Vuksanovic: China does not recognize Kosovo's independence, but sees it as a European problem

China does not recognize Kosovo's independence, but its role in the Kosovo dispute is much more complicated than it appears at first glance, Vuk Vuksanovic, a senior researcher at the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, assesses for Kosovo Online, adding that there is a desire in Belgrade for China to be a "more outspoken protector."

Vuksanovic points out that the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping demonstrates "the reality we have been witnessing over the past six years: that China has replaced Russia as Serbia's primary partner outside the Western world."

"It is evident that Belgrade understands that Beijing has much more capacity than Moscow. However, due to the war in Ukraine, and the fact that relations between Serbia and Russia are under constant monitoring and potential pressure, the Serbian ruling coalition may see this as an opportunity to play a different card. This visit is a continuation of the old foreign policy: on one hand, you use China and Russia to tell the West, 'Take us more seriously, give us a better offer, or we'll go elsewhere,' but it is also a confirmation of this other shift where the Russian card begins to be replaced by the Chinese card," our interlocutor believes.

Regarding China's role in the Kosovo dispute, he adds that it is a much more complicated question than it seems at first glance.

"China, although not recognizing Kosovo primarily due to its territorial disputes and issues like Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, or Hong Kong, unlike Russia, does not stand out with its veto in the Security Council because the traditional Chinese policy has been 'we don't veto in the SC except in disputes and conflicts that directly affect Chinese strategic interests.' So far, it has been more convenient for China to 'fly under the radar,' to leave the baton to Russia," Vuksanovic says.

He emphasizes that we will see if that approach changes.

"Belgrade had China's support when seeking the International Court of Justice's opinion in The Hague on the legality of Kosovo's independence, and the Chinese supported Belgrade's initiative, but in line with this policy of 'flying under the radar.' For example, they didn’t delegate their judge to the final process, even though they had the right. Now, as China becomes increasingly ambitious, it is ready to bend its policy, as it mediated between Iran and Saudi Arabia, but whether it will want to become active in the Kosovo dispute in a similar way is a question," he notes.

According to him, for now, China seems to perceive the Kosovo issue as a distant dispute that is primarily a European problem.

"But there is a Belgrade interest and a desire among leaders in Belgrade for China to be a more outspoken protector of Belgrade because Belgrade doesn't like a trend they see, which is Moscow using the Kosovo precedent to justify territorial annexation in Ukraine and other locations in the post-Soviet space. This puts Belgrade in a very awkward position, as can be seen from the statements of Serbian officials but also from Serbia's voting in the UN," Vuksanovic believes.

He adds that one of the key messages of the Chinese president's European tour is that, in a way, the EU remains one of China's most important markets. He reminds us that due to various issues such as the pandemic, the war in Ukraine, market competition, "there is discomfort regarding China in Europe," defining China in documents as a systemic rival and an actor with a different conception of the international system than the EU.

"This was a Chinese attempt to continue to show some leadership, to maintain some form of communication with Europe, and in that regard, three very specific countries were chosen. On the one hand, two Eastern European countries, Serbia and Hungary, where the elites in power are very open to China, and on the other hand, France, which currently with President Macron has this informal title of EU's political leader," he explains.

Vuksanovic emphasizes that there will most likely be a degree of Beijing's interest in Southeastern Europe because the war in Ukraine interrupted a very important branch of the Belt and Road Initiative, the one that was supposed to connect China to Europe through Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian territory.