Hill: The U.S. will no longer intervene as before—Kosovo and Serbia must resolve their own issues

Former U.S. Ambassador to Serbia Christopher Hill stated that he does not expect the United States to intervene in resolving Balkan issues, including the dispute between Kosovo and Serbia, as it has done in the past. In an interview with Radio Free Europe, Hill emphasized that Kosovo must proceed with the establishment of the Community of Serb-majority Municipalities, while Serbia also has its own obligations.

Hill stressed that Kosovo and Serbia cannot expect others to solve their problems—they must work together to do so.

Regarding the dialogue, Hill described the Ohrid Agreement as highly appealing and reiterated that Kosovo must begin by forming the Community. He also said Serbia has commitments to fulfill.

He further remarked that he does not believe the U.S. will be heavily engaged in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue process.

You said yesterday at GLOBSEC that it's difficult to predict U.S. President Donald Trump’s policy, but what kind of approach can Kosovo expect from his second administration?

I think the U.S. will urge Balkan countries to start solving their problems themselves. People are getting tired of countries coming to us—or to a Western European country—just to complain about their neighbors. The world has moved on. We're no longer living in the 1990s. We're in a completely different era now. Of course, we understand the issue of Israel, the broader issue of Iran, which is enormous, the issue of Gaza. And of course, the key issue for Europe, in my opinion, is Ukraine and what everyone is doing for Ukraine. So, I think the time when a Balkan country could just come to us and complain about another Balkan country is over—people don’t have time for that anymore. That’s why they want to see cooperation frameworks created within the region, not each country turning to its favorite member of the international community and saying: “Help us.”

Historically, the U.S. has been one of Kosovo’s strongest allies. Do you expect that to continue, or do you foresee a shift in tone or priorities?

I think that will somewhat depend on what the people in Kosovo want to do. I can tell you that these issues in the Balkans are very complex, but their complexity often exceeds people’s willingness to understand them. So, going to the U.S. and saying “we have all these problems with our neighbors,” people will just say—look, everyone has problems, go solve them. So I think what’s expected now is that, without daily mediation, without constant involvement from NGOs or friendly actors, people in the region should reach out to their neighbors and try to resolve problems directly—because the international community has turned its attention elsewhere. I’m not saying the Balkans aren’t important. As I’ve said, it’s still very much unfinished business in Europe. But people in the Balkans must understand that there are other pressing issues globally. So, don’t expect the world to set aside the matters it’s currently dealing with—like Ukraine or the Middle East—just to say: “Okay Kosovo, let’s help you now.” Kosovo, like all Balkan states, really needs to step up and solve its problems.

Recently, the provisional Government of Kosovo agreed to temporarily accept up to 50 migrants deported from the U.S. as part of a resettlement agreement with a third country. What does this step say about Kosovo aligning with U.S. interests?

I think it shows that Kosovo is interested in aligning with the U.S. and trying to help with its problems. But I would emphasize that such symbolic gestures, while very important and useful, should be accompanied by a broader approach that ensures Kosovo stays off the list of problems.

Are you referring to anything specific?

Nothing specific, except to say that this is what’s happening right now. It’s been 25 years since 1999. I have to say I’m very disappointed with how little has been achieved in those 25 years.

Do you expect the United States to play an active role in mediating the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, or would it be more effective for the European Union to take the lead?

I think the U.S. has been saying for years that this is really something the Europeans should resolve. The U.S. has had a special envoy for years, but I would expect less American involvement now than in the past. So the idea that the U.S. will be deeply engaged in the Balkans every day will look very different. You will still see U.S. business interests in the region, there will be some diplomatic activity—no doubt—but I wouldn’t expect the U.S. to step in and resolve people’s problems. People will need to resolve their own problems.

You previously said the Government of Kosovo bears much responsibility for the lack of progress in the dialogue. What specific actions or decisions were you referring to?

