FEUILLETON 25 years of NATO bombing of Serbia (17): Clinton on the persecution and murder of Milosevic

Written for Kosovo Online by Dragan Bisenic

There are many who claim that the 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia was a "personal war" of Madeleine Albright, from Henry Kissinger to leading American journalists like Walter Isaacson. Even Ivo Daalder has called this war "Madeleine's war."

Martti Ahtisaari also believes it is a credible opinion that Madeleine Albright was the main proponent of the use of force and bombing. "It has been speculated in many places that Secretary of State Albright wanted exactly such an outcome and that negotiations at Rambouillet were intentionally scuttled. This claim is especially substantiated by information that Americans were arming and training KLA fighters, hoping that their units' actions, along with NATO bombing, would win the war against the Serbs," states Ahtisaari. He concludes that "it is true that Albright was the most active and firmest advocate of the use of force."

Describing the atmosphere before the bombing, Albright notes that her foreign policy team met on March 19 with Clinton to consider the remaining options. "There were no good options. George Tenet reported that the Serbian offensive had already begun and had managed to force many KLA units to retreat. The number of refugees and displaced persons was rapidly increasing. The military's assessment was equally grim. Civilians in Kosovo were very vulnerable to Serbian attacks. At least initially, NATO air strikes could not help them. There was a risk that many innocent people would be injured or killed. The NATO bombing operation targeting Milosevic's sources of power would weaken him, but we did not know how long he would last. I listened, watched the president. His eyes were as dark as I felt. On the eve of its fiftieth anniversary, NATO was on the brink of war for the second time in its history, the first time in Bosnia," Albright recorded.

Explaining the goal of the war, she says it was "to gain support for an agreement that did not reflect the ultimate goals of either the Albanians or the Serbs." Victory would mean a long-term military commitment to maintaining order in a very dangerous neighborhood, but giving up was unthinkable, Albright stated. She then placed this action in an even broader context: "Our decision was part of a much larger choice between autocracy and democracy, and between intolerance and tolerance in the heart of Europe. I said, 'See, let's remember that the purpose of using force is to stop Milosevic's style of banditry once and for all. There is no guarantee we will succeed, but the alternatives are worse. If we don't respond now, we'll have to respond later, perhaps in Macedonia, perhaps in Bosnia. Milosevic has chosen this fight. We cannot allow him to win.'"

The president agreed, stating publicly: "In dealing with aggressors in the Balkans, hesitation is a license to kill." We sent Dick Holbrooke to Belgrade in a last attempt to persuade Milosevic to stop. "Those talks yielded nothing but delay tactics, so I said the president had stated we could no longer wait, although the timing was awkward, Russian Prime Minister Primakov was en route to the United States when Al Gore informed him by phone that military action was inevitable.

"A few hours later, on the evening of March 23, NATO Secretary-General Solana ordered General Wesley Clark to initiate air operations," Albright recorded.

She notes it was past midnight and she was exhausted when she went home, then stayed up late watching the news on television. "I was almost asleep when the phone rang. It was the president. He said, 'We are doing the right thing here. It's going to be a long road and this won't end quickly, but I truly think we've explored every alternative.' We reviewed the efforts we had made to find a diplomatic solution, including the 15 trips I had made to Europe to consult with allies over the previous year. We talked about our responsibilities to the Kosovars and particularly to our own armed forces. Sending our young men and women into combat is the hardest decision any president can make. Whenever I visited American troops, I tried to make eye contact, so I could always conjure their faces in my mind. No American leader should ever commit to military action without fully weighing the human costs. In this case, we had. The president again said, 'I think we're doing the right thing.' 'Yes, Mr. President,' I said, 'we are.'"

Clinton, like Albright and the entire American foreign policy establishment, for some reason, ties the fate of the Albanians to the Constitution of 1974. Albright in her memoirs has an identical sentence as Clinton in his: "Tito gave Kosovo autonomy, allowing it self-government and control over schools. In 1989, Milosevic took away the autonomy. Clinton noted that "tensions have been rising since then, and exploded after Bosnia's independence was secured in 1995. "I was determined not to let Kosovo become another Bosnia. As did Madeleine Albright," Clinton stated.

Giving his overview of events, he records that by April 1998, the United Nations had imposed an arms embargo, and the United States and its allies had introduced economic sanctions against Serbia for its failure to end hostilities and start dialogue with Kosovar Albanians. By mid-June, NATO began planning a series of military options to end the violence. As summer arrived, Dick Holbrooke returned to the region to try to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict.

