Kosovo in regional relations - Between "Yugosphere" and "Greater Albania"

For Kosovo Online: Dragan Bisenic, journalist

The vote regarding Kosovo's application for membership in the Council of Europe reopened the question of Kosovo's place in the complex and sensitive regional relations of the Western Balkans and Southeastern Europe.

Regardless of the fact that it can be considered that Serbia approached this application with a certain amount of fatalism, it cannot be ignored that not a single country from the region sided with Serbia.

Serbia, namely, was limited in two ways. First, by his acceptance of the document on future relations with Kosovo and the fulfillment of its Article 4, it denies itself the possibility of opposing the admission of Kosovo in international organizations. Second, with its overall attitude towards Germany and its role as a dominant individual economic partner in Serbia, and through the European Union, an even more prominent factor in the Serbian economy. In contrast to the principles of a liberal order in which the dominant country, the USA, promoted that order, without seeking special benefits for themselves for a long time, the European Union and Germany formulated a policy of political conditioning of their economic and investment activities, which was absolutely unequivocally communicated to Serbia. In such circumstances, voting against Serbia was a "safe" game. It was considered that Serbia's opposition would be too risky, with no prospect of the outcome changing significantly, and other Western Balkan countries are not in a better position either. Montenegro, North Macedonia and Albania are members of NATO, which is a sufficient cohesive factor for such a decision, while Bosnia and Herzegovina took advantage of the legislative vacuum.

Despite this, Kosovo is far from a factor of regional harmony and stability. It plays different roles in the perspectives and plans of regional countries, even if they are publicly united on the side of Kosovo. According to Kosovo officials, the dominant political partner in the region, if Albania is excluded, is Croatia. A few days ago, the Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Pristina and confirmed this closeness, and so did his hosts. "As a member country of the EU and NATO, Kosovo sees Croatia as a success story and a model that should be followed in terms of economic and democratic achievements, but also in terms of respecting the rights of minorities," said Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti.

Kurti strongly emphasizes the example of the Joint Council of Municipalities with a Serbian majority, which was defined by the Erdut Agreement, as a model for what Kosovo would offer to the Community of Serbian Municipalities. Kurti, apart from this, also has a deeper message. He asks, if Serbia recognized Croatia with this position of the Serbs, then why would Serbia not recognize Kosovo under the same conditions? The logic, it must be said, is partially correct, but it ignores that Milosevic and Tudjman made concessions to each other and that during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, they had common goals.

A frequent guest in Kosovo, where the Croatian army contingent is located, is the Croatian president, Zoran Milanovic.

Milanovic, who is in frequent misunderstandings and arguments with the ministers and the president of the Croatian government, however, expressed the harshest criticism of the nature of Kosovo's independence. In a statement in which he asked that the Russians not be compared to "Serbian shoemakers", the Croatian president called the Kosovo case "annexation" where he did not question Kosovo, but the whole concept. "We annexed Kosovo. We and the international community. It was taken from Serbia. Who made it but us? Have we recognized Kosovo? It's not annexation, it's expropriation. What is it called? Extraction. Euphemism. This is not challenging the issues of Kosovo, but the whole concept - Milanovic said.

The Croatian perception of the Kosovo case is not, therefore, straightforward and unquestionable, so it leaves a lot of room for a completely different understanding of it, regardless of the fact that the political line of continuity follows a completely different path. Although Croatia directly renounced any type of "Yugoslavia" and "Yugoslavism" in the Constitution, its regional position is such that it would be unreasonable to renounce regional ambitions in which Kosovo is a welcome addition. Pristina observes that the stabilization of the Western Balkans and the European Southeast comes only after the harmonization of relations between Belgrade and Zagreb, and tries to get involved as a "third factor" that would shape that bargain. That, even involuntarily, Kosovo becomes a double factor of the "Yugosphere". It attracts Croatia into this orbit, but through Croatia it also positions itself in the former geopolitical space, and moves away from "Greater Albania", which, undoubtedly, almost all Albanians see as an inevitability, from which they are only a few additional steps away.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, although it does not recognize Kosovo, voted for the admission of Kosovo to the Council of Europe. The formal non-recognition of Kosovo, which the Republc of Srpska makes impossible with its veto, largely limits Kosovo's room for maneuver in Sarajevo. The Bosniak champions are not without influence in Kosovo, and neither is the Bosniak faction of the Kosovo Albanians. They welcome Kurti's cry: "We don't want another Republic of Srpska in Kosovo." Although it is clear that there is not the slightest possibility that something like that will happen again in Kosovo, especially since Bosnia and Herzegovina is an independent country and a member of the UN, and Kosovo is not, it seems that this is killing two birds with one stone. But here, too, there is no coincidence of the policy structure. Politicians, Kosovo Albanians, consider their politics more inclusive, open and more pro-European than Bosniak politics, which is personified by their largest party - the Party of Democratic Action.

On the other hand, the prestige of SDA founder Alija Izetbegovic as one of the founders of "Islamic renewal" far surpasses the reputation and affirmation of Kosovo in the Islamic world, which would be very useful for Kosovo in spreading the recognition policy. But it was not an easy task even for Turkey and its president Erdogan, and not only for the Bosniak supporters of Kosovo's independence, because this issue goes far beyond the local Balkan framework and is placed in the global relationship between the Islamic world and the USA.

Pristina is a regular destination for Montenegrin politicians. Former Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic was in Pristina before the recent elections, which is a regular destination for other Montenegrin politicians, including Prime Minister Dritan Abazovic.

The newly elected President Jakov Milatovic announced that Montenegro would not change its policy of recognition towards Pristina, so that the friendly relations established so far would be continued with the new authorities.

Today, Skopje is an alternative, and perhaps the leading center of the Albanian issue in the Balkans, thanks to the practically achieved constitutive status of the Albanian community in North Macedonia. While Kosovo Albanians encounter obstacles in Albania itself, their wishes are very easily accepted in Skopje. Recently, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of North Macedonia, Bujar Osmani, disclosed the establishment of the "Western Balkan Four" with representatives of Kosovo, Albania and Montenegro, which many associated with the outlines of plans for an "Albanian federation", although Osmani stated that the platform of the Western Balkan Four was in accordance with "common foreign and security policy of the EU", but also with "democratic values and principles".

The regional affirmation of Kosovo, despite the unanimity achieved in declaring for membership in the Council of Europe, is therefore not an expression of a harmonized and harmonious picture of the place and role of Kosovo in the Western Balkans. As it is more and more certain that the negotiation process will continue in the coming years, the regional context of Kosovo will still be considered and significantly re-examined, before it is defined, one would say, under significantly changed assumptions from today.