When I talk about responsibility, I mean the normalization agreement—the so-called Ohrid Agreement—which I believe is very fair and carefully crafted with the help of Mr. Lajcak. It’s quite disappointing that we can’t seem to get to the point of agreeing on the Community of Serb-majority Municipalities. That issue has been stalled by things that are more propaganda than substance—like who signed what, and so on. We need to see the agreement fully implemented. Part of that agreement includes a degree of limited autonomy for Serbs in North Mitrovica. That Community should manage schools, hospitals, and related matters. There are models for this across the world, especially in Europe. When then-Prime Minister Thaçi signed the agreement, it was supposed to be implemented. So that’s one issue. But I’m not saying Kosovo is the only country with issues. Serbia also needs to fulfill its part. But in direct response to your question—Kosovo should focus on forming the Community and move forward from there. Serbia doesn’t actually dispute Kosovo’s territory. The broader issue in the Balkans isn’t about land, it’s about people. The real question is whether people in the Balkans want to stay or move elsewhere. And so far, migration continues. This isn’t a question of territory—there’s plenty of land. It’s about whether people want to stay, work, and live in the Balkans.

Do you think Serbia is doing enough?

I think everyone has a responsibility. But when foreigners say you’re not doing enough or you are doing enough—I’m not going to weigh in on that. I think everyone knows what they should be doing.
In 2021, you said that mutual recognition between Kosovo and Serbia would unlock Serbia’s European potential and contribute to…

I don’t think I said that. I believe someone else did. We weren’t talking about mutual recognition. We were discussing normalization—that’s what’s on the table.

But mutual recognition was discussed previously?

Yes, earlier we talked about normalization. That was the EU’s position. We supported the EU on that.
All right. When you were ambassador…

Again, I want to be very clear. This isn’t about shouting slogans or saying “I like this one, I don’t like that one.” It’s about efforts to resolve problems. I believe the EU has put forward a very serious proposal in Ohrid. That’s what’s on the table, and it needs to be addressed.

How would you respond to observers in the region—especially in Kosovo—who saw your approach as overly accommodating to President Vucic?

My approach was to work in line with how the U.S. government wants to resolve things. We have many interests in Serbia that have nothing to do with Kosovo. Serbia has been helpful on Ukraine—we want that to continue. But the fact that we’re working on certain interests with Serbia doesn’t mean we’re against Kosovo—we have many interests in Kosovo as well. Again, I’d be cautious with the idea that major powers are somehow choosing sides. We’re not interested in that. We want to see the whole situation calm down. We believe the EU’s approach is fair and want to see it followed.

If I’m not mistaken, in 2021 you also said the U.S. should show Serbia that it offers a better alternative than Russia or China. Has that message reached Serbian leadership? Because we still see strong ties between Serbia and those two countries. Vucic also recently visited Moscow.

More recently, Vucic visited Ukraine and made an offer…

Does that mean his balancing policy is actually successful?

You’d have to ask him that. I’m not here to criticize his policy. I’m not here to criticize Kosovo’s policy either. From the U.S. perspective, we want countries to be helpful on the core issues of our time. The central issue in Europe right now is Ukraine. Countries that are willing to support Ukraine, to cooperate with Ukraine—those are the countries we want to cooperate with. But you know, these are practical issues we all have to deal with. And I think we miss the point if we treat Ukraine as somehow secondary to older issues from past eras. We’re living in a very dangerous moment globally, and Ukraine is one of those issues that urgently needs to be addressed. So Serbia is doing something, and of course, we will cooperate with Serbia on that.

Were you surprised by Vucic’s visit to Moscow?

I’m sorry it happened after I left. I left Belgrade in January. I think many people anticipated the visit. There are various reasons for it. But again, I don’t think that’s what we should be worried about. What we should worry about is: who is helping Ukraine, and who isn’t.

Let’s return to Kosovo, which is currently facing a prolonged institutional vacuum following elections. A new parliamentary leadership still hasn’t been formed. From your perspective, how damaging is this—both domestically and for Kosovo’s international credibility?

Every country has its own politics. We have our own politics. Ours has been quite rough and difficult in recent months. So I’m not here to criticize Kosovo. They’ll have to resolve that based on what kind of consensus they can build. It’s not easy. So I’m not here to pass judgment. Clearly, Kosovo needs to form a government and have some political stability—but that’s for Kosovo to resolve. It’s not for me to handle or comment on.