Kurti and the Kosovo diaspora in the elections: Guaranteed votes and a guaranteed victory?

Driving force, Kosovo’s bridge to the world, a silent hero… This is how Kosovo’s caretaker prime minister and leader of Self-Determination, Albin Kurti, has recently described the Kosovo diaspora, from which he has historically received a significant number of votes in elections. With parliamentary elections scheduled for 28 December—during the holiday season—the diaspora, a powerful voting bloc, will be able to exercise its right to vote while in Kosovo. The question now is whether Kurti’s support among the diaspora will remain as strong as in previous elections, or whether their attitude has shifted in the wake of the institutional crisis.

Written by: Milena Miladinovic

The arrival of the diaspora is when the New Year’s euphoria is felt most strongly in Kosovo. Citizens who live and work abroad return en masse to visit family and relatives. This year, the holiday atmosphere intertwines with the election season, as voting for the new government and parliament will take place just two days before New Year’s Eve.

Whether by chance or intention, Self-Determination and its leader Albin Kurti, in their second attempt to form a government, have managed—within constitutional deadlines—to push the snap elections to the very end of the year.

Following President Vjosa Osmani’s announcement of elections for 28 December, public analyses quickly emerged suggesting that this timing was coordinated with Kurti, ensuring that the Kosovo diaspora—present in the country over the holidays—would have one main obligation: to vote.

In addition to the financial influx—often described by economists as an economic injection for Kosovo—the diaspora, which according to the 2023 Statistical Agency data exceeds 850,000 people, represents an important voting body and a vote that is often won with relatively little effort.

Party leaders have placed significant hope in the diaspora. Even before the official start of the campaign, they have used social media to urge the diaspora to participate in shaping political changes in Kosovo. Self-Determination has also made strong efforts at the Central Election Commission to open polling places outside of Kosovo’s diplomatic missions.

When asked whether the diaspora remains a reliable source of votes for Kurti and Self-Determination—as it mostly was in the past—or whether it has changed its stance following the February election crisis, analysts offered different views for Kosovo Online. 

While Pristina-based analyst Artan Muhaxhiri says that a few patriotic slogans are enough to win diaspora votes, Dušan Ilic from the Institute for European Studies argues that the decision rests with external “centers of power.” Pupin Initiative associate Petar Ivic, on the other hand, believes that Self-Determination can no longer rely on secured diaspora support.

“An Instrument in the Hands of Power Centers”

According to Dušan Ilic of the Institute for European Studies, the Kosovo diaspora has always been an instrument in the hands of certain geopolitical forces and will, in the 28 December snap elections, vote according to the instructions of those centers of influence.

Speaking to Kosovo Online, Ilic said that caretaker prime minister and Self-Determination candidate Albin Kurti cannot count on overwhelming diaspora support—not because of a change in attitude toward extremism, but due to shifting geopolitical conditions.

“The Albanian diaspora, and the Albanian factor as a whole, has never been an independent political actor, but rather an instrument in the hands of certain powers and geopolitical actors in the region. This time will be no exception. The Albanian diaspora has often decided elections in Kosovo, in North Macedonia, and to a large extent in Albania. But Kurti and his party cannot expect such massive support now—not because the diaspora has changed its view of extremism or of Self-Determination, but because geopolitical circumstances have changed,” Ilic said.

He added that criticism from Brussels and Washington could influence a break in the diaspora’s traditionally uniform voting patterns.

“Part of the Albanian diaspora lives in Western Europe, under Brussels’ umbrella, and another part in the United States, where Donald Trump is now in power. Given the clash between the Trump administration and what could be called the ‘deep state’—of which Albanians, their diaspora, and not only Kurti but the entire Albanian political factor have long been exponents—it seems that the diaspora will not be as monolithic as in previous elections. These criticisms may signal that the diaspora’s unity in supporting Kurti could weaken,” Ilic added.

He emphasized that the diaspora has historically followed political instructions from Washington, Brussels, and London—centers that, in past years, supported Self-Determination—but this may now change.

“It seems that whenever it suits the Anglo-Saxon centers of power—primarily Washington and London—the Albanian diaspora shifts its preference to support a new party, such as the recent rise of the Vredi movement in North Macedonia, which until recently was minor. We can expect the diaspora's ‘will’ to shift in the coming period, choosing whoever better aligns with Anglo-Saxon strategic interests,” Ilic concluded.

A Different Category of Voters

Analyst Artan Muhaxhiri believes that the Kosovo diaspora is a distinct category of voters whose support is much easier to secure. Aware of this, Kurti places great hope in diaspora votes, while the LDK and PDK have largely abandoned attempts to win them.

Diaspora—deeply emotional and symbolic in Kosovo media discourse due to its decades-long support—is not persuaded by economic arguments, Muhaxhiri says. Often, a few patriotic slogans are enough.

“Politicians know that when they speak highly of the diaspora, they can expect to receive their votes. The diaspora votes differently from residents of Kosovo—their votes are much easier to obtain. Sometimes it is enough to say a few patriotic slogans; there is no need to convince them with economic projections or promises. They are a different category of voters,” Muhaxhiri told Kosovo Online.

He added that Kurti has historically received overwhelming diaspora support, which is why he pushed for elections to be held on 28 December.

Meanwhile, other parties have given up on the diaspora.

“He knows the diaspora will come to celebrate New Year’s, and he expects to win most of their votes. But other parties like the PDK and LDK appear to have given up—they have not worked to win or secure a larger share of diaspora votes. That is why I believe the diaspora is Kurti’s greatest advantage and main hope in these elections. He knows he cannot repeat the same narratives to voters in Kosovo itself,” Muhaxhiri said.

A Shift

Pupin Initiative associate Petar Ivic believes that the diaspora’s stance on supporting Kurti has changed, and that it can no longer be treated as a guaranteed vote.

According to him, the diaspora’s vote is no longer secure, as Kosovo has never experienced such a political crisis.

“Since the diaspora comes from many countries, there is no reliable data—it is all speculation. But I dare say the situation has changed. We have never before had such a months-long crisis, a blockade of institutions, or a government as illegitimate as Kurti’s, which likely no longer reflects the democratic will of the citizens. We will see on 28 December,” Ivic told Kosovo Online.

He added that criticism of Kurti from governments of countries where the diaspora lives will reflect in the election results.

“When we look at the diaspora—especially those in countries where criticism of Kurti is increasing—it is clear that something has changed, and this time the situation is likely to be very different,” Ivic said.