The Council of Europe as a Theater of the Absurd

Written for Kosovo Online by Dragan Bisenic

Europe, the USA, and NATO increasingly focus on political developments in the Balkans. Although a kind of “status quo” on the Ukrainian battlefields is favorable for the Biden administration in an election year, it does not mean missing opportunities to gain strategic advantages. Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly the Republic of Srpska, are still considered undefined areas and "gray zones" under Russian influence. As long as this is the case, Russia retains a small outlet into Europe's backyard.

Currently, Western strategic interests in Europe are concentrated in the triangle of the Balkans, the Baltics, and the Black Sea. The desire to strengthen the anchor points of this design explains NATO's activation along the Scandinavian and Baltic routes, as well as in Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece. General Eisenhower, as the supreme commander of American forces in Europe in the early 1950s, explained this NATO influence strategy with the figure of an "inverted bottle neck," where the tip was in Scandinavia and the base in the Balkans. Today, things have changed, Scandinavia is fully in NATO, but the Balkans remain uncovered. In today’s circumstances, "weakening" any of these nodes could lead to strategic weakening of the entire triangle and its instability.

Greece, geographically leaning on the Balkans, strengthens the region from the south for the West, weakening its hypothetical links with Turkey, which acts too independently. In recent years, Greece has positioned itself as the "southern shield" of Europe, by analogy with the political concepts of Poland as the "eastern shield" of Europe and Romania as the "Black Sea shield."

Between Scandinavia and the Black Sea, the West's position is quite strong, but in the Balkans, as one of the triangle's peaks, there remains some instability and widespread pro-Russian sympathies. The Balkans serve as a convenient springboard for access to southern Europe, Turkey, and the Middle East. Instability in the Balkans narrows Italy's and France's plans for influence in Africa, affects US strategies in the Middle East, and generally leads to a weakening of presence in the Mediterranean.

The admission of Kosovo into the Council of Europe, on one hand, serves to strengthen this front against Russia, but on the other, it does not entirely contribute to establishing unity between the US and the European Union. Regarding Kosovo, there has been an ongoing debate between the president of the Bundestag's Foreign Policy Committee, Michael Roth, and the special envoy for the Balkans, Gabriel Escobar. After the vote in the Political Committee of the Council of Europe recommended Kosovo's admission, Escobar and other US officials reminded that Kosovo should establish the Community of Serbian Municipalities and that returning the property to the Decani Monastery is not enough for entry into the pan-European organization in Strasbourg. Michael Roth reacted by stating that the additional conditions the US imposes on Kosovo for entry into the Council of Europe are unfair.

"It is completely incomprehensible that the US imposes additional conditions for Kosovo's membership in the Council of Europe. This unbalanced approach of the US towards Kosovo must finally end. It is not fair. The Council of Europe and its member states sit in the driver's seat, not the US," says Roth.

Roth shared a post by his Bundestag colleague, Frank Schwabe, who commented on US envoy Gabriel Escobar's statement that besides the decision about the Visoki Decani monastery, Kosovo must meet two conditions, including the CSM.

"With all due respect to the US Special Envoy to the Western Balkans, Gabriel Escobar, the Council of Europe enables things others could not achieve. And we will decide on Kosovo's membership application based on our rules and values," wrote Schwabe.

The US is not a member of the Council of Europe, only having observer status. German legislators are very sensitive to US representatives openly commenting on the work of European institutions, considering it their exclusive territory of operation. Russia has left the Council of Europe, and European countries have decided after long restraint on the risky experiment of admitting Kosovo to the Council of Europe. The risk is twofold: first, Kosovo is not a state organization to be admitted to the Council of Europe and second, in this case, the unwritten rule that new members are admitted by the consensus of all other members will be broken.

The discussion in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe about Kosovo will take place on Tuesday, April 16, after which there will be a vote. In the Parliamentary Assembly, votes are based on party orientation, and stances on individual issues are taken by parliamentary groups, regardless of the country they come from. The final decision on Kosovo's admission to the Council of Europe will be adopted by the Committee of Ministers on May 18. To be adopted, the decision must be voted on by two-thirds of the members, which currently number 46, requiring a majority of 31 members, while Kosovo is not recognized by 12 member states. It is most likely that Hungary will not vote for Kosovo's admission, as it did not do so at the session of the Political Committee.

This is, however, enough capacity for deputies to make the discussion on Kosovo's admission very uncomfortable for the leadership of the Council of Europe and all those who directly stand behind such an application.

