European and Albanian Constitutional preconditions for North Macedonia

On October 11, 1941, the uprising in occupied Macedonia began with an attack on a Bulgarian gendarmerie station in Prilep, targeting German-Italian forces and the Albanian and Bulgarian quisling units. After liberation in 1945, this date was marked as the most significant national holiday. The Day of the National Uprising was established during the time of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a holiday of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, continued to be celebrated after Macedonia's independence in 1992, and is still observed today by the newly named Republic of North Macedonia.

The establishment of an independent and sovereign Republic of Macedonia was the result of a long historical process. The construction of the modern Macedonian state began during the National Liberation and Anti-Fascist War (1941–1944), when the Macedonian people fought for the liberation of Macedonia and the creation of a new, free, and national state. Under the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the supreme commander Josip Broz Tito, the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia brought liberation to Macedonia, which first became part of SFR Yugoslavia. After its dissolution, Macedonia gained the right to function as an independent and sovereign state, with its policies oriented towards Euro-Atlantic integration.

However, achieving these strategic goals faced significant obstacles, especially from neighboring countries like Greece and Bulgaria. Additionally, Macedonia and its people have faced attacks on their identity and language. Meanwhile, the Albanian political factor has been growing stronger, along with Albanian interests and demands.

The Prespa Agreement with Greece, constitutional changes, and the country’s renaming led to North Macedonia’s NATO membership, but not its EU membership. Bulgaria now demands further constitutional changes to recognize its people as a constituent element of North Macedonia’s Constitution, without offering reciprocity, supported by the EU. The current government opposes such conditions, seeking guarantees that if this requirement is met, the country will face no further obstacles on its path to EU integration. No such guarantees have been given, and North Macedonia was excluded from the joint EU accession package with Albania. This has further complicated relations between Albanian and Macedonian political parties.

The ruling coalition, composed of VMRO-DPMNE and the Albanian coalition VLEN, has faced internal opposition on this issue. VLEN has demanded constitutional changes within six months to align North Macedonia’s European path with Albania’s. However, according to Prime Minister Mickoski, this won’t happen without guarantees from the EU that no further conditions will be imposed. During the election campaign, VMRO-DPMNE promised no constitutional changes under Bulgarian pressure, while VLEN insists on the changes and threatens to oppose its coalition partner if North Macedonia’s EU accession prospects falter.

On the Day of Uprising, President Gordana Siljanovska Davkova urged the EU to have a clearer stance on North Macedonia, emphasizing that the EU should demonstrate a consistent enlargement policy, respecting the Copenhagen criteria. VLEN and the Albanian opposition disagree with the state positions promoted by President Siljanovska Davkova and the executive government led by Hristijan Mickoski.

During the official reception of Serbian Prime Minister Miloš Vučević in Skopje, no ministers from VLEN, a part of the government, were present. This absence may be protocol-related or coincidental. However, VLEN’s alignment with Kosovo’s Prime Minister Albin Kurti, who disagrees with both Albania’s Prime Minister Edi Rama and DUI, the largest Albanian party in North Macedonia, suggests deeper political discord. DUI, removed from power by popular vote, accuses VLEN of failing to secure the same EU accession progress for Albanians in North Macedonia as for Albania.

During the rule of SDSM and DUI, almost half of North Macedonia’s executive branch consisted of members from Albanian parties. After VMRO-DPMNE came to power, Mickoski reduced Albanian representation in the government to four ministers and the Speaker of Parliament, limiting their role to the Ohrid Framework Agreement. The recent decision by the Constitutional Court to abolish the "balancer" (a system used to ensure equitable ethnic representation in state institutions) has caused particular outrage among Albanians. The court's decision effectively removes employment privileges based on ethnicity, prioritizing qualifications, knowledge, and education.

It is clear that interethnic relations and issues play a significant role in shaping political processes, affecting many decisions, including traditional principles. With the West's hypocritical policies, which North Macedonia knows and feels well, internal conflicts are becoming sharper and threaten not only the country’s security but also the stability of the region.

The question raised in this text is whether the West's perceived hypocritical policies will continue with the Berlin Process, especially considering the previous success of the "Open Balkan" initiative in maintaining peace. The United States has supported the countries of the Western Balkans, while Germany and France have been the most resistant to the development of this initiative, allegedly with the help of Albin Kurti, aiming to undermine it.

In response, the Berlin Process allocated a budget of six billion euros for the Western Balkans, redirecting attention away from "Open Balkan." On October 16th, two billion euros will be distributed among Serbia, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, and Kosovo to boost economic growth in the region, while Bosnia and Herzegovina remains on hold.

Given the unresolved neighborly relations, especially between Bulgaria and North Macedonia, there is uncertainty about whether the EU will distribute the two billion euros unconditionally as grants and favorable loans. It’s noted that the Ukrainian crisis may be pressuring the EU to ensure that the "Balkan powder keg" does not ignite into a global explosion.

The outcome of this will depend on whether the Berlin Process can effectively address both the region’s economic needs and the lingering political tensions, or if the issues will continue to undermine progress.