By mid-July, Serbian forces again attacked armed and unarmed Kosovars, starting a summer of aggression that would force another 300,000 Kosovar Albanians to leave their homes. By the end of September, the UN Security Council passed another resolution demanding a cessation of hostilities, and by the end of the month, we sent Holbrooke on another mission to Belgrade to try to reason with Milosevic.

NATO threatened to attack Serbia within four days if UN resolutions were not respected on October 13. Air strikes were postponed when

4,000 Yugoslav special forces were withdrawn from Kosovo. "For a while, things improved, but in January 1999, the Serbs were again killing innocents in Kosovo, and NATO air strikes seemed inevitable. We decided to try diplomacy one more time, but I was not optimistic," Clinton states.

The goals of the sides were far apart. "The United States and NATO wanted Kosovo to have the political autonomy it enjoyed under the Yugoslav constitution between 1974 and 1989, until Milosevic took it away, and we wanted peace forces led by NATO to guarantee peace and security for Kosovar civilians, including the Serbian minority," again claims the American president.

He recalls that the President of the FRY, Slobodan Milosevic, wanted to retain control over Kosovo and opposed any deployment of foreign troops there. Kosovar Albanians wanted independence. They were also divided among themselves. Ibrahim Rugova, the shadow government head, was a quiet man prone to wearing a scarf around his neck. I was convinced we could make a peace agreement with him, but I was not so sure about the other main Kosovar faction, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), led by a young man named Hashim Thaci. The KLA wanted independence and believed it could stand up to the Serbian military.

"The sides met in Rambouillet, France, on February 6, to work out the details of an agreement that would restore autonomy, protect Kosovars from oppression with a NATO-led operation, disarm the KLA, and allow the Serbian military to continue patrolling the border. Madeleine Albright and her British colleague Robin Cook aggressively implemented this policy. After a week of negotiations coordinated by American Ambassador Chris Hill and his colleagues from the European Union and Russia, Madeleine discovered that our position was opposed by both sides: the Serbs did not want to agree to NATO peace forces, and the Kosovars did not want to accept autonomy unless a referendum on independence was guaranteed. And the KLA was not happy to be disarmed, partly because they were not sure they could rely on NATO forces to protect them. Our team decided to write the agreement in a way that would postpone the referendum, but not deny it forever.

Kosovar Albanians, including Thaci, initially accepted the agreement on February 23, returned home to sell it to their people, and by mid-March traveled to Paris to sign the finished document. The Serbs boycotted the ceremony, as forty thousand Serbian soldiers were gathered in and around Kosovo, and Milosevic again said he would never agree to foreign troops on Yugoslav soil. I sent Dick Holbrooke back to see him one last time, but even Dick couldn't move him.

After Holbrooke left Belgrade on March 23, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana, with my full support, issued an order to General Wesley Clark to begin air strikes. That day, with a bipartisan majority of 58 to 41, the Senate voted to support the action. Earlier this month, the House of Representatives voted 219 to 191 to support sending American troops to Kosovo if there is a peace agreement. Among the prominent Republicans who voted for the proposal were new Speaker Dennis Hastert and Henry Hyde. When Congressman Hyde said America should oppose Milosevic and ethnic cleansing, I smiled to myself and thought maybe Dr. Jekyll was out there somewhere.

While most of Congress and all our NATO allies were in favor of air strikes, Russia was not. Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov was en route to the United States to meet with Al Gore. When Al informed him that a NATO attack on Yugoslavia was inevitable, Primakov ordered his plane to turn around and take him back to Moscow. On March 24, I spoke to the American people about what I was doing and why," Clinton recorded.

Before we examine his lengthy speech from today's perspective, it's interesting to show what was happening behind the scenes of these moves and how the closest American allies, especially British Prime Minister Tony Blair and new German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, reacted. Some of Clinton's conversations with them have become public in recent years, providing invaluable material that allows insight into events that were not public at the time – from the preparation of the bombing, through the bombing itself, and negotiations to reach an agreement with the FRY and end the bombing. We used these materials in this text and subsequent parts of the book.

Already in the next conversation on August 6, after they talked about Tuscany and Clinton boasted about having Steven Spielberg and Tom Hanks as guests and watching their new movie "Saving Private Ryan," Clinton told Blair that he called to talk about Kosovo.

