FEUILLETON: 25 years of NATO bombing of Serbia (11): Espionage in Brussels and the Russian S-300

Havijer Solana
Source: Profimedia

Written for Kosovo Online by Dragan Bisenic

The Yugoslav Army did not sit idly by. Apart from direct negotiations with NATO, as the impending bombing became increasingly apparent, intelligence officers who were official representatives in Yugoslav embassies searched for information that could uncover NATO plans as much as possible and thus assist in defense preparations against NATO attacks. The representative in Brussels, Colonel Jovan Milanovic, went the furthest in this.

In an extremely successful operation, he obtained a list of targets from the French major Pierre Binel, who was in the French representation at NATO. After intense persuasion by the Yugoslav officer, Major Binel brought a document with certain targets to Colonel Milanovic's office, and that same night, until 5 in the morning, the embassy's telegraphist typed it up.

The next day, the relocation of certain targets began. NATO received a report on October 7th and 8th that there were no more targets at previous positions, so on the 12th, a decision could not be made to start bombing.

"There was alarm in NATO that the targets for aggression had disappeared. They accessed the computers and, through search, found the person who printed the plan. They asked Binel's boss, who was a general, if he had received those papers, and he replied that he had not. They asked Binel where the document, stamped with the highest secrecy, was, and he did not respond. Binel was arrested on October 19th and taken to investigative custody in Paris. The French public was informed on October 31st that Major Binel had admitted to handing over the aggression plans to the Serbian diplomat Jovan Milanovic," testified Colonel Milanovic.

"But on October 12th, a NATO Council meeting was held. That day, considering that due to the missing targets there was no possibility for aggression, they decided to negotiate with President Milosevic. In Belgrade, there were Javier Solana, Wesley Clark, and Leighton Smith, commander of the NATO southern wing. It was agreed to exchange pilots at airports as a confidence-building measure, bring in international forces as observers (2,000 people), and for the Yugoslav Army to partially withdraw some units from Kosovo to the administrative boundary zone. Also, the Ministry of Interior forces. Upon return from Belgrade, they reported to the ambassadors and proposed that the NATO Council decide to postpone aggression until October 17th. After the measures were implemented, they returned to Belgrade in five days and verified what was agreed and implemented. A decision was made to suspend aggression on October 27th. I reported to Belgrade by telegram that the aggression was postponed, but the danger had not passed."

French Army Major Pierre-Henri Binel was arrested on October 19, 1998, in Brussels on grounds of reasonable suspicion of espionage in favor of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Binel worked at NATO as the chief of staff for the French representative, General Pierre Viriot. Major Pierre-Henri Binel spent several weeks in custody after his arrest and was released pending trial. Interestingly, during his first appearance before a military investigating judge in 1999, Binel was openly supported by a group of fellow officers. The main trial before the French military court, on charges of treason, was scheduled three years later, coincidentally during President Chirac's visit to Yugoslavia. Military prosecutor Jeanine Stern emphasized that by revealing NATO military secrets, Binel had "compromised" France with its allies, which appears to be the main political argument of the lawsuit. Major Binel was sentenced to five years in prison, three of which were suspended.

Major Binel said he had no regrets about what he had done and added that he would do it all again regardless of the price he paid.

"They took away my Legion of Honor, but they cannot take away my War Cross because I earned it in war," said Binel, who is equally proud of the "Milos Obilic" medal awarded to him by Serbia for everything he did for our country.

Regarding the NATO bombing of Serbia, Binel said it was a criminal attack and a war crime. "Although prohibited by the Geneva Conventions, civilian targets were deliberately targeted. A quarter of a century has passed since the beginning of the NATO Alliance's attack on Serbia. For me, it all feels like yesterday. That period of my life is very present in my memories," Binel said to "Novosti."

He added that he had been in the Gulf War and carries strong memories from there, but according to him, all of that is nowhere near what he feels toward Serbia and the war in Yugoslavia. "There is also a strong personal dimension, considering what I have been through," he said.


Binel vividly remembers those moments when, as the chief of staff for the French representative to NATO, General Jovan Milanovic, out of humanitarian reasons, he provided plans of possible NATO targets in our country, trying to prevent the bombing. "I provided preparatory plans; the type and number of targets were known if the attack were to start, but not the exact location," he said. Unfortunately, he couldn't prevent the bombing, but he delayed it for several months. He thwarted the horrors from happening during the winter.

