Tupurkovski: Belgrade and Pristina owe us all a solution to the Kosovo issue
Belgrade and Pristina owe it to all of us, in the region, but also to the wider international community, to find a solution and should bear the responsibility for finding a solution to the Kosovo-Serbian problem, and I think that such a solution will be found, unfortunately, with the help of great powers, Vasil Tupurkovski, a Macedonian politician and former member of the Presidency of the SFRY says in in an exclusive interview for Kosovo Online.
Tupurkovski also points out that everyone needs peace, which is why politicians on both sides must be "on the same level", aware that they cannot constantly reject everything or insist only on their views.
In the conversation, he recalled his relationship with other members of the Presidency of the SFRY, and with Josip Broz Tito, and explained how he became a "fashion icon" of the former Yugoslavia, recognizable by his sweaters.
You have not been active in politics for more than 15 years. You were a participant in the events at the time of the breakup of Yugoslavia. How do you see the political and economic conditions in the countries of the former SFRY today, could we all have done better or maybe worse?
We had to do much better, but we were obviously not ready for that, instead we got a new situation that we didn't take advantage of. That's my conclusion. All countries could have done better, because a new phase in our history has opened. New people came, relatively young, and I thought that we could do something for our countries. That's how I fought for Macedonia to become independent, its own, and I believed that it could only be in Macedonia's favor. But it didn't turn out that way. Unfortunately, it didn't. We remember very well what happened, how it was, what opportunities we had in that country, what came out of all that, so I am not at all happy with the development of the situation in our countries, and above all I am talking about Macedonia.
You have often spoken before about the harmful role of the great Western powers in the disintegration of Yugoslavia, how do you see their role today in the countries that are now known as the Western Balkans?
We believed that we could build great relations with great powers, but we are not great powers. That's where we made the first mistake. We had to invest much more interest in the sovereignty of our countries, in our own sovereignty, and thus build positions that are respected and can be respected even by the great powers. I think they believe that we are countries that do not have great capacity, that we have to listen, that is the attitude of the great powers towards us. Macedonia has a special relationship with the USA and all other republics, but I don't have the impression that we can tell them what is good for us, what depends only on us, how much we can contribute to it... I have the impression that they have to treat us as weaklings and incapable of leading our own politics.
Can that change?
That could change. I don't believe that they want to direct our lives here. I don't believe it, but at least, as far as our strategic relations are concerned, they have to believe that they have strategic partners here, that we can do something. On the Macedonian example - our situation is now very difficult, so the people also demand that someone come and solve our problems, or help in this. We don't trust ourselves. And that is not unjustified, because we have been sinking more and more every day for 30 years, it can be seen at every step and at every moment. So people no longer trust our leaders and ask for help. That's why sometimes such a situation occurs - a letter from the American ambassador arrives, and the whole country is upset about it. And, after all, it is the American ambassador, not the president. But it's American politics and people believe in it, but they can't see how quickly it's going to happen.
The crisis in Kosovo is still ongoing, you used to have contacts with Albanian politicians from Kosovo within the Union of Communists, such as Mahmut Bakali and Fadil Hoxha, what are the causes and why is the crisis lasting so long?
In the last years of Yugoslavia, I was active in politics, first in the party, and then in the state presidency. I knew our situation, and we also have the Albanian factor in Macedonia. So it was clear that two issues would ultimately remain central for resolution, the Albanian and Macedonian issues. More or less, the other countries had their own problems and their own solutions, except for those that came through the war, first in Croatia, then in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That's why I believed that we have to solve those two issues in Macedonia, not Kosovo, but Albanian. We didn't do that, they took over things themselves, war conflicts came in Macedonia as well and that made the situation difficult. I'm in the early 90s, 1992/1993, proposed a solution to Macedonian-Albanian relations through a Macedonian-Albanian treaty. No one could accept that, I received "big beatings" because of those proposals, but it turned out that after that, in 2001, when the Macedonian war broke out, that solution was imposed and we could not lead our problems to a solution by our own forces with negotiations. All this was possible, because while there are talks, you can also solve the problem, when some kind of military, war solution and campaign starts, then those issues will open up on a much broader level and you will not be able to solve those issues yourself. And what the solution will be, that is another question. I believed that we can be ourselves and that is why I say that our own sovereignty is important. We could have solved the Macedonian-Albanian problem by ourselves, we had people on both sides who could do it, but that didn't happen.
What is the responsibility for the events in Kosovo on the former Yugoslav communist authorities?
I think it's big, because I felt that problem, and that's why I went to Kosovo, among the Albanians. It was not against Serbia, or against some other environment, but we had to react in order to prevent the spread of such an atmosphere that cannot be solved. Serbia did not create such conditions, and came to the situation of resolving the conflict. We could, if we were aware of the danger, and we were, raise questions that could radiate some hope, open up some perspectives, and that's why I thought we had a great responsibility, but it was already wonderful at the end of the 80s and in the 90s for years. It was very difficult to create possible solutions with Serbian politics, which was very burdened and it simply did not go together.
