Kurti's Gamble: How Unilateralism Backfired in Kosovo's Elections?

Written for Kosovo Online by Helena Ivanov, Research Associate at the Henry Jackson Research Center

Not long ago, Mr. Kurti was confident that he would secure another landslide victory for his Vetëvendosje (“Self-Determination”) party (VV), expecting a repeat of the 2021 results. So assured was he that he “had hinted before the vote that he would prefer to sit in opposition if his party was unable to form a majority government” and frequently branding the opposition as “’animals’ and ‘thieves’ ready to make a deal ‘with the devil’ against his government.”

But reality proved different. VV secured around 41% of the vote – more than any other party but not enough for an outright majority. This means Kurti must now seek coalition partners to remain in power. The Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) followed with 22%, while the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) took 18%. Importantly, the Serb parties ended their boycott and chose to participate in the elections, with Srpska Lista (endorsed by Belgrade authorities) sweeping all 10 available mandates. While this victory possibly puts Srpska Lista “in the position of kingmaker” it is extremely unlikely, if not impossible, that Srpska Lista would ever enter a coalition with Mr Kurti.

Thus, Mr Kurti now sings a different tune, vowing to hold onto power and forge a new government. However, how he intends to achieve this remains uncertain. Experts predict that any new government will be unstable, with some even suggesting Kosovo could be heading back to the polls sooner rather than later.

How, then, has Mr. Kurti found himself in this predicament? The answer lies in his stance towards ethnic Serbs in the north of Kosovo. On one hand, some of his supporters back his tougher approach, believing that extending control over the north is in Kosovo’s best interest.

However, Kurti’s hardline position has been marked by a series of unilateral actions and a failure to honour previous commitments, including the creation of the Association of Serb Municipalities (ASM). These moves have not only stalled the normalization talks between Belgrade and Pristina but have also “antagonized Kosovo’s main backers – the EU and the US.”

The EU has imposed a series of measures, the effects of which are kicking in. Moreover, just days before the elections when Mr Kurti praised Kosovo’s relations with Washington, Richard Grenell (the former US envoy for Serbia and Kosovo) stated that Mr Kurti was “delusional” and that “relations have never been lower.”

In turn, many voters who prioritise strong relations with Western partners – and who are now bearing the consequences of their deterioration – have turned away from Mr Kurti and VV, hoping that a different leader and government will adopt a more pragmatic approach to the issue of ethnic Serbs, honour the previously signed and accepted agreements, and repair the strained ties with the US and the EU.

Who will form the next Kosovo government and how long that partnership will last remains to be seen, but an important lesson must be drawn from this election outcome. Unilateral actions come at a very high cost – first and foremost for the people of Kosovo, whether they are of Serb ethnicity, who bear the direct consequences, or whether they are Albanian, impacted indirectly by a dysfunctional society and more directly by EU measures. Secondly, such moves are damaging for the countries themselves, as evidenced by Kosovo’s growing isolation. Therefore, whoever becomes Prime Minister would be wise to return to the negotiation table with a more constructive approach, starting by fulfilling the pledges and commitments, some of which – like the ASM – were made over a decade ago.