Joint arming of Croatia, Albania and Kosovo: A “shortcut” to Trump or a clear message to the “neighbors”?

Vojni savez Hrvatska, Albanija, Kosovo
Source: Kosovo Online/Ilustracija

The joint purchase of weapons — this time from the United States. This is the first concrete move of the military alliance between Croatia, Albania, and Kosovo. Analysts point out that the purchase of “cheaper weapons” is secondary, while the main objective is clear lobbying with the new American administration. They also warn that Serbia has reasons for concern if this alliance expands to include other Western Balkan countries.

Written by: Djordje Barovic

The purchase of defense capacities was the first obligation from the declaration signed by the defense ministers of Albania, Croatia, and Kosovo on March 18 in Tirana.

“For example, the system (of weaponry) that the three states want to buy from the U.S. would be ordered as one purchase, using the legislation of each country, but with common quantities and delivery deadlines. Because when a larger amount is bought from the U.S., the price is lower and the delivery faster,” explained Kosovo’s acting defense minister Ejup Maqedonci to RFE/RL.

University professor Farmir Çolaku stresses that for Kosovo “more than for anyone else” it is necessary to be included in associations and military alliances, such as this agreement with Albania and Croatia.

“Albania as the parent state, but also Croatia as Kosovo’s historic friend, with a consolidated modern army, NATO membership, and EU membership — these are circumstances that facilitate and support Kosovo’s development and perspective,” said Çolaku.

Serbia’s foreign minister, Marko Djuric, immediately warned that such military agreements upset the balance of power and the security architecture in the region, as well as the 1996 Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control.

Military analyst Vlade Radulovic stressed that the announced weapons purchase could lead to a review of that agreement, especially as the KSF is in the process of transforming into the “Kosovo Army.”

“They will have to work much more seriously on acquiring complex combat systems, as planned in the third phase (2025–2028). Additional light portable air-defense systems, anti-tank systems, and perhaps U.S.-made howitzers are possible,” said Radulovic.

Analysts for Kosovo Online are convinced Kosovo is most interested in anti-tank systems and new drones, while also reminding that Pristina has already contracted the purchase of Javelin missiles and Black Hawk helicopters.

“A Means of Lobbying”

For geopolitics and security consultant Nikola Lunic, the key word is not “weapons purchase” but lobbying.

“Will they manage to unite these acquisitions to get a lower price? Not very likely. The question is how successful it will be. However, what’s important is that this currently serves them as lobbying in the U.S.,” Lunic told Kosovo Online.

He explained that such weapons purchases cannot easily “change the balance of military power” in the region, but what matters more for Serbia is the future perception of the U.S. toward the Western Balkans.

“The U.S. perceives the Western Balkans as a region where effective governance and integration into transatlantic institutions are being obstructed. It is directly stated that this constitutes a threat to U.S. national security and foreign policy,” warned Lunic.

He called the signed military agreement between Albania, Croatia, and Kosovo “an empty piece of paper.”

“The declaration is an empty piece of paper that explicitly states the signatories have no obligations toward one another, and it cannot affect their international commitments. Therefore, the initiative itself is meaningless,” Lunic said, pointing out that both Croatia and Kosovo already buy weapons from the U.S.

Croatia is acquiring Bradleys, HIMARS, and Black Hawks, while Kosovo is purchasing Javelin missiles and Black Hawks.

Kosovo’s acting defense minister Ejup Maqedonci announced that at the autumn session of the U.S.-Adriatic Charter (A5), new members might join the alliance.

Lunic warned it would be no surprise — and a real danger for Serbia — if North Macedonia and Turkey joined.

“One should not be surprised if North Macedonia and Turkey join this initiative. If it expands further, it could represent a real danger for Serbia. At the moment, it does not,” stressed Lunic.

He added that it would be “a major precedent” if Kosovo were admitted to NATO or other security structures.

Kosovo’s NATO Path

On the other hand, Avni Mazreku, a professor of European law from Pristina, argues that Kosovo’s cooperation with NATO members, including Albania and Croatia, is no threat to neighbors, and that its armament aligns with its NATO accession ambitions.

“Any cooperation within NATO is not a threat to neighbors, because Kosovo is preparing to join NATO. Every system purchased from NATO members goes in that direction. If Kosovo were buying weapons from China, like Serbia, that would show no intention of joining NATO,” Mazreku told Kosovo Online.