You were once with Azem Vlasi, the young hope of the political scene of communist Yugoslavia, do you have contact with him and with former party comrades?
I have, of course. Both with Azem and others. He was the president of Youth, before I became one. We knew each other, we had a big discussion when he was sentenced. In the Presidency of the SFRY, when that issue was discussed, there were strong forces in that body, not numerous, but strong - Croatia and I defended the human integrity of that man, because he was convicted. The Serbs condemned him. Our defense was significant and I think it was a great asset for the Yugoslav situation.
What does Azem Vlasi tell you about Kosovo today?
I see him less often, because we've gotten older, but we've heard each other many times and seen... He never held a grudge against us, he knows that we didn't have the numbers (in the Presidency of the SFRY) to defend him or to rehabilitate the whole situation in a different way. But Kosovo was treated when it was a question of the Yugoslav state... always Kosovo was on the agenda, maybe not always only Kosovo, but it was always significant in those issues and it led to a certain resolution in a way that would help Yugoslav politics in general. But that didn't happen, because the war was already close and it couldn't provide a solution in that situation.
How do you see the further relations between Belgrade and Pristina, can a compromise and sustainable solution be reached?
I look at this problem from a human perspective. And when I was in Belgrade, and in one Presidency or another, I reacted to the situation and events in the same way. I cannot understand that there is so much animosity between people that they cannot resolve this issue. I reduce it to politics, to politicians. I don't believe people can't solve that problem. And in general, all problems, people have their other attitudes and families, and I believe that there is a much wider range for solving that issue, when it is outside of politicians. But it was always solved by politicians. Now the whole matter has been taken over by other, high circles, it is already a serious international issue, geopolitical, so I think they will manage to solve it. And how the politicians, Kosovar and Serbian, will treat him, how the final solution will be reached, when it will be said that the Serbs and Albanians from Kosovo have reached a solution at the negotiating table, I can't predict that, but it will happen, I'm sure.
Does this mean that the international community will impose a solution?
It is certain, what should we expect... we all, including Serbs and Kosovars, had 30 years since the breakup of Yugoslavia. If you cannot create any epilogue to it for 30 years, and the situation is getting complicated, now the war in Ukraine is also on the agenda, these participants and those who are solving it now will not allow it... It can be seen that the space for them to negotiate on their own is becoming much smaller, to tighten the situation by themselves and to delay the solution by themselves, both Serbs and Kosovars. That's why I think it's better for them to understand the situation, to jump over the obstacles and somehow go towards the end.
Was Tito aware that the Kosovo issue could become a problem after his death?
He was certainly aware of all the possibilities, but one was the politics during the time of Tito, who was already old and everything unfolded differently, and the other was after Yugoslavia and Tito. So everyone was aware, but we didn't look for solutions anywhere. And in Macedonia, in all the last years of Yugoslavia's existence, we, Albanians and Macedonians, were in some form of, if not war, then certainly conflict.
Today we have a different geopolitical division, the allies from the Second World War, the USA and the Russian Federation, look at the matter differently, how do they see the new division, political and economic?
She had to come, because it is a situation of the Second World War and wartime alliances, because the USSR could thus cooperate with the USA and Great Britain. And, there were figures who could impose that process. Today, it is realistic that these alliances are impossible. It is bad that there is a war, and that it threatens to become wider, perhaps even global, although I hardly believe in that, although the danger is great. That is why there are strong options of a different alliance, and system changes. There are new countries in the game now, and how many years will it take until the key state of China is accepted. Everyone understands it, but cannot admit it. And, when this is recognized, many strategic situations will be recognized as well.
How important is the Balkans with the problem of Kosovo in that distribution of cards and how can Belgrade and Pristina find a solution in that situation?
Belgrade and Pristina owe it to all of us, in the surrounding area, and more broadly, the international community, to find a solution. And they should take responsibility for the solution of the Kosovo-Serbian problem as a problem that burdens other communities and peoples, both smaller and larger peoples and the wider context of it. I think that responsibility will increase in political circles and that such a solution will be found, with the help of great powers, unfortunately.
How do you comment on the Ohrid annex that was agreed upon in the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina and what kind of message was sent from there?
This is important, because it also helps Macedonia, which should nurture the Ohrid Agreement between Serbia and Kosovo and contribute to it. That's why I think that a big situation arises from the involvement of others around Serbia and Kosovo in that process. They need peace, just like Serbia and Kosovo, and while they need (peace) and while the situation is like that, the politicians of both sides have to be on the same level and see it, because you can't constantly reject everything or highlight everything you own. You simply cannot.
There was constant talk about a "greater Albania", did that danger disappear with the creation of independent states?
