What can Serbs expect from Kurti’s new term?

A Christmas greeting sent by caretaker Prime Minister Albin Kurti to Serbs in Kosovo—or police interventions by the Kosovo police on Christmas Eve in Gracanica and North Mitrovica? Which of the two is the true indicator of how Kurti will relate to the Serbian community in the new term? According to one view expressed by interlocutors of Kosovo Online, Serbs will remain under pressure, albeit wrapped in institutional forms. Another perspective holds that Kurti has completed the formal integration of the north, leaving Serbs in Kosovo to seek greater investment from the central authorities in the municipalities where they live.

Written by: Dusica Radeka Djordjevic

The diaspora that secured a convincing victory for the Self-Determination Movement in the parliamentary elections on 28 December is gradually leaving Kosovo.

After three weeks of vacation, one Albanian expatriate remarked: “When you come to Kosovo, there is neither America nor Dubai.”

This is well understood by both Albanians and Serbs who live there.

What the coming years will bring, as Albin Kurti assumes the helm of the government for the third time, remains uncertain.

For Serbs, it is hardly encouraging that on Christmas Eve the Kosovo police forced a group of people in Gracanica to remove T-shirts bearing the inscription “Come, my son, cross yourself and say ‘Christ is Born.’” Nor is it reassuring that in North Mitrovica the police confiscated a banner reading “Peace of God, Christ is Born,” which representatives of the Serb List had attempted to place on a building in the city center.

“Based on the experience of Kurti’s second term, pressure on Serbs in Kosovo will continue, only changing its form,” believes historian Stefan Radojkovic.

In his assessment, the north will be particularly exposed to pressure through institutional means, as Kurti has occasionally done even during election campaigns.

“There are a number of laws being prepared and set to be adopted, including the Law on Foreigners and regulations on vehicle authorizations. All of these will directly affect, above all, Serbs in the north, but also Serbs throughout Kosovo and Metohija, with little distinction,” Radojkovic told Kosovo Online.

Institutional pressure or institutional functioning?

According to Radojkovic, local authorities in the north are already so constrained in their operations—a situation brought about by previous (Albanian) mayors.

“Budgets have already been reduced, and the Ministry of Local Government has set numerous precedents by interfering in decisions that fall within the exclusive competence of local self-government. The groundwork has been laid, the pressure already exists, and no additional measures are necessary. They will, in essence, control every move of municipal assemblies and new mayors,” he said.

As one possible example of pressure, he noted that a local authority might attempt to commission artists to repaint murals that had been whitewashed, or to create similar ones to those that previously existed in the north, but questioned whether this would be feasible, particularly given the presence of special police units.

He also warned that pressures framed within an institutional context would, in Western capitals, be interpreted as normal institutional functioning.

“That institutional framework will be sufficient for the West—especially the European Union—to view such actions as legally and institutionally grounded, so they will not be seen as institutional violence, but simply as the functioning of Pristina’s administration,” Radojkovic observed.

Political analyst Nexhmedin Spahiu offers a different perspective, arguing that it has proven incorrect to claim that Kurti is opposed to the Serbian community in Kosovo.

“Kurti has succeeded in expelling the Serbian state from Kosovo, and that is a fact. This may not be good news for Belgrade or for the authorities in Belgrade, but it does not mean that this constitutes a campaign against the Serbian minority. Serbs in Kosovo may wish to live in the Republic of Serbia, or for the Serbian state to function in Kosovo, and for Kosovo not to exist as a state—but this is a reality that emerged from the 1999 war and was implemented under Kurti’s rule. Essentially, however, this is not a policy directed against the Serbian minority,” Spahiu told Kosovo Online.

Continuation of “substantive integration”

According to Spahiu, the final integration of the north has already been achieved, and there is little left to do in terms of formal integration.

“By the very fact that representatives of the Serb List won, there is now legitimate and legal authority in Kosovo’s northern municipalities. They were sworn in before the flags of Kosovo, and all of that is in order. There is nothing more to be done in terms of formal integration.

Substantive integration, on the other hand, implies greater investment in the north and higher employment, and that is a process that continues across the whole of Kosovo,” he said.

He believes that during Albin Kurti’s next term the Serbian community should not view the authorities as adversaries, but should instead seek greater investment in the municipalities where Serbs live, as well as increased employment opportunities.

Such demands, in his view, could yield results, and the authorities would not ignore them.

Commenting on the new Kosovo government, Spahiu expects Nenad Rasic to once again be part of a coalition with Kurti, while the Serb List will sit among the opposition parties in the Kosovo Assembly.

“I expect it to be more active and to establish cooperation with other parties in parliament, Albanian and non-Albanian alike, in order to better advance the interests of the Serbian community in Kosovo. I have no objections to the way it functions, but I believe it needs to be more active and assertive, as that is in the interest of the Serbian community in Kosovo,” Spahiu emphasized.

During the “Kurti 2” government, it should be recalled, the use of the dinar in Kosovo was banned through the adoption of the Regulation on Cash Transactions, designating the euro as the sole currency permitted for cash payments—an outcome that affected all citizens who receive salaries, pensions, and other income from the Serbian budget. The import of Serbian goods was also prohibited, and such goods continue to face difficulties in reaching Kosovo.

The Kosovo police carried out raids on the premises of Serbia’s Republic Health Insurance Fund and the Pension and Disability Insurance Fund; Social Welfare Centers operating within the Serbian system were closed, as were branches of Post of Serbia.

In North Mitrovica, with the assistance of Kosovo police officers, a mural dedicated to Patriarch Pavle—who led the Serbian Orthodox Church for nearly two decades—was painted over.