It's getting worse. The headlines show it, and Milosevic is moving towards a military solution. Serbian security forces are not only suppressing Albanian militants but are also engaging in systematic campaigns against the civilian population. I think we are approaching a major humanitarian catastrophe. Milosevic thinks he can do this as long as NATO's military response threatens him because he believes NATO will only respond with a UN resolution, but Russia guarantees it will block it. My view is that, at the very least, we need to make him think again. We need to finalize the planning we started, identify forces, and think about some ultimatum to make him stop the offensive and restore autonomy for Kosovo. I believe we should clearly indicate that, while we want to get approval from the UN, we can do it without it. I know we haven't agreed on this, and Albright (Madeleine) has talked with Cook (Robin, then British foreign secretary) about the need for UN Security Council authorization. Let me tell you, we are heading towards a collision in Kosovo and with what further happens in Russia – Clinton said and added that he is worried about the health of Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his country's economy.

Then he said he fears many civilians will die in Kosovo and there will be many refugees, and due to the complicated situation in Russia, it's best not to conduct a vote in the UN now.

Milosevic thinks he has carte blanche. I talked to you and John Major (previous British Prime Minister) and I understand you have a different system for deciding on legal authority there – Clinton said.

Building a Legal Case

He then described how a legal case could be built to justify bombing.

There were several cross-border incursions and threats to international observers, which could be a pretext for self-defense. Also, there's Milosevic's record of threatening international peace and security, and then the humanitarian atrocities. I think we could construct a legal case, but if I can't convince you of this, we won't stand a chance with Chirac and Kohl - Clinton said, referring to the French president and German chancellor who was fighting for a new term at the time.

Blair's response is not published, and Clinton continued.

Shouldn't we try to persuade Chirac and Kohl to sign an ultimatum with us to give to Milosevic? Discussing planning something like this would be useful to convince Chirac and Kohl that a UN resolution is not legally necessary. I know Chirac wants this, but it will hurt Yeltsin if we put him in a position to sign or block (the resolution) – he said.

Clinton told Blair he fears the situation in Kosovo will worsen.

I've heard rumors about a mass grave of 500 people. That may not be true, but the other side is trying to get us involved. There are problems you and I discussed earlier. People want us to be their air force for gaining independence. But I think the problem is that we've been through this with the civil war in Bosnia, and I don't want to repeat it with another Muslim population – he said.

Sometime later, on August 27, the same two interlocutors discussed a comprehensive operation against Serbia and the possible elimination of Milosevic, including his assassination.

The conversation started with a harmless introduction about Clinton's interrupted vacation. In the document, where large parts of the conversation are omitted, it's shown that at one point, Clinton talks about joint communication team actions involving Blair's strategist Alastair Campbell and Clinton's team. The material of this transcript is disordered, so somehow the conversation about Kosovo seems out of context, i.e., it's not clear whether this page is part of the conversation from 1998 or 1999 when the bombing had already started. Since the bombing was seriously being prepared already in 1998, it's possible that ground troops and eliminating Milosevic from Serbia were already being discussed then.

Then Clinton moved on to the ground operation. "The last question I want to ask is about joint planning of a ground operation. I personally believe it can be done under an assessment umbrella. I told you we're working with our people, who are very afraid it might leak... We've made progress on that, but I'd like to see where you stand and unify our efforts. (Then a large part of Clinton's speech is omitted)...

Clinton continues his presentation, which clearly relates to the President of the FRY, Slobodan Milosevic: "If he thinks we don't want to kill him, bomb him, or drive him out of Serbia, I think we can do that. I don't think we can give public promises about war crimes because the Tribunal is an independent body. By the way, Louise Arbour is here (chief prosecutor of the Hague Tribunal). I said we cooperate with the Tribunal, which is a much more delicate issue."

Clinton then invited Blair to provide "the best people who know Russia" in case of a ground operation, because "what the devil do we do with Russia, if it leads to the collapse of our relations."

"I think Putin has tremendous potential," Clinton said after Putin was elected Prime Minister of Russia. "I think he's very smart and thoughtful. I think we can do a lot of good with him."

At another point, Clinton said: "His intentions are generally honorable and clear, but he's still undecided. He could slip into democracy."

The following conversations concerning Kosovo were in October, when the OSCE Monitoring Mission was established in Kosovo, and from them, it's clear that the French agreed that air strikes should be threatened. However, they didn't talk about it in the following months, all until January 21 when Blair called Clinton.

Hello, Bill. Kosovo – he started, and what he said we don't know, because the entire paragraph is censored.

However, Clinton said he agrees that military action is necessary but doesn't want to send ground troops. Further, he said he needs to have a political plan to implement military action.

We were in a much different situation legally and politically in Bosnia because the world said these people deserve autonomy, but not independence. I don't want to get into trouble, but now 45 people have been slaughtered, and Milosevic is trying to expel the Monitoring Mission, we have no choice but to do something – Clinton said.

