FEUILLETON 25 years since the NATO bombing of Serbia (8): Demonizing the "charming person"

Writing for Kosovo Online: Dragan Bisenic

The political and ideological preparation for the bombing continued during sessions of the Senate bodies. In the Foreign Policy committees, senators, along with other invited speakers, discussed the options available to pursue US policy. Senator Biden reminded those present that he had been in Belgrade for the first time in April 1993 and had a long, three-hour meeting with the President of Serbia, which he announced.

"At one point, in his office, and it was late at night, he looked at me across a small table and asked, 'What do you think of me?' I said, 'I think you're a damned war criminal and you should be tried,'" Biden began. Then he added that the reason he mentioned this was the response of the President of Serbia. "He looked at me, cold as ice, and roughly said: 'I wish you good luck, have a nice day, and by the way, would you like to talk to Radovan Karadzic?' I then said to him: Well, I thought you didn't control him.' He replied: ’Yes, I don't control him. Would you like to talk to him?' This happened at 11 o'clock at night.

He dialed his phone, and 15 minutes later, a man with the kind of hair I wish I had, a mind I'm glad I don't have, and an attitude I wouldn't wish on anyone, appeared on the stairs, literally panting, I swear to you! He entered the room, sat next to Milosevic, and said, 'Mr. President, sorry (panting), sorry for being late. I'm sorry.' And I looked at Milosevic and said, 'Without control, huh?'

Biden emphasized that Milosevic "has control" and doesn't know "how to achieve any real progress other than by force" because that was "the only thing he responds to." Biden reiterated that "nothing else" affected the President of Serbia. He did not directly oppose Senator Bob Dole's demands for Kosovo to become a "republic," but he reiterated the need to clearly tell the KLA that "we are not seeking an independent Kosovo," because "that is not our goal." "This is a tough thing, and the longer we delay, the harder it will be," Biden concluded.

Robert Dole then raised his hand to speak again. Obviously, Biden's presentation had impressed him to some extent, as he even singled out special compliments for the President of Serbia.

"In my opinion, he is a very charming person, with whom you can sit and he will say to you: Well, stay for lunch or dinner or the whole night or even a week." When you meet with Tudjman, Izetbegovic, and Milosevic, he is the charmer in that group because he wants to get rid of the sanctions. I was there in January. He told me that two years were enough: We've been under sanctions long enough." I replied: What about Kosovo? "Yes. We've made great progress in Kosovo. I'm about to announce a major education program agreement." Just a few weeks later, the first people were killed. You can't trust him after all," Dole concluded.

Departing director of the Carnegie Foundation and former ambassador to Turkey, and later a very influential figure in the policy led by Madeleine Albright, Morton Abramowitz, began by stating that "thanks to the active support of the Yugoslav People's Army, Bosnian Serbs were allowed to forcibly carve out and implicitly gain international recognition of a practically independent state within Bosnia," but that "Albanians in Kosovo, who make up 90 percent of the population, have been denied such an opportunity, largely because they still do not have weapons."

He rejected claims coming from Serbia and the world that the KLA were terrorists. "The question arises: who are the terrorists? Milosevic says they are Albanian separatists. It seems that many in the West accept this view. For them, a rebel movement fighting against Mr. Milosevic's brutal apartheid is morally lower on the scale than state terrorism," Abramowitz warned.

He then launched even stronger and with much greater exaggeration against the President of Serbia, insinuating that he should be on the US list of terrorists. "Of course, as we have already heard, Milosevic is responsible, or largely responsible, for imposing a virtual police state in Kosovo over the past 10 years, and in Bosnia for the deaths of hundreds of thousands, the displacement of millions, and for empowering and supporting war criminals. He is now accepted as someone who legitimately exercises his authority as the President of Serbia. He is not a candidate for the US list of terrorists," Abramowitz said.

Addressing Bob Dole regarding the mention of the region, he emphasized that the "stakes are huge" and involved "the futures of Kosovo, Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia, and Albania, and perhaps even a wider area, including Greece, Bulgaria, and Turkey." "Americans are particularly interested in Bosnia, where we have 8,000 soldiers, which could be seriously threatened - it's about stability that could be seriously jeopardized by what is happening in Kosovo," Morton Abramowitz presented his understanding.

He assumed that Milosevic could use his influence on the Bosnian Serbs to threaten Kosovo as he "probably can topple Milorad Dodik." "However, it seems that the magnitude of the roles does not make it easier for Western nations to understand what needs to be done. NATO is divided. The US government is divided again, and the Russians have their own views. Milosevic is well aware of all this, and he has shown that he is capable of benefiting from our differences to defy Western demands," Abramowitz pointed out.

"The question now is whether the situation can be changed without further violence, which is spiraling out of control and radicalizing all Albanians, including those in Macedonia. Progress toward stopping violence in Kosovo requires, in my opinion, at least two things. First, the Serbs must immediately cease their military campaign. But that must go hand in hand with another: a concrete offer and urgent implementation of serious political change in Kosovo. So how do we achieve these two things? And they may still be insufficient. Here are some options, in my opinion," Abramowitz said.

