FEUILLETON: 25 years of NATO bombing of Serbia (10): Clark's assessments that Milosevic wants to kill all Albanians

Written for Kosovo online by Dragan Bisenic

The negotiators spent nearly three hours explaining the plan in great detail. "We showed them a map of the areas where we intended to conduct reconnaissance and the buffer zone we deemed necessary. We discussed the need for them to move their MiGs and their SA3 and SA6 so that our forces were not endangered.

General Short assessed that the "general in charge of the Serbian Air Force was very courteous". It was General Ljubisa Velickovic who later died during the bombing, while visiting units in the field. "I met him earlier. He said, 'Thank you very much for your presentation. It is clear that we were not prepared for this. I need to gather my experts,' Sort said.

The next day, the general said: "Thank you again for your presentation. What you have proposed violates everything I have stood for in my career as a Serbian officer. NATO forces would violate Serbian airspace and the promise to the Serbian people that I would not allow NATO to enter our country. The Serbian people would be terribly disappointed if I allowed this to happen, so I cannot accept your proposal under any circumstances."

Sort said he was "terribly disappointed and, frankly, shocked by his logic." "He is an old combat pilot, like me. I said, 'General, first of all, the Serbian people will be disappointed in your interpretation of your responsibility... If you force me into war against you, and they find out that this war could have been prevented if you had accepted our very reasonable terms for a non-intrusive reconnaissance regime over your country - and that instead you almost single-handedly chose to be bombed, instead of painting in Kosovo - I think the Serbian people will be very, very disappointed in you. I think you are making a very bad decision. However, if this is really your decision, let me say that I know you believe you understand how NATO fights, and how America fights in particular. You have studied the Gulf War and the operation in Bosnia in 1995. I know you think you understand how I will do my job. But you're not even close. Whatever you did, you can't imagine what it will be like. The speed and violence and deadliness and destruction that will happen are beyond anything you can imagine. If, indeed, you refuse to accept my terms, we must immediately end this meeting. I suggest you go outside, get in a car and drive around the city of Belgrade. Remember what it looks like today. If you force me into war against you, Belgrade will never look like that again - never in your life, or in the life of your children. Belgrade and your country will be destroyed if you force me to fight," Sort threatened.

- Did you really mean this?

- Absolutely. This was different from a bluffing point, and professional soldiers don't bluff.

- But you didn't have the authority to do that...

- Of course I did. I was the commander of the air force, and if we were to go to war, I had no doubt it would eventually come to that. Blood was running down his face, and he said, "General Short, I've known you for several years... I no longer respect you because you threatened me, and I have lost respect for you. "I thought to myself, 'Boy, did I mess up.'

I told him, "I'm disappointed that you no longer respect me, because I still respect you as a professional. I think you have made a bad judgment, but I respect you. But if you no longer respect me, then that is a very serious matter, because then you and I can no longer negotiate. I will now leave the room and call General Clark. I will tell him to withdraw me as his military negotiator, because you and I no longer have the kind of relationship we need for negotiations. We don't have to love each other, but we have to respect each other as professionals. So I have to withdraw from these negotiations and have someone you can respect replace me."

The translator conveyed my comments to the general. He returned and essentially said, "Maybe I went too far. I still respect you. I cannot accept your terms, but I understand that you are a professional like me, and I still respect you. We can continue to talk." I wasn't bluffing.

I thought maybe I had gone too far and wouldn't be useful on the mission anymore. It turned out that wasn't the case. This was probably a pretty good thing to throw cold water in this guy's face, and let's get back to the table. And then we got back to negotiations," General Short said in his confession.

Today, a quarter century after the bombing, the "ambassadorial five" issued a statement reaffirming their support for the bombing and military action because it "prevented a humanitarian catastrophe." As they state in their joint statement, on March 24, 1999, the military intervention "that no one wanted" began.

The Allied Force operation was designed to force Slobodan Milosevic, then President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to stop the abuse of the civilian population in Kosovo, to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, and to enable refugees and displaced persons to return, and humanitarian organizations to access Kosovo - the statement said.

The operation, as it is added, was launched after all political and diplomatic means to convince Slobodan Milosevic to opt for a negotiated solution and peace in Kosovo, based on the Rambouillet agreement and fulfilling the demands of Security Council Resolution 1199, adopted within Chapter VII with the support of Russia".

Since it was known in advance that a "humanitarian catastrophe" was prevented? An interesting answer was provided by General Wesley Clark, who commanded the bombing of Serbia. At the time the "activating order" for the bombing was given, intensive diplomatic negotiations were underway, involving senior military commanders as well. At the meeting on October 25, 1998, in Belgrade, when the agreement was signed, General Wesley Clark recorded that the Serbian president, despite the agreement, intended to violently and ruthlessly deal with the Albanian population. His assessment later played a role in the overall American stance in favor of bombing and was the subject of a polemical discussion at the Hague Tribunal during the trial of Slobodan Milosevic, when General Clark appeared as a prosecution witness.