He pointed out, however, that the Albanians also violated the ceasefire.

They probably have as many ceasefire violations as Milosevic, though his are more drastic – he said and added that the Albanians must sit at the table and take their responsibility.

Then in February, they talked again shortly before Clinton met with Chirac.

He's here and I'm going to meet with him in a few minutes... We need to make sure we all agree – he said.

Not long before that, Clinton met with new German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder.

The next few conversations concerned a possible agreement and the fact that Milosevic agreed to talk with Richard Holbrooke, but Clinton said he doesn't believe Milosevic will agree on ceasefire terms, which didn't happen.

On March 23, Clinton told Blair that Milosevic hadn't agreed and seemed ready to "carry out major violence in Kosovo."

Much of the further conversation is censored, but they said they would talk to Chirac and other officials. It was clear that bombing was certain.

Are they stronger than the Iraqis? – Blair asked Clinton.

Yes. They have better air defense, and we have people nearby who are vulnerable. The stakes are high, but the potential benefits are huge – Clinton said.

March 24 followed, the first day of bombing. Clinton and Blair talked on March 30 about finding a solution for refugees, but he was also concerned about the growing involvement of Russia and that "surrounding countries need to more closely inspect Russian shipments to Kosovo, to ensure that the arms embargo is not violated."

Part of the text is censored again, and Clinton told Blair to be careful what they say because it's an open line.

In further conversations in April, Clinton talks about hoping that international forces will be in Kosovo and that they "will have to be committed to protecting Serbs in Kosovo as much as Kosovar Albanians."

Clinton wanted to target Montenegro: "I know there will be collateral damage..."

However, in one of those conversations, Clinton insisted on more destructive bombing, stating that he knew there would be "collateral damage."

I was hoping that you and Aznar (José María, former Spanish Prime Minister) could convince (censored) to give Clark and Solana the authority to target a wider range of objectives. That would require striking national headquarters, military-industrial targets, TV towers (which he was resistant to), some presidential targets, power plants, the headquarters of the Socialist Party, which also has a radio TV broadcaster. I really believe we made a mistake not turning up the heat on these guys. My people are also calling on me to consider preemptive actions against some targets in Montenegro. I know (censored) doesn't want to hit there, but even he said there are targets there that need to be hit.

Let me give an example or two: there are several facilities where I believe they are storing their missiles; in and around ports inside Montenegro; there is a critical bridge we need to hit before their military units start moving... More importantly, we need to reach phase III targets inside Serbia. I know there will be collateral damage and some controversy, but if we want a chance for a resolution soon, we must turn up the fire – said Clinton, and Blair, you guess, agreed with him on everything.

"The horror story" of the hit bus and the Chinese embassy

The conversations in May are interesting, where Blair said the campaign is progressing and that striking power plants and the power outage in Belgrade "made a big difference."

However, Clinton pointed out that global interest in the events in Kosovo is waning and that there isn't enough justification for the bombing in the media, while "horror stories about collateral damage like the one about the bus hit on the bridge" emerge.

And soon followed the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, which resulted in casualties.

I just went out and made a statement saying we hit several important commands and continental targets, and that the damage to the Chinese embassy and the deaths were completely accidental. I expressed deep regret to the people and leaders of China, but also said it's important to remember why the strikes were necessary - Clinton said, adding how American pilots literally risked their lives to avoid hitting innocent civilians in Serbia.

"They would ask us to flatten this place"

Clinton justified the bombing by saying that one must remember what caused the air strikes and what can end them. Then Blair said that Clinton was absolutely right.

TV cameras are not in Kosovo, but if they were, they would see people being killed by Serbs, Milosevic, every day – Blair said.

If we had a TV showing 15 people tied together and burned alive, people would demand that we bomb them to the end, people would wonder why we haven't flattened this place, but our people must constantly tell the media this – Clinton said.

They concluded that they should have more recorded crimes in Kosovo and were frustrated that the Chinese and Russians say the bombing is barbaric.

When Milosevic finally decided to agree to a compromise, the bombing ended, and Clinton and Blair began discussing their further plans for the region, especially for Kosovo, which Clinton said would be handled by the greatest American experts, whatever formal status it might have.

We need a prosperous Balkan, with fewer temptations for conflict. We want it to be more integrated with Europe. With the EU, with NATO. The first thing we have to do is define that space: Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, Kosovo. And Serbia if we can get rid of Milosevic – Clinton concluded.