In the statement of the Committee on Political Affairs that recommended discussing Kosovo in the Parliamentary Assembly, it is stated that "membership in the Council of Europe would 'catalyze momentum for Kosovo to continue to advance in strengthening human rights, democracy, and the rule of law and to address open challenges and issues of importance,' citing issues such as the gap between normative standards and their effective application, the need to improve the protection of rights of minority communities, and fostering an environment conducive to trust, reconciliation, and inclusion.

The Committee welcomed as a "great step" the implementation of the Constitutional Court's ruling in the case of the Visoki Decani monastery, adding that establishing the Association of Municipalities with a Serbian majority should be a "post-accession obligation" for Kosovo that will help ensure the protection of the rights of Kosovar Serbs and that expropriation is carried out "with the strictest respect for the law" and in full agreement with the Ahtisaari Plan.

Noting the deterioration of the security situation in the municipalities in the north of Kosovo, the Committee pointed out that "the risk of open violence in Kosovo is all too real" and assessed that security depends on "protecting the rights of the Serbian community, de-escalating tensions, and normalizing relations between Kosovo and Serbia."

Recently, the EU's High Representative for Foreign Policy, Josep Borrell, with some surprise in his voice, spoke about the "return of traditional sources of disputes, such as issues of territory, sovereignty, and national identity, along with violent conflicts and pointed to conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza." Kosovo's entry into the Council of Europe is a real example of this Borrell assessment, which he himself did not consider, because then he might have to ask, and answer, who is actually and in what way returning "traditional sources of disputes"? There is no doubt that it is now the leading European states imposing solutions that are not in accordance with any historical experience or international law, and therefore cannot be accepted in real life and practice.

Even serious Russian analysts do not think that Serbia should make any demonstrative step, because Serbia is not now in circumstances that would be to its advantage in any confrontation, and any confrontation could have a dramatic effect on it. The director of the Russian Valdai Club, Timofey Bordachev, assesses that "despite the fact that the vast majority of Serbs consider KiM part of their sovereign territory, the ruling party would be doomed to defeat in the next elections" if Belgrade breaks with Europe because of EU decisions regarding Kosovo."

What may be more significant in all this is what is being prepared to follow after Kosovo's membership in the Council of Europe. Such status and "cohabitation" of Serbia and "Kosovo" in the Council of Europe should serve as a model for how Serbia and Kosovo can be represented in the international community, even in the UN, and that, you see, it does no harm to their mutual relations. Perhaps this will be followed by ceremonial and public recognitions. But that will be just one side of ambivalence. On the other hand, there are countless lawsuits at the European Court of Human Rights against Serbia and Serbian citizens, and then the already announced lawsuit for the payment of war damages, and after that for war crimes and genocide. Along with this is connected a resolution in the General Assembly of the UN about genocide.

On the third side, there are consequences arising from the fact that Greece is directly involved in this sad and disappointing episode. This opinion, we realize, is not the end in the Greek stance on this issue. After this, Greek recognition of Kosovo can be expected, as this is another message conveyed by the Dora Bakoyannis report. It was clear a year ago, during the voting on Kosovo's application in the Committee of Ministers, that the choice of rapporteur would be instrumental to the extent that it avoids the possibility of further compromising European states that undoubtedly and completely stand behind Kosovo's independence, so the choice of personalities from countries that do not recognize Kosovo was the most optimal solution. At that voting, the abstaining states, which do not recognize Kosovo, can be ideal candidates to offer "convincingness" and "objectivity" in Kosovo's admission to the Council of Europe and thus try to overcome all violations of the Council of Europe's Statute and procedural deficiencies in this process. The position of Greece and its historical relationship with Serbia in this is unmatched.

The role of the Greek report, therefore, was not just of a technical nature. It has essential significance for minimizing the possibility of blocking Kosovo's membership in the Council of Europe.

Although it seems logical for Serbia to leave the Council of Europe, Serbia does not have many options except to remain a bewildered spectator in the theater of the absurd in which it has found itself. Formally speaking, it will have a doubled membership in the Council of Europe, as it is stated in the Dora Bakoyannis report and the opinion of "eminent lawyers" that Kosovo's admission to the Council of Europe "does not prejudge the status issue." For example, this means that Kosovo in all Council of Europe documents will be marked with an asterisk in the footnote, as it is in the actual proposal for admission to the Council of Europe. Serbia will thus be a member formally with Kosovo as a recognized territory, but also with Kosovo as a separate part of Serbia. Such a nightmarish scenario was seen only in 1950 when the Saar region, annexed by France, became a member of the Council of Europe. There are those, including former leaders of the Council of Europe, who proposed "conditional membership" for Kosovo, just by analogy with the Saar situation. However, the "Saar solution" did not last, and who can guarantee that the "Kosovo solution" will last?