created under Olaf Scholz’s government, and Sarrazin’s appointment was a compromise between the SPD and the Greens.

“The envoy role served as a political outlet for the Greens and certain Social Democrats. But in essence, CDU has maintained a consistent policy line since Angela Merkel—and that policy toward the Western Balkans will largely remain unchanged,” he said.

Asked whether the new German government might alter its stance toward Belgrade and Pristina, Curcic responded that major changes are unlikely.

“Germany remains one of the key backers of Kosovo’s declared independence. Kosovo can expect continued support from Berlin. However, Germany is also invested in broader bilateral ties with Serbia, including support for its EU accession process,” Curcic emphasized.

He is confident that the new government will sustain interest in lithium extraction and other critical raw materials in Serbia—an initiative that began under Angela Merkel and continued under Olaf Scholz.

“We should expect the same from Chancellor Merz. This is nothing new,” Curcic added.

He concluded that Bosnia and Herzegovina will also be high on the agenda of the new German government.

“Understanding developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina will be crucial. Germany will expect Serbia to support peace efforts in that country,” Curcic concluded.