He explained that all NATO members, as well as aspiring countries, must meet certain criteria regarding weapons acquisitions and combat systems.

That is why Kosovo buys weapons precisely from NATO countries: Albania, Croatia, Germany, or the U.S.

“All these acquisitions are part of preparing the state for NATO membership, not out of aggressive intentions toward others. NATO is not an offensive but a defensive alliance. Article 5 speaks of collective defense — if one member is threatened, Article 5 is triggered,” Mazreku explained.

He added that Kosovo’s exclusion from NATO is only a “political problem” since some countries do not recognize its independence.

“This makes Kosovo’s NATO accession politically and formally impossible, but Kosovo is already part of every military initiative tied to NATO in the region. Its military capacities are directed that way. Every project where Kosovo participates in military operations and weapons purchases in line with NATO systems are steps toward NATO membership,” stressed Mazreku.

Reliance on the U.S.

Historian Stefan Radojkovic disagrees. He is convinced the tripartite alliance functions outside NATO with the main goal of ensuring stronger ties with the U.S.

“What is very indicative is that this group — two NATO members and one entity in Kosovo and Metohija — tries to act outside NATO’s framework. On the other hand, it is clear they rely on the U.S. in their relations. This indirectly shows they do not expect strong support from other European NATO members. They are very insecure in this regard, which is why they are not ‘placing all their chips on one table,’ but rather ensuring that if NATO weakens, their ties — especially Albania and Croatia’s — remain firmly with Washington,” Radojkovic told Kosovo Online.

He views the weapons purchases from the U.S. as a “symbolic move” where the three focus on anti-tank mines or drones, but the essence is not just “lower prices” but the language President Donald Trump best understands: financial gain for the U.S.

“Not only is it cheaper and allows larger deliveries, but it clearly shows willingness for deals from which the U.S. profits financially. What’s questionable here is the actual quantities. I cannot imagine them being large, given Israel’s and Ukraine’s needs in their wars, partly supplied by the U.S.,” he said.

Regardless of quantities, he stressed, the symbolic message is crucial.

“This is more of a symbolic move, sending signals to Washington that they are ready to cooperate regardless of everything, while Kosovo tries to link itself to NATO this way, through two members — Croatia and Albania,” he said.

Commenting on Kosovo’s acting defense minister Maqedonci’s announcement of new members in October, Radojkovic stressed that what matters most for Serbia is that North Macedonia and Greece do not join.

“For Serbia, it is of crucial importance that Montenegro and North Macedonia do not join this tripartite pact. Strategically, this would cut Serbia off from the Adriatic Sea,” he said.

He reminded that the alliance was justified as combating “malign influences and hybrid warfare,” but that its true essence is different.

“In reality, it is directed against Serbia. That is why some sort of tripartite pact or alliance of Serbia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia would be a good counterbalance. It would also be very good if Bosnia and Herzegovina stayed out of these arrangements,” Radojkovic said.

He emphasized that Serbia should not fear immediate danger from such an alliance.

“Serbia should not fear any direct threat from this pact. Serbia is militarily far stronger, especially compared to the Pristina administration and Albania. With Croatia, the situation is somewhat different. That is why they all signed this tripartite alliance — to somewhat balance Serbia’s hard power,” he concluded.

(Non)Transparency

Political analyst Ben Andoni from Tirana said the Albanian public is not familiar with the details of the agreement with Croatia and Kosovo, but it is no secret Tirana wants to develop its defense industry and Kosovo to increase its capacities.

“I think the agreement between Albania, Kosovo, and Croatia on joint defense and weapons production was not transparent for the Albanian public. Much was said about cooperation modalities, but not about how it would be implemented,” Andoni told Kosovo Online.

He added that this was understandable given the military nature, but that cooperation is still “in its initial phase.”

“It seems we are at the initial stage, and Albania has started seriously considering its armament, since it had factories, but they are not functional. Kosovo believes it must increase its capacities because it sees a threat from Serbia — heightened by Minister Maqedonci’s statements that 80 percent of Serbia’s army is on the border with Kosovo,” Andoni said.

He assumed that in this phase the three countries will focus mainly on the infrastructural aspect of cooperation: how much they can align with their goals, with practical implementation to follow later in phases.