From BRICS to a new global economic architecture: A world with multiple centers

Written for Kosovo Online by Zeljko Sajn, special correspondent from New Delhi

As the global economy faces mounting trade tensions, sanctions, and competition for control over energy, technology, and strategic raw materials, BRICS is seeking to build a network of economic relations that would offer its member states greater choice and reduce their dependence on existing financial channels.

At the 18th BRICS Summit, to be held in New Delhi from September 12 to 14, issues including payments, national currencies, financing, trade, energy, and strategic raw materials will be among the topics that demonstrate how prepared the group is to translate its economic capacities into a concrete alternative to the existing international system.

BRICS currently comprises 11 countries—Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Ethiopia, Iran, and Indonesia. Its economic potential can be viewed through three interconnected pillars: payments, financing, and the real economy.

The first pillar consists of national currencies and cross-border payments, the second of development banks and new sources of capital, and the third of energy, manufacturing, infrastructure, food, and strategic raw materials.

A turning point came at the 2024 Kazan Summit, when greater use of national currencies and the development of cross-border payment mechanisms moved to the forefront. The aim was not to create a single BRICS currency, but to develop a broader range of options for trade and financial transactions outside traditional channels.

Russian President Vladimir Putin stressed at the time that Moscow was not pursuing an “anti-dollar campaign,” but was seeking new solutions because of restrictions on its access to certain dollar-denominated transactions. The focus is on national currencies, independent payment systems, and infrastructure that would reduce dependence on external influence.

The essence is that different national currencies can function alongside one another without the creation of a common currency. India has UPI, Brazil has the Pix system, while China is developing the digital yuan. Discussions on linking instant payment systems open up the possibility of faster cross-border transactions with less dependence on traditional financial intermediaries.

The second pillar is the New Development Bank, founded by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. The Bank subsequently expanded its membership. By mid-2026, it had approved 141 projects with total financing of approximately $44 billion. It finances energy, transport, water, digitalization, and other infrastructure, with financing in local currencies playing an increasingly important role.

Brazil provides an example of how this concept works in practice. In 2024, the New Development Bank approved CNY 1.425 billion for the modernization of electricity distribution infrastructure in the state of Sao Paulo, with the agreement signed in 2025. A major infrastructure project was thus financed in a currency other than the US dollar.

The connection is clear: capital—development bank—national currency—infrastructure—new trade.

The third pillar consists of energy, manufacturing, transport, food, and strategic raw materials.

The scale of BRICS’ potential is also evident from the figures. Its 11 members account for approximately 48.5 percent of the world’s population and around 36 percent of its land area. Together, they produce approximately 43.6 percent of the world’s oil and around 36 percent of its natural gas. BRICS countries also account for approximately 72 percent of global rare-earth mineral reserves, while their share of global coal production exceeds 78 percent.

Measured by purchasing power parity, BRICS countries together account for around 40 percent of the global economy.

Russia is a major energy and raw-materials power; Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are important energy hubs; Iran is a major energy producer; Brazil has enormous agricultural and mineral potential; China is an industrial powerhouse and a key country in the processing of critical minerals; while India is a vast market and an increasingly important manufacturing hub.

BRICS members produce around 61 percent of the world’s rice, 53 percent of its soybeans, 47 percent of its wheat, and 43 percent of its corn.

Lithium, nickel, copper, cobalt, graphite, and rare earths occupy a particularly important place. They are crucial for batteries, electric vehicles, power grids, and modern technology.

According to the International Energy Agency, global demand for lithium could increase from around 205,000 tonnes in 2024 to almost 930,000 tonnes by 2040—more than a fourfold increase. At the same time, the three largest lithium-processing countries accounted for around 96 percent of global processing capacity in 2024.

Control over mines is therefore no longer sufficient. Control over processing, technology, and supply chains is becoming increasingly important.

This is where BRICS’ three pillars converge. Payment systems facilitate transactions, financial infrastructure provides capital, while the real economy produces the goods, energy, and infrastructure that generate new trade.

Iran provides a particularly clear example of why this architecture is acquiring geopolitical significance.

On August 24, the United States launched a new and broader phase of economic pressure on Iran, imposing sanctions on nearly 60 individuals, companies, and vessels. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent also announced broader use of secondary sanctions against countries and companies doing business with Tehran.

Iran is a BRICS member, and Tehran announced in August that it would soon join the New Development Bank. The Bank, however, had not officially confirmed its membership by that point.

Sanctions are therefore becoming one of the tests for BRICS. If trade depends on a single system, pressure can also affect trading partners. Alternative payment systems, national currencies, development banks, and diversified sources of capital can reduce that exposure.

Nevertheless, BRICS is not the European Union. It has neither a common central bank nor a single monetary policy. Its members have differing interests, and some are also competitors.

The common denominator, therefore, is not the creation of a single economic system, but the need for greater choice and greater resilience to external pressures.

The new architecture should consequently be viewed as a network: more currencies, more financial centers, more sources of capital, and more trade routes.

This does not mean that the dollar will disappear. A gradual change in its relative role is a far more realistic prospect. Such a shift could emerge through trade, lending, infrastructure projects, digital payments, and transactions involving energy and strategic raw materials.

An alternative economic architecture, therefore, is no longer merely the subject of long-term debate. Its individual elements already exist—national currencies used in bilateral trade, instant payment systems, development banks, financing in local currencies, and increasingly interconnected energy, industrial, and raw-material markets.

That is why New Delhi will be an important focal point in this process from September 12 to 14.

India, which holds the BRICS chairmanship in 2026, is organizing the summit under the theme “Building Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability,” with an emphasis on a people-centric and humanity-first approach.

The logo of India’s chairmanship itself conveys this message. Petals in the colors of the BRICS member states symbolize their collective strength and unity, while the “Namaste” gesture at the center represents respect, warmth, and harmonious cooperation.

The summit is not expected to create a new global financial system overnight. But it may provide a clearer indication of whether the three elements—payments, financing, and the real economy—are becoming increasingly interconnected and whether BRICS is succeeding in building a broader network of economic relations.

If this process continues, the greatest change may not be the dismantling of the existing system, but the emergence of a world in which no single financial, trade, or economic center retains the same degree of decisive control.

In other words, a “world without the dollar” does not have to emerge for a world with multiple economic centers to take shape.