Return of Snap Elections

Written for Kosovo Online by Muharem Bazdulj

In parallel developments, the government fell in the Republic of Serbia, and in its southern province, which the authorities in Belgrade have not had effective control over for more than a quarter of a century, elections were held. A cynic might say that there is no better proof of the thesis that Kosovo is Serbia than the various synchronicities that have persisted since Kosovo declared independence. For instance, until these recent elections, there had never been regular elections in Kosovo, only snap ones. Now, however, Albin Kurti’s party has managed to govern for an entire electoral cycle. Similarly, during the same period, Serbia has had a tendency toward snap elections. Following the parliamentary acceptance of Vucevic's resignation by the majority, the selection of a new government is expected, and it is realistic to anticipate that the next elections in Serbia will be regular ones. However, the possibility remains that we might see another snap election this spring.

Returning to the regular elections in Kosovo. Last time, Albin Kurti and his Self-Determination movement secured an absolute majority of over 50 percent of the votes. In such a situation, there was no doubt about forming a government. With additional support from minority MPs, he had a more than stable majority. According to all statements and propaganda from the election campaign, he expected the same or similar results in these elections. Although his party did indeed achieve the best result by a significant margin, it was far from an absolute majority. They won just over 40 percent of the votes, which means they will have 47 out of 120 MPs in parliament. The Democratic Party of Kosovo won 22 percent of the votes, and the Democratic League of Kosovo 17 percent, which translates into 25 and 20 seats respectively, totaling 45, nearly matching Kurti’s result. An additional 8 seats were won by the coalition of the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo led by Ramush Haradinaj and Fatmir Limaj’s party (which accounts for 7.4 percent of the votes). In total, that makes up one hundred seats, plus there are ten seats reserved for minorities and another ten for Serbs.

If the three Albanian lists united against Kurti, they would have 53 votes versus Kurti’s 47. With minority votes, Kurti has 57 votes and therefore lacks four for a very thin, bare majority. In this context, the result of the ten Serbian mandates is very important. As it stands, it is not yet clear whether the Serb List won all ten or if Nenad Rasic has indeed won one. So, if Rasic were to support Kurti’s majority again, that would be 58 votes, while a union of all other Albanian parties and their agreement with (at least) nine Serb List MPs would create a majority of 62 MPs.

Some analysts and commentators, who do not hide their sympathies for Kurti, claim that he will again form a government without any particular problems. They confidently predict that Kurti will attract some "defectors" in one way or another. This, of course, is not impossible. Those who already hold power are initially at some advantage, and there are practically no post-Yugoslav governments that have not been formed at one point or another thanks to defectors. What also works in Kurti's favor is the fact that he has greater control over his list than a coalition composed of four parties, that is, two parties and one pre-election coalition.

However, there are also factors that do not necessarily work in Kurti's favor. Namely, the overwhelming majority of the international community, led by the USA, is against him. The influence of the American embassy in Pristina is anything but insignificant. In this sense, it is not guaranteed that all ten minority votes will side with Kurti. There is a kind of fine unwritten tradition in the world that minorities should not be the deciding factor in who takes power, but that it is quite natural and logical for them to join the majority once it is already formed. This has often been the case, for example, with Serbian MPs in Croatia over the last quarter-century.

One should not dismiss the possibility, as has been repeated several times in Bulgaria in recent years, that it might be impossible to form any majority, even one that would elect a minority government. In that situation, snap elections are of course on the agenda. Even if a majority is formed, as the results very clearly suggest, it will be very weak and thin. In such a case, the possibility of snap elections will hang in the air from the very beginning. Thus, the most likely possible forecast is a return to the mode of snap elections; that is, it is hard to imagine that the next elections in Kosovo and Metohija will be held only in 2029.