Zaner: Parallels should not be drawn between the war in Ukraine and other conflicts; the Serbia–Kosovo dispute is unique

Luke Zanier, a former U.S. diplomat and senior fellow in the National Security and International Policy Department at the Center for American Progress in Washington, said in an interview with Kosovo Online that too many parallels should not be drawn between the war in Ukraine and other conflicts around the world, assessing that any solution that “rewards” Russia would send a very negative signal to regions such as the Western Balkans.

Peace talks involving delegations from Ukraine, the United States, and Russia began yesterday in Abu Dhabi, in the United Arab Emirates.

Zanier, whose work focuses on transatlantic relations, international development, and the geopolitical dynamics between Ukraine and Russia, emphasizes that many will attempt to rely on any agreement reached as a precedent, while Kosovo, in his words, remains a special case arising from a “very complicated relationship that resulted in its independence.”

If a future agreement between Russia and Ukraine were to include territorial concessions or special autonomy arrangements, how might such provisions be interpreted internationally?

I think it is important not to draw too many parallels between the situation in Ukraine and Russia and how that could be applied to other conflicts or other parts of the world. Obviously, people will make some assumptions. The most important thing will be to see how any agreement between Ukraine and Russia reinforces the principle of sovereignty, because that will be the most important—and likely the most consequential—indicator. That is why so many of us are concerned about ensuring the preservation of Ukraine’s sovereignty.

On the other hand, if Russia were to be rewarded for its aggression against Ukraine, that would send a very negative signal to the Western Balkans, the European Caucasus, and other areas that could be vulnerable to Russian influence. Instead of stopping Russia’s security threat, we could end up importing it—perhaps in an even greater form—into the heart of Europe. These are the two sets of principles we are looking at when considering what kind of final agreement might be reached to resolve the conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

Could such an agreement be treated as a precedent for other unresolved disputes, or would it be considered strictly sui generis—particularly with regard to Kosovo?

There is always a risk that one party or another will try to rely on certain elements of any agreement reached to argue that a precedent exists. The fact is that the situation between Russia and Ukraine is unique. Most conflicts around the world are unique, and it is very difficult to take a precedent from one and apply it to another. We will certainly see many actors attempting to rely on any agreement reached and to present it as a precedent, but I do not think it should necessarily be viewed as a precedent for other frozen conflicts around the world.

Why is Kosovo still treated as a sui generis case in international diplomacy? What specific legal, historical, and political factors distinguish Kosovo from other territorial disputes, and is that distinction likely to endure if future agreements—such as a potential Russia–Ukraine deal—include territorial or autonomy arrangements?

Part of the problem is that all of these disputes have very unique origins. That does not justify conflict in any way, but it is important to understand those roots in order to resolve them effectively. The dispute between Serbia and Kosovo is, in many respects, a unique one. Many people do not want to hear that, because many would like to believe there is a clear precedent on one side or the other. But it was a very complicated relationship that ultimately resulted in Kosovo’s independence as it exists today.

What we are essentially looking at now in terms of a Serbia–Kosovo solution is encouraging Serbia to accept the fact that Kosovo is independent, and then bringing the entire region into the European Union, where these borders and disputes become far less relevant.

The core benefit of bringing these countries into the EU is their reintegration into a broader framework. Frankly, the biggest challenge is finding a way to accelerate the EU accession process as a means of de-escalating divisions among them. That is extremely difficult, because two dynamics are at play. One of the most important things to remember about the EU is that every enlargement—essentially up to 2020, including Croatia’s accession in 2013, the last time a country joined—marked the end of a process that began with democratization or the restoration of democracy. The political process had been completed, and then the technical process followed.

What we are now asking of the EU is, in essence, to put the political ahead of the technical. To some extent, we want the EU to act as a stabilizing political force—bringing Ukraine and Moldova into the Union and integrating the Western Balkans. This is intended to consolidate European stability, which is a different requirement from earlier accession processes. It is more complicated and somewhat unprecedented. Europeans are working very hard to navigate this—on the one hand ensuring countries can meet EU standards, and on the other taking into account the security and political considerations that must be acknowledged in today’s Europe. It is a very complex process, but fundamentally the solutions—for Serbia–Kosovo, for Bosnia, for North Macedonia and its disputes with Bulgaria and Greece—lie in bringing all of these countries into the EU, because that is the framework within which remaining issues can be resolved.

How do you assess the Trump administration’s approach to these negotiations, and what can Kosovo expect from the new policy in Washington, given the administration’s broader global posture?

I think most would agree that the Trump administration’s policy is far more transactional and, in my view, much more short-term and less strategic than the approaches previously taken by both political parties in the United States toward the Balkans.

Transactional policies have drawbacks—particularly their durability and how well they stand the test of time—and I think that is the main concern. Another issue is the priority the Balkans hold for this administration. One point that has been raised repeatedly in recent weeks is that there are no confirmed U.S. ambassadors in any of the six countries we are discussing. Croatia and Slovenia do have ambassadors, but they are EU member states. When it comes to Serbia, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, or Bosnia—and even Bulgaria and Romania—there are no confirmed ambassadors. That sends a signal to the region that this may not be the priority it was under the Bush, Obama, or Biden administrations, or even under the first Trump administration.