James Ker-Lindsay: Pristina does not even accept basic rights of Serbs to autonomy

In the case of the Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities, we have seen that Kurti is completely opposed to autonomy, even in its minimal form. It is clear that the Law on Foreigners and the Law on Vehicles are contrary to the spirit of the Ahtisaari Plan. Pristina is attempting to impose its authority over healthcare and education. The ultimate goal is very clear – to integrate the Serbs or force them to leave, says political analyst, Cyprus expert and Western Balkans specialist James Ker-Lindsay in an interview for the Croatian portal Novosti.

The Law on Foreigners and the Law on Vehicles, which are set to enter into force in Kosovo on March 15, are absolutely contrary to the spirit of the Ahtisaari Plan, Ker-Lindsay says regarding the legal acts that Serbian NGOs have warned could lead to the collapse of the education and healthcare systems available to the Serbian population in Kosovo.

The author of the book “Kosovo: The Path to Contested Statehood in the Balkans”, an expert on the Cyprus issue and the Western Balkans, Ker-Lindsay assesses in the interview that Kosovo is in an international limbo, with slim prospects for membership in the United Nations and even the European Union, despite significant efforts by both Brussels and Washington.

As he notes, most countries with which Kosovo needs relations have recognized it, yet it remains in international limbo because more than half of the world does not recognize it.

“Many in Kosovo are angry and irritated by this, because it is not a member of the United Nations. Others say they do not care, that the UN is a ridiculous organization. The fact is that membership in UN agencies is important. Kosovo is part of the World Bank and the IMF, but not the World Health Organization, the International Energy Agency, the World Food Programme, or UNESCO, which it attempted to join. It was precisely after the application for UNESCO membership that the recognition process began to decline,” Ker-Lindsay said.

According to him, the question of Kosovo’s membership in the European Union also arises.

“One EU official once told me: ‘We actually do not know whether Kosovo can join the European Union if it is not a member of the UN.’ That is not clear, especially when you have five EU member states that do not recognize Kosovo. Their positions on recognition have not softened; they have become even firmer over time,” he added.

Speaking about the elections held in Kosovo last year and the opposition’s results, Ker-Lindsay said that the trial of Hashim Thaçi for war crimes in some way “broke the spell” of the long-dominant Democratic Party of Kosovo, while the Democratic League of Kosovo and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo lost support.

He notes that the population had a sense of deep corruption, while Albin Kurti presented a very different image of himself.

“He is problematic, a hypocrite and a populist, but intelligent and resourceful. He portrayed himself as incorruptible. For disappointed voters, his defiance of the international community was also important. They say: ‘The British, French, Germans, the U.S. told us: declare independence and we will sort things out for you. And they did not.’ These people see Kurti as a hero,” he added.

When asked about the presidential elections in Kosovo, Ker-Lindsay said that Vjosa Osmani presents herself internationally as the reasonable face of Kosovo, but that he was absolutely horrified when he saw her at the launch of Trump’s Board of Peace.

He considers this a very wrong move, particularly since the European Union has clearly stated its position.

“Osmani tried to demonstrate as friendly a relationship as possible with Donald Trump. EU officials go to her when they do not want to speak with Kurti. We will see whether Kurti will appreciate that or not,” he added.

Responding to a question about the Ahtisaari Plan, under which Kosovo declared independence but which also guarantees the rights of Serbs in Kosovo, Ker-Lindsay said that the states which supported Kosovo’s independence, once the supervised independence process ended, essentially said – now continue on your own and uphold those values.

Governments prior to Kurti’s arrival recognized the need to maintain good relations with the EU and the U.S., Ker-Lindsay notes, adding that this was a different United States, with Obama at the helm, and that Thaçi was in Kosovo, with the cloud of war crimes hanging over him, making him easier to control – which is not the case with Kurti.

“The world moved on, and Europe had much bigger problems. Britain, France and the U.S., key partners of Kosovo, reduced lobbying for recognition around 2012–2013. A British official told me at the time: ‘All those we persuaded have already recognized Kosovo. It is becoming somewhat humiliating for our foreign minister to ask and for them not to do it. We look weak.’ The international community re-engaged only when Kurti began causing problems. The EU does not solve problems, it merely puts out fires.”

He emphasized that it is absolutely clear that the laws on foreigners and vehicles are completely contrary to the spirit of the Ahtisaari Plan, and that Pristina does not even accept basic rights of Serbs to autonomy.

“In the case of the Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities, we saw that Kurti is completely against it, even in minimal form. Pristina is trying to impose authority over healthcare and education, so that Serbs do not receive their own textbooks but follow the Kosovo curriculum. The ultimate goal is very clear – to integrate the Serbs or force them to leave. Many Albanians will consider either outcome a success, although politically it will create more problems for Pristina than they may now realize. Some will say: ‘If they receive education and healthcare from Serbia, they will not integrate.’ At the same time, they are aware that healthcare is better than Kosovo’s, and that many Kosovo Albanians go to Belgrade for treatment for certain conditions. When it comes to education, it is about control,” he stated.
Speaking about the sanctions the EU imposed on Kosovo and later lifted, Ker-Lindsay says the EU likely realized that Kurti is not the type of person they can force.