It always exists, especially in a situation where your land is weak. If the country had periods when it could go in that direction, even with Albanians together, because there were certain policies that created a closer relationship between Macedonians and Albanians, now you have a more widespread opinion that a "greater Albania" exists, that its factors are all Albanian communities and that it is a danger for Macedonians. I would defend myself against such attitudes.
You worked together with Kira Gligorov, creating a strategy for Macedonia, and one of them was that Macedonia must acquire the right and membership in Euro-Atlantic integration, in order to preserve territorial integrity. From whom was the greatest danger that Macedonia would fall apart?
Macedonia early entered the phase of cooperation with the EU and the idea of becoming a member of the EU. Back in 2010, we reached an agreement with the EU on stabilization. We have never had a reason not to believe in Europe and the European Community, especially not the people who in the last years of Yugoslavia had such a determination and participated in the Yugoslav-European negotiations on cooperation and the creation of the EU. We were never burdened by it, we had a clean situation ideologically and politically, but we were not capable of being serious in our efforts. This is how a situation arose in which we have corruption that poisons us and that we cannot eradicate and say - we will trample on firmness towards the EU.
How did the EU offer Yugoslavia to join the alliance and why was it not accepted?
We in 1989/1990/1991 had serious negotiations with the European Commission, with the President of the EC, Jacques Delor. He was a European figure. We are now negotiating with people whose names will be forgotten when their mandate expires. The people who represent the European interests do not know who the negotiators are, and they cannot impose the right European policy on themselves, as the leadership. It is a complex situation, the time of serious European politicians has passed. We are on the foreign policy front, I spoke with Hans Dietrich Genscher, who was an epoch-making politician in the foreign policy of Germany and Europe. When we don't have those figures who can make decisions with common sense, big ideas and thoughts, we don't have the possibility to realize what one of them tells you. People have lost faith in the European idea, because it has been postponed for years. They think that these people do not have the capacity to carry out, or to believe in what they say.
How do you assess the relations between Serbia and Macedonia today and at the time when you were in power in Skopje?
Those relations were never bad, it was always the belief that Serbs and Macedonians were close, both politically and as people. And that can be seen today, that they are close, positive solutions to various situations came from Serbia, and that was received excellently here. And now it is not difficult to decide whether the relations are good or bad. Relations are very good. I remember 1990/1991 when the Serbian delegation led by Milosevic and Jovic came to Ohrid, for some final talks, because the country was definitely falling apart at all seams, and we were going to independence. The Serbian president was not the first to speak, but Jovic, and he said that the door is open to us, and we wish you a happy journey. But Milosevic said that two issues would remain permanent, open for solutions, and that is Albanian, as in Serbia, and the other economic, because we were in a very difficult economic situation. And that, in his opinion, would be wrong. But he didn't cause any problems either, he said - Macedonian brothers, if you're going, go, but those questions will remain. That's how it was and that's how it is today.
What do you think about the Open Balkans initiative?
That initiative is good. I cannot understand why it is not a more dynamic process, wider, but only of Serbia, Macedonia and Albania, for now. I believe that there will be an expansion, I have a positive opinion about it. But you have big opponents to every process in these countries, the opposition believes that it must be against it, and that's why it gets complicated. They will always tell you that Serbia is the strongest factor in that initiative, should we think... But, we should go concretely and much more broadly. I always support it.
You were with Tito and handed over the baton, how was your relationship with Tito and Tito's with you?
I became the president of Youth after Azem Vlasi, and he used to use numerous opportunities to be with Tito at international events, and I didn't accept that... I didn't go to those events, because I felt that I didn't belong there as a young person. However, I have been to numerous events, some of them historical. One problem was that I could not dress according to protocol. But I had several meetings, when the youth leadership had a meeting with Tito. I remember the most when on May 25, on Youth Day, and he was already 87 years old and didn't remember very well, he asked me at least 10 times - did the children get cakes... And I answered - yes, comrade Tito. .. He was a historical figure, for whom one had to be smart to know that one could not be equal to him.
Can the former Yugoslav republics be close again as they were during the SFRY, or is that irretrievably lost?
I think I can. There is a great deal of hostility that remains, but it is now less in scope than it was. And when you find some positive attitudes and solutions, and spread them, then it can happen. This is seen every day in small matters. It was covid, so vaccines came from Serbia to Macedonia and that changed the situation immediately positively.
At one point, you were a fashion icon of SFRY, you didn't wear suits like most politicians, but you were known for sweaters. What was the reason for that?
It is easy to answer this question. It sounds different now... I didn't have any suits when I became a politician, because I was very young. Who would have a suit in Yugoslavia then... That's one reason. Even at the funeral of Josip Broz, I was in a suit borrowed from the National Theater, from the play Messrs. Glembay, they found me a suit there... I was attached to that lifestyle, I never considered that it meant anything to me, and that's why it was like that. Then it spread and I became an icon in my own way.

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