As an agreement on multipolar peace remains pending, Europe steps up rearmament – where does the solution lie?

Written by: Zeljko Sajn for Kosovo Online

As Washington, Moscow and Beijing shape a new multipolar order, Europe is increasing its military 
budgets but losing political initiative. Putin has proposed talks on a new security architecture, while Macron has attempted to revive dialogue with Moscow, yet European capitals still lack a common vision. Public discontent, particularly among young people, raises the question: does the continent need a new generation of leaders?

Europe stands at a historic crossroads. The continent that built its post-Second World War identity around peace, reconciliation and economic integration is increasingly tying its future to the defense industry, higher military spending and a strategy of deterrence. Yet while expenditure on armaments continues to rise, Europe’s political influence over the resolution of the world’s major international crises has not kept pace.

According to the European Defence Agency, EU Member States allocated around €418 billion to defense in 2025, while approximately €454 billion is projected for 2026. At the NATO Summit in The Hague, a target of spending five percent of GDP on defense and related security needs by 2035 was agreed. Nevertheless, the question remains whether the continent’s security can be guaranteed in the long term solely by purchasing more weapons.

European society, however, is not united on the continuation of the war in Ukraine. Opinion polls indicate war fatigue, growing concern about the economic consequences and increasingly pronounced skepticism about the possibility of ending the conflict through a military victory by either side. In Germany, such views have also taken the form of organized peace initiatives. Politician Sahra Wagenknecht and publicist Alice Schwarzer launched their “Manifesto for Peace” in 2023, calling for an end to further arms supplies to Ukraine and the opening of negotiations. The document collected hundreds of thousands of signatures. This does not mean that European citizens reject support for Ukraine, but rather that peace, economic development and social security are becoming increasingly prominent issues in the public debate.

As early as the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Vladimir Putin warned of the dangers of a unipolar world, the expansion of military alliances and the disregard of other countries’ security interests. Seventeen years later, on June 14, 2024, he presented an initiative for a new Eurasian security architecture open to all countries on the continent, including NATO members.

The essence of the Russian proposal was that security should not be built against others, but through agreement and respect for the interests of all states.

Putin reiterated the idea on December 19, 2025, during his annual press conference with journalists and members of the public. Referring to the vision of German politician Egon Bahr, he spoke of a common security system that would include the United States, Russia and the countries of Eastern Europe, without excluding anyone.

That initiative represents a Russian political vision rather than a finalized agreement. The war in Ukraine, territorial integrity, security guarantees and the profound erosion of trust remain serious obstacles. Nevertheless, the question that arises is why Europe has failed to develop an initiative of its own that would enable discussion of the continent’s future security.

Interestingly, on December 19, 2025, Macron said that Europe needed to re-establish direct dialogue with Putin and could not remain on the sidelines while Washington and Moscow discussed issues that directly determine Europe’s future.

Two days later, the Kremlin announced that Putin was ready to speak with the French president. A concrete diplomatic step followed: on February 3, 2026, Macron’s diplomatic adviser Emmanuel Bonne traveled to Moscow, where he met with Yuri Ushakov, adviser to the Russian president.

This sequence of events demonstrated that, despite the deep political divide, the issue of direct dialogue had once again been opened. Macron’s move did not signify acceptance of Russian terms, but rather an attempt by France and Europe to restore their own diplomatic channel with Moscow.

However, this individual initiative did not become a common European policy. Differences between Paris, Berlin and other capitals remained substantial. While some insist on military deterrence, others believe that there can be no long-term security solution without political dialogue.

Meanwhile, international attention is turning toward Shenzhen, where the APEC Summit will be held on November 18 and 19. China will host leaders from across the Pacific region, while meetings between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping will carry considerable international significance. The possibility of a trilateral meeting between Trump, Putin and Xi is also being considered, although such a meeting has not yet been officially confirmed.

Shenzhen is thus becoming a symbol of a broader transformation in international relations: while Asia is opening up space for discussions on trade, technology, investment and strategic stability, Europe continues to grapple with the question of how to reconcile military security with diplomacy and economic development.

While European elites focus on strategic competition, citizens face everyday problems: expensive housing and energy, insecure employment and problems in education. Student protests and public discontent in various countries do not constitute a unified movement against rearmament, but they point to a broader crisis of confidence in political institutions. Young people are seeking a more secure future, social prospects and the opportunity to influence decisions that determine their lives.

Kosovo and Metohija represents a particular test for any new European security architecture. UN Security Council Resolution 1244 must remain part of any serious discussion about stability in the Western Balkans, because the principles of territorial integrity and international law cannot be applied selectively.

Europe therefore does not need to relinquish its right to defend itself, but rather to abandon the belief that international influence is measured exclusively by the quantity of armaments. It needs a new generation of leaders capable of engaging with Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, but with a clear mandate to represent European interests.

Such a leader would have to offer a concrete initiative: the renewal of the European security architecture, arms control, a reduction in the risk of direct conflict, respect for international law and the political resolution of crises.

The Helsinki Process of 1975 demonstrated that even at a time of profound bloc division, it was possible to establish common principles of security. Today, a new process adapted to a multipolar world is needed, with the participation of the major powers and European states.

Europe does not have to choose between the United States, Russia and China. It must find a way to engage with all three powers from the standpoint of its own interests. To do so, it needs political unity, new leaders and a positive vision of the future.

After Abu Dhabi and ahead of Shenzhen, Europe’s dilemma is becoming increasingly apparent: either Europe will find the political strength to participate in shaping the new world order, or it will remain a space in which others make decisions about its future. Its greatest deficiency today is not a lack of weapons, but a lack of leadership capable of linking security with peace, development and cooperation.