Meanwhile, his prison sentence was shortened, and when he was released in 2022, he changed professions and started working as a surveyor. Shortly after, he visited our country.

"My friendship with Serbs is historical, you could even say familial. My grandfather fought alongside Serbian officers under the command of General Tranié around Skopje. For me, Franco-Serbian friendship is very important. Serbia is in my heart, and Kosovo was stolen from Serbia. Kosovo is a Serbian province," emphasized Binel.

Leonid Mlechin: Russia and the Bombing

Whether there would be bombing and what the behavior of the US and NATO would be largely depended on Russia's stance. In 1999, Russia was in a very specific situation. A year earlier, it had experienced a huge financial crisis and practically went bankrupt, so Russia's position in the world and in international relations was not at all great. However, Russia played a role in the Balkans, especially in Serbia, so US President Clinton, together with NATO, sought to keep Russia in the position of a negotiator and often an advanced representative of the international community who could achieve what the West could not. However, the attitude towards Serbia and the Balkan crisis was not at all so straightforward. Russian President Vladimir Putin was very frank when recently speaking about Russia's position and its ability to influence the course of events and NATO policy towards Serbia in 1999.

Russian President Vladimir Putin believes that it is now difficult to talk about whether he would have been able to prevent the bombing of Yugoslavia.

"You understand what the point is, that the situation in Yugoslavia was different. There was a country in a state of severe internal conflict. Therefore, it is now difficult to talk about it. And it seems to me that it doesn't make much sense. Alexander is an experienced politician, I think he will agree with me, that's already gone. In any case, if we had a united ally, of course, we would build relations with him in the interests of our country and our ally. If we had any obligations in our relations, of course, we would fulfill those obligations. At that time, there were no such relations between Russia and Yugoslavia," commented Putin on the statement by Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic that Putin would not have allowed NATO to bomb Yugoslavia if he had been the head of state at the time.

According to him, Russia's leverage on the first President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, was much greater 25 years ago because Russia was dependent and had lost a significant part of its sovereignty.

"Russia was quite weak and dependent on various kinds of financial instruments and mechanisms, political, domestic political. In this sense, it can be sadly noted that Russia temporarily lost a significant part of its sovereignty," said Putin.

One of the most prolific contemporary Russian authors in the journalistic and non-fiction genre, Leonid Mlechin, describes in detail the atmosphere prevailing in Moscow at that time. He illustrated this by stating that "Russians' attitude towards the war in the territory of the disintegrated Yugoslavia depended on which party they belonged to and which newspapers they read: 'Tell me which party you are in, and I will tell you what you think about Serbia and Croatia'."

Russian nationalists saw the war that the Serbs waged against the Croats and Bosnian Muslims as a model worthy of emulation. From their point of view, "the Serbs showed the whole world that only the language of force should be used in negotiations with America and the West. Russians must follow the example of the Serbs because America has prepared Russia's fate with the fate of Yugoslavia."

According to Belgrade leaders, the Pan-Slavic idea should guarantee them Moscow's support. But why does Slavic solidarity apply only to Serbs and not to Poles, Croats, and Czechs? They are all Slavs. Is it possible to realize the Pan-Slavic idea in contemporary politics? As Alexander Solzhenitsyn said: "Well, what do we need the inflated, arrogant, worthless idea of Pan-Slavism for?"

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that NATO was waging war to destroy the Yugoslav people. In the spring of 1999, many politicians claimed that it was necessary to transfer nuclear missiles to Belarus – closer to NATO countries, supply Yugoslavia with modern weapons, or even simply provide military assistance to the Serbs.

"First of all, according to our generals, the Serbs need air defense systems. This will help them resist the bombing; NATO aviation will begin to suffer serious losses. The army believed that several battalions of S-300 missile systems, considered a reliable means of combating enemy aircraft, could be quickly transferred and deployed," Mlechin stated.