He outlined four scenarios. The West could designate the KLA as terrorists, close the border - help to close the border with Albania for them - and at the same time insist that Milosevic follows these steps by ceasing hostilities, initiating immediate political change in Kosovo, and engaging in serious political negotiations with the Albanians. Many believe that US policy is heading in this direction.

Secondly, we can risk and hope that the fighting will not escalate too much, that it will be a low-intensity war for a few years, and wait for Milosevic to fall, thereby changing the balance of power.

The third alternative is to threaten Milosevic that we will destroy a significant portion of his military establishment if he does not cease military operations and immediately offer real political change in Kosovo. Frankly, it's hard to avoid the conclusion that NATO, despite its strong rhetoric, hesitates to use force. I don't think they will use force unless there are even more refugees coming from Kosovo, especially towards Macedonia.

Fourthly - we don't want to use force. We can make it clear to Milosevic that if he is not willing to immediately stop the violence and implement rapid and serious political change in Kosovo, we will do everything to overthrow him, including supporting the KLA. Obviously, if he agrees, we will have to pressure the Albanians to stop the violence," Abramowitz concluded.

His alternatives resonated within the administration. Although he himself did not believe in the use of force, which he desired, US policy embraced Abramowitz's most radical proposals, which included the 3rd and 4th options: destroying military capabilities through the use of force and, in conjunction with that, overthrowing the President of Serbia. Abramowitz spoke about this several times, but always with the same message.

At the same time, questions arose about the attitudes of US generals towards the planned NATO action. In the fall of 1997, John Shalikashvili was retiring, and the choice of his successor became a significant decision, especially with the last chapter of the Balkans yet to be written. It was never just a matter of talent, and there was no sure source for Shalikashvili's replacement. One of the leading candidates was General Jack Sheehan, a marine. He was a formidable figure, intellectually superior, unusually confident, and equally outspoken, always unwilling to compromise on matters he believed were significant. However, he made both civilian and military officials nervous due to his unique brusqueness. He tended to tell his officers that they should always prepare for battle in the last war, not the next one. On strategic matters, he agreed with some visions of the Clinton administration on what the USA could do in a changing and disorderly world to help stabilize it at relatively low costs. In fact, probably no officer was a greater critic of the military's failure to adapt and prepare for the new types of tasks the country faced – tasks that required restructuring military forces and reassessing US military strategy to conduct smaller, lower-intensity wars in second and third-world countries. Both Clinton and Burger were intrigued by Sheehan's talent and intelligence, but by White House standards, he was highly risky.

Just a year earlier at a conference at the Aspen Institute where many significant figures from national security had gathered, Sheehan had startled the audience with his frank speech. Cheap military missions without casualties are wishful thinking, he said. If the US military intends to wage war abroad, then it's better to assume that it will cost a significant amount of money "and will put your sons and daughters on a dangerous path." Sheehan sought to impress high-level officials.

There was no doubt about Sheehan's intelligence, talent, and determination. He was exactly what the military liked. He was nearly two meters tall, a former college basketball player in Boston, and a recipient of the Silver Star in Vietnam. But he wasn't always liked by other officers. Once he told an armored commander that his tanks were essentially useless due to technological changes in weaponry and their vulnerability to new weapons. Shalikashvili did not recommend Sheehan for the chairman, fearing the resentment of other officers. Privately, he was considered the smartest of all the candidates with equally good combat records as any other nominee. In terms of strategy, his vision could parallel that of Clinton's civilian officials, and that was a problem. If a situation arose where the use of armed forces was required, he would demand a strong commitment – what are the roles and missions, what is the exit strategy, how would the administration publicly support the military, and where does Congress fit into the story? Would the military go in and then find, if things got complicated, that they were left on their own? Sheehan, it was estimated, would be the most difficult to control of all the senior officers, and if there was any disagreement over strategy, he would likely withdraw in protest. That was a nightmare. This great, extremely impressive marine, who agreed with the Clinton administration's theory of what to do in foreign policy, could go public if there was no willingness to fulfill the necessary commitment. He was not appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

However, he did not remain without a role in Balkan issues.

In March 2010, he testified before the US Congress that, according to the chief of staff of the Dutch army at the time of the incident, the fall of Srebrenica was caused by a lack of readiness because the Dutch were more focused on internal "socialization" of the army than on its combat capability. Sheehan said that this was partly due to homosexual men serving in the military. During the same testimony, Sheehan stated that homosexuals had weakened the military, whereas attraction between men and women in gender-integrated units would not have done so.

Speculations suggest that Sheehan was referring to General Henk van den Breemen, the chief of the Dutch General Staff at the time of the Srebrenica events. General van den Breemen denied having said anything like that and called Sheehan's comments "utter nonsense." Dutch Minister of Defense Eimert van Middelkoop stated that Sheehan's statement was "shameful," and "unworthy of anyone in the military." Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende described Sheehan's words as "shameful," "outrageous," "beneath contempt," and "disrespectful to all those involved in the troops." Dutch advocates for gay rights, organized by the Pink Army Foundation and the Foundation for Homosexuality and Armed Forces, announced a defamation lawsuit against Sheehan and demanded public apologies. The majority of the Dutch parliament expressed support for the collective lawsuit.

Tomorrow - Milosevic to Short: So, you're the man who's going to bomb me?