Post-Epstein regulation of elites

Written for Kosovo Online by Zeljko Sajn

The publication of the so-called Epstein files cannot be understood as a sincere attempt to establish justice, but rather as a mechanism for regulating elites under conditions of a shifting global order. The partial, selective, and temporally controlled manner of their release indicates that the goal is not judicial accountability, but the delegitimization of certain actors without endangering the structure of the system itself. The Epstein case therefore does not appear as an exception, but as a symptom—an illustration of how truth is used as an instrument of power rather than as a legal or moral imperative.

In this context, the critical perspective of Jeffrey Sachs acquires particular analytical weight. Sachs interprets contemporary conflicts, including the war in Ukraine, as the result of a long-term strategy of hegemony rather than a series of isolated miscalculations. From his perspective, NATO enlargement was not a neutral security measure, but a deliberate provocation. He further points to the selective application of international law, which shields powerful actors from accountability while sanctioning weaker ones. In that sense, the Epstein files do not represent a rupture of the system, but its internal corrective mechanism.

By contrast, Francis Fukuyama views the liberal international order as a normative framework capable of self-correction. However, the realpolitik doctrine of Zbigniew Brzezinski clearly shows that strategic interests are primary, while moral narratives are often used as ex post facto legitimation for decisions already taken. It is precisely at this point that a key historical precedent emerges.

The 1999 bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia represents a watershed moment in the contemporary international order. The decision to intervene militarily was taken without a mandate from the United Nations Security Council, thereby openly suspending the principle of state sovereignty in the name of an alleged “higher moral purpose.” The consequence of this act was the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo and Metohija, creating a profound legal and political paradox: territorial integrity was formally retained as a universal norm, yet in practice suspended whenever it suited the interests of dominant powers. Kosovo and Metohija thus did not become an exception, but a model—a precedent later used as an argument and justification in other crises, including in the post-Soviet space. In this way, the bombing of Yugoslavia represents not merely a regional conflict, but a point at which the universality of international law began to unravel.

Historical experience shows that states survive only when they manage to limit the autonomy of their own elites. In the late Roman Republic, the senatorial aristocracy turned into an autonomous center of power, paralyzing the state. Augustus understood that stability did not require the destruction of the elite, but its discipline and integration into a new order. The opposite example is the Soviet Union, where the elite was never essentially constrained, which enabled its survival—but not the survival of the state itself.

In this sense, the Russian model of the early twenty-first century can be viewed as a conscious correction of the Soviet experience. Since Vladimir Putin came to power, systematic efforts have been made to redefine the relationship between the state and the elite, with the aim of preserving state continuity. A similar pattern of elite control can be observed in China, where anti-corruption campaigns function primarily as instruments of state security.

In a broader historical framework, Donald Trump’s political project in the United States can be interpreted as an attempt at a belated correction of the same problem—the autonomization of elites and the weakening of state institutions. His policies were aimed at preserving the key pillars of American power: the military, fiscal sovereignty, and the global role of the dollar.

In this context, what is analytically relevant is not the meeting in Alaska itself, but the political dynamics that develop afterward. The weakening of multilateral formats, distancing from international organizations, and a return to direct communication among great powers point to a process of system and elite reorganization.

In conclusion, the Epstein documents do not serve to dismantle the American system, but to preserve it: through the selective exposure of compromising connections, an internal consolidation of the elite is carried out in order to protect the foundations of the American state—military power, the stability of the dollar, and the capacity for global power projection under conditions of a changing world order.