"First I'll set the context, and then I'll go into details. What he said was, and that was immediately after the agreement of October 25 when we reached an agreement, but when it was not yet signed. So, there was some relaxation, a general relaxation, he addressed me and explained to me, in essence he said that the Serbs know how to deal with such people. He was talking about the Kosovo Albanians and this problem after the Second World War, and if I remember his words well, he said: 'We've done this before.' I asked: 'When?', and he said: '1946 in Drenica.' I asked: 'What did you do?', and he said: 'We killed them, we killed them all.' General Nauman and I looked at him, because clear emotions were visible on his face and it was an emotional outburst. We simply looked at him, and then he explained it, he said: 'Of course, we didn't do it all at once, it lasted for several years,' but what I understood was that he equated resistance in Kosovo in 1998 with the situation after the Second World War and that he intended to end that problem in the same way it was done before, despite the statement he had prepared and which I was supposed to take back to NATO headquarters. So, to me, it was a real indicator of his state of mind. I also paid attention to the behavior of other members, to the gestures of the others who were at that meeting and it was about the irrationality of the accused that did not tolerate any arguments, as they all flinched when he was saying that. General Nauman and I felt as if they had seen it before, so it seemed to me that it was something that was characteristic of their leader at that time. That's why I mentioned it during the testimony, because I think it was an important indication of his state of mind that influenced the activities and actions in Yugoslavia towards the people in Kosovo in the autumn of 1998. So, that is the period when between 300,000 and 400,000 people were driven out of their homes, so, that is the period when General Djordjevic told me about how they needed only two more weeks to kill them all, and then I heard Milosevic saying that, and I got the impression that I understood what was the force that motivated all those Serbian actions", testified General Clark.

He continued that it was "shocking to him that he wanted to solve this problem in the same way." The American general said that "it was shocking how vehemently he said that." "It was an emotional statement and now as I listen to his voice, I remember how much it froze me when I realized what was behind what he said, because it seemed to me that there was a will to eliminate the problem by killing them all, regardless of what was previously said in the statement," Clark interpreted. Essentially, Clark said he understood that despite the signed agreement, Serbia would treat Albanians as they did in 1946. "Therefore, these were not normal police activities and disproportional force was used here, this was an illegal form of using force and this was actually a replica of what happened in 1946," said Clark.

Milosevic rejected these claims and called them "mockery of elementary logic".

What is important here is General Clark's recognition that he recommended that "the US and NATO must not allow another round of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, led by the accused" and "I made great efforts to warn the United States government about what would happen, I made recommendations for a policy that were accepted and the United States took action to prevent ethnic cleansing. Some people in Washington disagreed with that, but we did it anyway. I am very proud of what we have achieved. We saved a million and a half Kosovo Albanians from ethnic cleansing", said Clark. He said there were "political differences" on this issue with General Hugh Shelton, who was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Milosevic then referred to an article in "The New Yorker" of November 17, which published an interview with General Clark and a part where it says: "General Hugh Shelton, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who was Clark's boss in 1999 when Clark was told in an undiplomatic way to get off his position, so from the position of Supreme Commander of Allied Forces for Europe". And then Shelton is quoted as saying: "I've known Wes for many years," Shelton said, "I'll tell you the reason he left Europe earlier, and it had to do with integrity and character issues. Wes won't get my vote".

Former Assistant Secretary of State for Russia, Strobe Talbott, published his memoirs about his diplomatic actions in Moscow during the bombing of Belgrade under the title "The Russian Hand." Talbott was a correspondent for Time magazine in Belgrade in the 1970s. He explained why the United States did not believe it necessary to have the approval of the UN Security Council for their action. "The United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution expressing protest and the terms of a settlement. Milosevic gladly rejected the resolution. His rejection was based on the position that Kosovo, under international law, was recognized as an integral part of Serbia and the truncated Yugoslavia (which also included the republic of Montenegro). The way Belgrade treated separatists and terrorists on its territory - how it treated the Kosovars and Kosovo - was a matter for Belgrade and no one else.

In the West, for many, including the Clinton administration, Milosevic's "statements on sovereignty did not present a serious legal argument to prevent the international community from stopping him from killing and expelling part of the population," because "the vast and systematic mistreatment of Kosovars had turned into a form of crimes against humanity; it was certain that the fire in Kosovo, if not extinguished in time, would spread across state borders," Talbott explained.

At the same time, meetings at the White House were held in a special setting, especially after the events in Racak. "The latest crime, particularly horrific and well-covered in the media, committed in September, shook the United States government and prompted the start of a new round of intensive diplomatic activity. Sandy Berger convened a meeting and, to keep us focused, placed a copy of the front page of The New York Times in front of each of us dominated by a color photograph - a photograph of the corpse of an elderly Albanian, a peasant, with his throat cut. The meeting ended with a decision to double efforts to find a way out of the double squeeze brought about by Western Europe and Russia. If we solved that problem, we would be ready, for the first time, to authorize emergency NATO action," Talbott testified.

To be continued tomorrow: Espionage in Brussels and the Russian S 300