Slovenia and Germany's non-paper: Is abolishing the veto right truly unattainable?

Known as a roadblock during Croatia's negotiations for joining the European Union, Slovenia, now alongside Germany, authors a non-paper whose idea is to enable a somewhat quicker path for countries negotiating with the EU. Their proposal is that EU member states renounce their right to veto during decision-making in the pre-accession process, but this initiative is not favorably viewed by everyone. Sacrificing the right to veto, even if it’s just about deciding to open clusters, has proven to be a significant challenge.

Written by: Dusica Radeka Djordjevic

Tanja Fajon, the Slovenian Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, stated that Slovenia and Germany have prepared a non-paper that envisions no possibility of veto and blockade due to bilateral issues with neighboring countries during the pre-accession process.

“This is an initiative to accelerate the entire enlargement process, that is, the pre-accession process, so that we won’t have too many veto possibilities from neighbors due to bilateral issues and that we make more use of the possibility of qualified majority voting,” Fajon explained.

According to a speaker from Kosovo Online, the non-paper has been discussed for the last six months, but among the 27 EU countries, there is still no consensus on it. This means that everything remains as it was because the non-paper does not have binding power. As long as there are members who place a veto on abolishing the right to veto, anyone on the path to EU integration can be tripped up due to the narrow interests of certain states, even if they have met the last requirement.

Strahinja Subotic, Program Manager at the Center for European Policies, told Kosovo Online that Slovenia and Germany currently do not have the necessary support from EU member states for the ideas proposed in the non-paper, but there is a convincing majority of member states that like this idea.

“To abolish unanimity, a unanimous decision is needed. This is indeed a paradox and difficult to overcome. We have countries like Hungary insisting on the right to veto in all areas where it is possible to retain it. Cyprus, as a small state, believes that its interests, especially regarding Turkey, will be bypassed and ignored if it gives up the right to veto. Then there's a large country like France, which is still considering whether to give up the right to veto, as it is a founding member of the Union and believes it should have a say,” Subotic points out.

He explains that the non-paper's idea, discussed for the last six months, aims to speed up the decision-making process related to the enlargement policy.

“Both political and technical decisions related to enlargement require unanimity, and they say that political decisions - about opening and closing negotiations should continue to be made unanimously, but as a compromise solution, they envisage switching to qualified majority voting for a technical move, such as opening a cluster. They wanted to speed up the accession process, as it is known that often one, two, or three countries can abuse their veto right and block a country even when it has fulfilled all the necessary reforms to open a cluster. Opening a cluster is a technical issue that can have a stimulating effect both for citizens and decision-makers, and it is often really a pity that such technical matters still require unanimity,” says Subotic.

If the non-paper became official policy, as he points out, it would be significant for those countries in the "initial intermediate phase" of EU accession, since unanimity would still be required for closing chapters and making the final decision on a country's admission to the Union.

"The non-paper, for example, is not relevant for Montenegro because it has already opened all clusters. It is relevant for Serbia, which still needs to open further clusters, for Albania, Ukraine, and Moldova, or for countries that are at the beginning or like Serbia, somewhere in the middle. Regarding North Macedonia, this non-paper would not change the situation on the ground because they need to close the beginning of the negotiation process, and that procedure requires unanimity. Even if Bulgaria agreed to the non-paper, it would still have a veto right, thus, it could demand that North Macedonia meet all the necessary conditions for the negotiations to officially open," Subotic explains.

As he adds, if everyone in the EU had accepted the non-paper, Serbia would have been able to open Cluster 3, because even with eight members against it, there would have been a qualified majority.

Slobodan Zecevic, Director of the Institute for European Studies in Belgrade, tells Kosovo Online that the non-paper is an informal statement or an act of goodwill from someone saying, "I will not use the right to veto." Therefore, he sees the only solution as a systemic change within the EU, which would define that clusters and the chapters within them should be opened by a qualified majority.

"A true systemic change, which was discussed at the expert level between France and Germany, is that decisions should no longer be made unanimously when it comes to opening clusters and the chapters within them, but rather by a qualified majority, which implies that 55% of the ministers in the Council of the European Union vote 'for' and that they represent 65% of the population of the European Union. If this principle had been adopted and the methodology for opening clusters changed, Serbia would have opened Cluster 3 without any problems," assesses Zecevic.

If the German-Slovenian non-paper were formally accepted by all EU member states, as he explains, then a candidate country for EU entry could not be blackmailed over something unrelated to the cluster once it meets all the conditions for its opening.

"Very often, neighboring states use an argument that absolutely has nothing to do with the cluster's theme but relates to their own calculations and foreign policy interests, thus slowing down the EU accession process. Bulgaria can blackmail North Macedonia and Serbia because it has interests in North Macedonia and considers Serbia too close to Skopje. Croatia can blackmail Serbia because it believes that its position in Europe would be strengthened if it became an EU member," our interlocutor states.

The most striking example of a blockade, he recalls, was the former conflict between Slovenia and Croatia over territorial waters.

"It created problems for Croatia during its EU accession to the extent that Croatia said, 'we will never use such a method in relations with neighboring countries,' and yet we see that Croatia was initially against opening Cluster 3 for Serbia, so it might have changed its opinion later," says Zecevic.

He also emphasizes that if the rule of a qualified majority for opening clusters were adopted, the rule of unanimity would certainly remain when deciding on the admission of a new member to the EU, as it is considered a serious, formal act that requires consensus among all EU member states.

The initiative launched by Slovenia and Germany, according to Avni Mazreku, a professor of European law in Pristina, is still in its preliminary phase.

"Every EU member state can block this initiative or place a veto on new memberships for Western Balkan countries," Mazreku tells Kosovo Online, adding that he views the initiative more in the context of the region's accession as a whole, rather than the individual approach of states.

He reminds us that Slovenia once vetoed Croatia's membership due to the redefinition of the border between the two countries, and the most critical issue between them was the nuclear power plant located on the border. As he notes, such technical and political problems are always present for Western Balkan countries.

"In the case of North Macedonia, there are open issues regarding the use of the Bulgarian language, and as a result, Bulgaria has a less constructive attitude towards North Macedonia's membership. For Albania, there is an open issue of the border between it and Greece. In the case of Montenegro, there is dissatisfaction from Croatia regarding the demarcation of their border at Prevlaka, and there is also the issue of demarcating the border between Serbia and Croatia," Mazreku states.

In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, he says, there is a threat of a veto from the Netherlands.

"One of the EU countries that can use a veto against Bosnia and Herzegovina is the Netherlands, given that it is well known to have had a military contingent in Srebrenica, where the massacre occurred. The Netherlands is not satisfied with everything that has happened with the configuration of Bosnia and Herzegovina," Mazreku assesses.