According to him, Kurti is stubborn, and the stalemate is counterproductive.

Ker-Lindsay adds that Kurti’s behavior has led many to question whether the EU made a mistake in recognizing Kosovo. He believes recognitions will not be withdrawn, but that many are now more aware that certain lines should not have been crossed.

“Many European officials invested enormous effort in Kosovo, and Kosovo has put the EU’s credibility into question. The EU was meant to be a major global actor, yet it was effectively outmaneuvered by small Balkan politicians like Kurti, who say ‘I will not let you push me around’ and ‘You may have helped us, but that does not mean I will do what you want.’ Overall, this is a very uncomfortable situation for the EU,” Ker-Lindsay said.

Regarding the Belgrade–Pristina dialogue, Ker-Lindsay noted that much energy was spent on the Community of Serb-Majority Municipalities instead of on a comprehensive solution.
According to him, the best comprehensive solution is a discussion about the territorial solution from 2017–2018, which he considers the most logical.

“You must try to preserve the community as much as possible. The relationship between Belgrade and Pristina is not healthy. It is blocking Kosovo because of the issues I already mentioned, and it is also important for Serbia. On the other hand, Serbian attitudes toward Kosovo have hardened in many ways, and the key turning point was Pristina’s bid for UNESCO membership and the attempt to present Serbian Orthodox churches as Kosovo heritage. That upset many Serbs. The Ahtisaari solution is fundamentally flawed, positions are entrenched in Belgrade, and Pristina is not constructive,” he said.
Ker-Lindsay emphasizes that, when it comes to autonomy, it is not important how many members of a given nation constitute the minority granted autonomy. He cites examples from Cyprus, where autonomy for roughly 20 percent of Turks is unpopular, and from Wales, where one percent have autonomy within the United Kingdom.

He stresses that context is important, and that Kurti is playing the card of ultimately raising the question whether it is realistic for three percent of the population to have any autonomy at all and whether that percentage can truly run its own affairs, schools and hospitals.

At the same time, he adds, various measures are encouraging Serbs to leave, making it increasingly difficult to argue for any form of autonomy.

Regarding legal and political determination, Ker-Lindsay says numbers are not necessarily decisive, but if one speaks with foreign officials, especially those unfamiliar with the situation, that argument takes on a new dimension.

Commenting on claims that the Trump administration might present a plan for normalization and mutual recognition between Kosovo and Serbia, Ker-Lindsay says that during Donald Trump’s first term, Richard Grenell worked on the Washington Agreement, which was absolutely ridiculous at every level.

He states that the agreement did not normalize matters nor address the issues that needed to be resolved.

Asked about Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic and his stance on Kosovo, Ker-Lindsay says Vucic has always been much more pragmatic on the issue.

He adds that Europe does not perceive the Serbian president as someone fundamentally opposed to Albanians.

“It is noticeable, despite ups and downs, that he has a good relationship with Edi Rama. It also appeared that Vucic and Thaçi had a very good working relationship that even seemed relatively friendly. He does not appear personally overly interested in Kosovo, as he has no personal connection to it, but it is an issue he cannot ignore. He has not said he would refuse contact with officials from Pristina, which was evident in his talks with Thaçi. Perhaps he told Kosovo Serbs ‘I will protect you,’ but he certainly thought:

‘I will not destroy my political career because of you. I must maintain relations with the outside world.’ That is the essential message,” Ker-Lindsay said.

Speaking about the Serb List, whose vice-president was Milan Radoicic, accused of involvement in the Banjska incidents, Ker-Lindsay notes that many linked “the attack in Banjska” with Belgrade, and that some said it was clear evidence that Vucic tells one thing to international representatives while in reality supporting a militant group – the Serb List.

“I do not know what exactly is true, but there is clearly a problem with certain parts of the Serbian state and their relationship with Kosovo. Vucic is smart enough to know he must walk a very thin line with the European Union in every possible way. It is difficult to understand and explain his relationship with Radoicic, but perhaps it is the case that Radoicic has certain information about him. Politicians sometimes must keep their political enemies closer than their friends,” Ker-Lindsay added.

Commenting on Kosovo’s request for membership in UNESCO, Ker-Lindsay stated that the Church is considered a fundamental part of national identity, and that he understands why many Serbs were genuinely angry at the idea that Serbian Orthodox churches in Kosovo would be presented as Kosovo heritage.

“The Orthodox Church is very different from the Catholic or Protestant churches, and is more important to citizens than some outsiders understand. You saw that Edi Rama’s proposal to grant the Bektashi community in Tirana a small plot of land, that is, autonomy, was interpreted by many as a trick to create a model for Kosovo – for example, granting the Visoki Decani Monastery autonomy within the Special Protective Zone as an independent spiritual entity. The Church is a very important part of this story that is often overlooked, as is the role it could play in strengthening ties between Belgrade and Pristina, between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs,” Ker-Lindsay concluded.