FEUILLETON Henry Kissinger, America, and Kosovo (12): NATO policy means fragmentation of the Serbian State

Writing for Kosovo Online: Dragan Bisenic

Henry Kissinger articulated his stance on Kosovo in a commentary for The Washington Post titled "No US Ground Forces in Kosovo", published on February 22, 1999, when negotiations in Rambouillet had not yet taken place, and the bombing was not certain but existed as an ultimatum envisaged for the talks.

Kissinger responded to President Clinton's announcement that about 4,000 US troops would join NATO forces to assist the police in implementing the expected Kosovo agreement. He expressed concerns shared by those involved in long-term American national security policy.

"Having shared responsibility for national security policy and the extrication from Vietnam, I am deeply concerned about the extension of open-ended American commitments that involve the deployment of the US forces. The US forces are at risk in Kosovo, in Bosnia, and in the Gulf. They lack both a definition of strategic purpose by which success can be measured and an exit strategy. In the case of Kosovo, the concern is that American leadership would be compromised by Congress's refusal to endorse America's participation in NATO forces that largely arose from diplomacy devised and encouraged by Washington. Therefore, ultimately, Congress might feel it has no choice but to persist. In any case, its formal approval is not required. But Congress should alert the administration that it is unhappy about the constant confrontation with ad hoc military missions", emphasized Kissinger.

He again called for the "development and articulation of a comprehensive strategy, which is imperative if we want to avoid being too strained by other predictable and militarily more dangerous challenges". Kissinger insisted that "before any future troop deployment, we must be able to answer these questions:

What consequences do we want to prevent?

What goals do we want to achieve?

How does it serve the national interest?

President Clinton justified the deployment of US troops in Kosovo by stating that the ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia threatened the "stability and future of Europe". Other spokespersons from the administration compared the challenge to Hitler's threat to European security. "No statement corresponds to the Balkan reality", Kissinger retorted, assessing that the "proposed deployment of troops in Kosovo does not address any threat to American security as traditionally conceived". Due to its significance, the following paragraphs from Kissinger's text deserve to be quoted in full.

"The precedents for escalation outlined by the President—in Macedonia or Greece and Turkey in the long run are more likely to stem from the emergence of the Kosovo state. The Kosovo issue is not new. Ethnic conflicts have been endemic in the Balkans for centuries. Waves of conquests have condensed divisions between ethnic groups and religions, between Orthodox and Catholic faiths, between Christianity and Islam, between the successors of the Austrian and Ottoman empires. Over the centuries, these conflicts have been fought with unparalleled intensity because none of the populations has any experience with—and essentially does not believe in—Western concepts of tolerance. The rule of the majority and the compromise that is fundamentally a part of the majority proposals for a "solution" has never resonated in the Balkans. Moreover, it is unlikely that the envisaged Kosovo agreement will enjoy the support of the parties in the longer term. For Serbia, agreeing under the threat of NATO bombing involves almost unprecedented international intervention. Yugoslavia, a sovereign state, is asked to cede control and sovereignty over the province where its national treasures are located to a foreign military force. Although President Slobodan Milosevic has much to answer for, especially in Bosnia, he is less the cause of the conflict in Kosovo than its expression. Regarding the need to retain Kosovo, Serbian leaders—including Milosevic's domestic opponents—appear united. NATO's current policy for Serbia means either the fragmentation of the country or the postponement of the conflict to a date when, according to NATO's proposal, the future of the province will be decided. The same attitude prevails on the Albanian side. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is fighting for independence, not autonomy. But according to the envisaged agreement, Kosovo, now an integral part of Serbia, should become an autonomous and self-governing entity in Serbia, which, however, will remain responsible for external security, and even perform some unspecified internal policing functions. A plebiscite at the end of three years is supposed to determine the future of the region. The KLA will certainly try to use the ceasefire to drive out the last Serbian influences from the province and drag its feet to surrender its weapons. And if NATO resists, it may be attacked itself—perhaps from both sides. What the administration describes as a "strong peace agreement" is likely to be, at best, a prelude to another, far more complicated series of conflicts. Ironically, the envisaged peace agreement increases the likelihood of the various possible escalations outlined by the president as justification for the deployment of the US Independent Albanian Kosovo would surely seek to incorporate neighboring Albanian minorities—mostly in Macedonia—and perhaps even Albania itself. And the Macedonian conflict would take us back to earlier Balkan wars of this century. Will Kosovo then become a pretext for NATO's entry into Macedonia, just as the deployment in Bosnia is cited as justification for moving to Kosovo? Will NATO be the home for a whole series of Balkan NATO protectorates?" Kissinger asked.

