Krasniqi: Interpol membership would affirm Kosovo’s statehood; Serbia uses the blockade for strategic advantage

University professor and security expert Kolje Krasniqi argues that Interpol membership would strengthen Kosovo’s institutional capacities, improve coordination in combating transnational crime, and affirm its international subjectivity. At the same time, he tells Kosovo Online that Serbia, by blocking Kosovo’s accession to Interpol, secures political and strategic advantages.

“Membership in Interpol would have multifaceted significance for Kosovo and would affect a wide range of areas—from security and diplomacy to state-building. As a global organization for police cooperation, Interpol enables member states to exchange information immediately, coordinate operations, and access vital international databases related to various criminal offenses. For Kosovo, this would mean strengthening institutional capacities in the fight against cross-border crime, terrorism, human trafficking, and corruption, as well as improving efficiency in preventing and combating transnational criminal activities,” Krasniqi states.

He adds that, politically, Interpol membership serves as an important diplomatic instrument.

“It would contribute to affirming Kosovo’s international subjectivity, consolidating its position in Euro-Atlantic processes, and increasing its international credibility. At the same time, membership would protect Kosovo’s citizens from the misuse of politically motivated arrest warrants, which Serbia continues to issue—particularly against former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army. In this perspective, Interpol should not be viewed solely as a technical mechanism for police cooperation, but as a strategic platform for affirming Kosovo’s statehood and consolidating its role on the international stage,” he says.

Speaking about Serbia’s opposition, Krasniqi notes that it is not merely procedural but deeply political and aimed at delegitimizing Kosovo’s statehood in the international arena.

“First, Kosovo’s admission to the organization would amount to a form of functional recognition of its statehood, directly undermining Serbia’s strategy of preventing international recognition. Such a step would overturn the political narrative Serbia has built—that ‘Kosovo is not a state’—and weaken years of diplomatic efforts aimed at limiting Kosovo’s international subjectivity,” he explains.

As a second reason, he argues that Serbia seeks to maintain near-monopolistic control over the narrative of war crimes and legal processes related to the 1998–1999 conflict.

“By preventing Kosovo’s membership in Interpol, Serbia preserves space for issuing politically motivated warrants, selectively prosecuting former KLA members, and using international judicial mechanisms as instruments of diplomatic pressure. Third, Serbia has clear ambitions to position itself as the primary security hub in the Balkans. Its request to open a regional Interpol office in Belgrade is part of a broader strategy to consolidate regional influence. A Kosovo seat in Interpol would challenge this claim, relativizing the role Serbia seeks to assign itself and limiting its strategic advantage in international police cooperation,” the professor notes.

Krasniqi warns that the Balkans is exposed to high levels of transnational crime, including drug trafficking, corruption, money laundering, illegal migration, and human trafficking. He argues that Kosovo’s exclusion from Interpol creates a “security grey zone” in which information exchange is slower, police cooperation remains indirect, and criminal networks find opportunities to exploit institutional gaps.

“This poses a risk not only for Kosovo but for other Western Balkan states as well, including Serbia, because a regional security architecture is only as strong as its weakest link,” he stresses.

Krasniqi explains that Kosovo has not applied for membership since 2018 due to three main factors.

“First, the lack of sufficient international support created a significant risk of failure. Five EU member states that still do not recognize Kosovo, combined with the influence of Russia and China in Interpol’s decision-making processes, make voting outcomes highly uncertain. Second, political considerations relating to the Kosovo–Serbia dialogue have heavily influenced decision-making. Third, there is a legitimate concern that Serbia would exploit another failed vote, further weakening Kosovo’s international position,” he says.

He also points to the strategic benefits Serbia would gain from hosting a regional Interpol office in Belgrade.

“Above all, Serbia would position itself as the main center of security architecture in the Balkans, gaining an expanded role in coordinating regional police cooperation. Such a headquarters would offer Belgrade deeper access to global criminal data systems, enhanced capacities for operational coordination, and greater influence in setting regional security priorities,” he argues.

He adds that this would significantly increase Serbia’s political weight in relation to the EU, the U.S., and international organizations, strengthening its image as a central actor in regional stability, while simultaneously creating “a new channel for Russian influence in the Western Balkans.”

“Through such an office in Belgrade, Moscow would gain indirect access to regional security processes, enabling it to maintain or expand its geopolitical influence in an area where great-power competition is particularly intense,” Krasniqi notes.

He believes that an expanded role for Serbia within Interpol would have profound consequences for Kosovo, putting it at a disadvantage within the regional security architecture.

“The lack of direct access to Interpol would significantly slow the operational processes of Kosovo’s police and create delays in coordinating activities against transnational crime. Second, it would increase the risk of Serbia’s misuse of politically motivated arrest warrants. Such a situation would directly affect the freedom of movement of Kosovo citizens—especially former KLA members and public officials—exposing them to possible arrests in countries that enforce Interpol mechanisms. Third, Serbia would gain expanded diplomatic leverage, further reducing Kosovo’s room for integration into international security frameworks,” he explains.

Finally, the professor concludes that Serbia, by controlling a regional Interpol office, could further intensify diplomatic and security pressure on Kosovo.

“Serbia would likely continue its policy of ‘functional non-recognition,’ treating Kosovo’s institutions as non-state structures and avoiding any form of direct institutional cooperation. Through this mechanism, Serbia could obstruct Kosovo’s integration into regional security networks and reinforce the international perception of Kosovo as a ‘disputed territory’ rather than a sovereign and functional state. This would become an important strategic instrument for Belgrade in limiting Kosovo’s diplomatic space and international mobility,” Krasniqi states.