S-300 and Yugoslavia

The issue of acquiring Russian S-300 missile systems was for some time the central idea of Yugoslavia's defense against the announced air strikes in 1998 and 1999. Indications of a possible purchase of the S-300 existed even during the time of the SFRY (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). The JNA (Yugoslav People's Army) was interested in procuring that missile system. However, plans were disrupted by the civil war.

The idea resurfaced at a session of the Supreme Defense Council of the Yugoslav Army on June 2, 1993. The procurement of the S-300 was first mentioned by then-Defense Minister Pavle Bulatovic, who was assassinated in February 2000. He demanded that $124 million be allocated from the budget for the purchase of S-300 and "Tor" missile systems. He mentioned that talks were held with potential equipment suppliers, leaving open the possibility of discussing financing and offset agreements if such a purchase were approved. However, nothing came of the procurement because it all happened while FR Yugoslavia was under UN sanctions.

Bulatovic revived the same story only two years after Dayton, in 1997, when he again mentioned the procurement of the systems in the media. Former Air Force and Air Defense commander General Spasoje Smiljanic reveals that the then-commander of the Air Force Ljubisa Velickovic and Assistant Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army for Air Force and Air Defense Major General Mirko Vucinic drafted a proposal for the modernization of the Air Force and Air Defense. This act also envisaged the acquisition of two S-300 PMU-2 missile divisions, for which 1.2 billion dinars were needed.

In the second half of 1997, then-President of the Federal Government Radoje Kontic met with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin in Moscow. The head of the Russian government said that the request would be considered, but no response was received.

The following year, in 1998, the crisis in Kosovo and Metohija escalated, and open threats of NATO bombing once again shifted the focus of the country to the S-300. Former Prime Minister Momir Bulatovic wrote about it: "We pulled out old and new connections, involving diplomats and businessmen. Neither secret nor underground channels yielded the desired results. Otherwise, the enormously high price was not a particular problem. The insurmountable difficulty was its size. Such a large system could not pass through any of the well-developed alternative channels. This system was supposed to serve as a deterrent since aggression was inevitable."

In December 1998, Russian Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeyev arrived in Belgrade with a large delegation. In closed talks with representatives of the FR Yugoslavia government and military leadership in Belgrade, he expressed readiness to provide the delivery of the S-300 missile system. Five days after these talks in Belgrade, a delegation from FR Yugoslavia, whose visit was organized by Ambassador Borisav Milosevic, arrived in Moscow. A working meeting was scheduled with the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, and there was an open possibility for members of the delegation to meet with President Boris Yeltsin.

However, at the very beginning of the meeting, the Russian side stated that "unfortunately, President Yeltsin received the outline agreement from Belgrade with great reserve."

Yeltsin's Rejection

At the meeting, as one of the participants recounted, there was a tense atmosphere. "The hosts inquired about the preparations for the expected NATO aggression since we were told in Belgrade that they had reliable information that it would happen in the next few months. Our representatives from the Ministry of Defense reported on the progress of preparations and lamented about having outdated technology, so if there was aggression, our defense would be inadequate and very weak. Halfway through that conversation, the doors of the room where the meeting was held opened, and President Yeltsin appeared on them. He warmly greeted everyone, sat at the head of the table, and asked how the talks were going, saying, 'Brothers, how can we help you?'

Everyone was confused; the head of our delegation started to stutter, unable to find the right words to return the conversation to the topic for which they had come. President Yeltsin didn't even listen to him; he looked through him and interrupted him: 'Marshal Sergeyev reported to me after coming back from Belgrade; I am informed about the details of your talks. You must understand us, understand our position; if we give you the S-300 system, Serbia will provoke World War III.' With that, the discussion on this topic was concluded.

Simultaneously with these attempts, efforts were made to procure the S-300 from another Slavic brother - Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. The delegation that went to Minsk in October 1998 was led by Zoran Lilic. Retired General Blagoje Grahovac also testifies about this in his book "Voices from the Soundproof Room," stating that everything was very strange from the beginning, considering that their formal host, the chief of the General Staff of the Belarusian Army, was not informed about their arrival in Minsk. To make matters worse, a delegation led by Lukashenko's son went to Belgrade at the same time to inquire about what Yugoslavia needed. The Yugoslav delegation, of course, returned to Belgrade empty-handed.

 

To be continued: Ambiguity of the Russian Position