He continued by stating that what "further confuses the situation is that US missions in Bosnia and Kosovo are justified by different, perhaps incompatible goals". In Bosnia, the US troop deployment is promoted as a means to unite the Croats, Muslims, and the Serbs into a single state. "The Serbs and the Croats prefer self-determination, but they are asked to subordinate their preferences to the geopolitical argument that a small Bosnian Muslim state would be too insecure and irredentist. But in Kosovo, national self-determination is invoked to create a small state that is almost certain to be irredentist", Kissinger pointed out.

Since neither traditional concepts of national interest nor US security encourage troop deployment, the ultimate justification is a praiseworthy and distinctly American goal - alleviating human suffering. Therefore, Kissinger says that he eventually accepted the Dayton Agreement insofar as it ended the war by separating the conflicting forces. "But I cannot bring myself to support US ground forces in Kosovo. An exit strategy can be described in Bosnia. Existing separation lines can be permanent. If we don't do that, troops will need to be deployed indefinitely, unless we change our goal to self-determination and allow each ethnic group to decide its fate", Kissinger emphasized.

Unlike Bosnia, this option does not exist in Kosovo.

"There are no ethnic lines of division, and both sides claim the entire territory. America's stance toward Serb attempts to insist on its claim is clear enough; it's a threat of bombing. But how do we and NATO react to Albanian transgressions and irredentism? Are we ready to fight on both sides and for how long? Faced with such questions, the unity of the Contact Group forces acting on behalf of NATO is likely to fall apart. Russia will surely increasingly appear as a supporter of the Serbian viewpoint. We must ensure that we do not treat humanitarian foreign policy as a magical recipe for the fundamental problem of establishing priorities in foreign policy", Kissinger demanded.

Commenting on Clinton's statements "that we can make a difference" and that "America symbolizes hope and determination", he considered them advise rather than political recipes. "Do they think that US military power is available to enable every ethnic or religious group to achieve self-determination?

Will NATO become artillery for ethnic conflicts?

If Kosovo, why not East Africa or Central Asia?

And would the doctrine of universal humanitarian intervention reduce or increase suffering by intensifying ethnic and religious conflicts?

What are the limits of such a policy and by what criteria is it established?" Kissinger further inquired.

He then expressed the view that this line should be drawn towards American ground forces for Kosovo. "The Europeans tirelessly emphasize the need for greater European autonomy. Here's an opportunity to demonstrate that. If Kosovo poses a security problem, then it's for Europe, primarily because of the refugees the conflict could generate, as the president emphasized. Kosovo is no more a threat to America than Haiti was to Europe - and there we never sought NATO support", Kissinger pointed out.

Almost 300 million Europeans should be able to create ground forces to deal with 2 million Kosovars. To symbolize allied unity on larger issues, logistics, intelligence, and air support should be provided. Kissinger accepted this but insisted he did not see the need for US ground forces. Sooner or later, America's ability to sustain global policy must be articulated. The failure to do so has led America into the Vietnam quagmire.

"Even if one envisions a US strategic interest in Kosovo (which I do not), we must be careful not to stretch ourselves too thin in the face of far less ambiguous threats in the Middle East and Northeast Asia. Any gradual deployment in the Balkans will weaken our ability to deal with Saddam Hussein and North Korea. Psychological exhaustion may be even more serious. Every time we make a peripheral deployment of troops, the administration is forced to insist that the danger to US forces is minimal - the deployment in Kosovo is officially described as 'peace enforcement forces'", Kissinger noted.

Such comments, in his opinion, "have two unfortunate consequences": they increase the impression among Americans that military force can be used without sacrifices and send a signal of weakness to potential enemies.

Kissinger summarized his views by stating that he is always inclined to support the administration with a strong commitment to the national interest. "And as a passionate supporter of the NATO Alliance, I make the distinction between European and American security interests in the Balkans with the greatest restraint. But support for a strong foreign policy and NATO strength will surely disappear if we do not solidify them in a clear definition of national interest and provide a sense of direction to our foreign policy during a period of turbulent changes", Kissinger concluded.

Continuation tomorrow: A comparison of the bombing of Serbia and Vietnam