FEUILLETON Henry Kissinger, America, and Kosovo (7): A New Berlin Congress for the Balkans

Writing for Kosovo Online: Dragan Bisenic

Kissinger commented on the crisis in Bosnia, stating, "I do not understand what America wants to achieve in the Balkans". We could have done something at the beginning of the war when the Serbs were accused of massive human rights violations, to prevent it. However, now we are behaving as if we are forcibly trying to return the Serbs to some mythical Bosnia that has never existed in history. There is no Bosnian language, no Bosnian culture. Bosnia is an administrative unit consisting of Croats, Muslims, and Serbs, artificially created in the former Yugoslavia and foolishly recognized as a state by Western powers", Kissinger categorically stated.

Reflecting on the relations in Bosnia, Kissinger particularly emphasized the position and history of the Serbs.

Allow self-determination for the Serbs in Bosnia

"If you look at Serbian history, you will see that they fought for 600 years not to be ruled by Muslims. That is why the US violates its own principle of the self-determination of peoples, and why do our media call them 'Serbian separatists'? Are they trying to separate from something that has never existed in history? I believe that we should create a Muslim state and allow other nationalities to establish their independent states or join Croatia and Serbia. We don't have to interfere in the Balkan war that cannot be concluded even if we win", Kissinger said at the time.

He applied the same line of thinking to Kosovo when addressing US senators. "Let me start with Kosovo. Allow me to deal with it in three parts: the prelude to military operations, military operations, and the potential exit from military operations. As some of you may know, I felt extremely uncomfortable about the diplomacy preceding military operations. I had very serious questions about the choice of targets and the way they were achieved", Kissinger said.

Kissinger emphasized that Americans and the West were dealing with a leader in Kosovo whose dedication to Kosovo "was much greater than it was for Bosnia, which, after all, was never a part of Serbia". "The Serbs consider Kosovo the place of their national origin, their cradle, and an integral part of Serbian history. Therefore, separating Kosovo from Serbia is a more complex task than even Bosnia, and that was difficult enough", Kissinger emphasized.

The negotiations in Rambouillet began on February 6 and lasted until March 19, 1999. Yugoslavia was willing to provide autonomy to the Albanians in Kosovo within the framework of Serbia, but they rejected it. Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, in a conversation with a delegation from the Cypriot Parliament on February 20, 1999, stated, "Threats to our country that it will be bombed if it does not allow foreign occupation of a part of its territory constitute a warning to the entire world and all peoples and individuals who care about freedom and peace. We will not give up Kosovo, even at the cost of bombing".

According to Kissinger, the second problem was the existence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), "which many people believed to be led by Marxists, passionately dedicated to Kosovo's independence". Regarding the ceasefire negotiated by Richard Holbrooke at the time, Kissinger stated that both sides had violated it, with the KLA doing so more frequently and brutally than the Serbs.

"We landed precisely in this hornet's nest to find a comprehensive solution. Now, it's not easy to come up with comprehensive solutions for conflicts that are 400 years old. Sometimes it's better to push the problem ahead without intending to solve it with one big effort and move", Kissinger believed.

He emphasized that the "means chosen, the so-called Rambouillet Agreement, which was really presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, without negotiations on either side, was undoubtedly a very clever document, but only for an academic exercise". Given the passions and history he described, Kissinger doubted that it would be acceptable to either side, as indeed, it was not accepted by either side.

He noted, "that if it miraculously got accepted, we would find ourselves projected into a conflict from both sides because I don't believe that the KLA would ever allow itself to be disarmed by NATO forces as it was supposed to; and I never understood how Serbian forces would stay, and how NATO and KLA forces would react in that situation".

The question of Macedonia

Finally, the autonomy of Kosovo and the independence of Kosovo must raise the question of Macedonia. All of these were very difficult issues to resolve, and frankly, I did not believe they could be resolved by ultimatum. An attempt to resolve them by ultimatum would likely have produced a conflict of great passion on both sides.

Kissinger claimed exactly that. "I was uncomfortable with NATO's decision to seek the right to occupy a country with which it was not at war. Making such a decision is unprecedented in the history of NATO, involving us in diplomacy controlled by 19 nations and a strategy controlled by 19 nations", Kissinger stated in his conversation with US senators.

He called for "something to be done in political and strategic planning in NATO, rather than allowing it to depend on the daily decisions of 19 governments, guided by many different domestic situations". Indicating that he had not yet come to a clear conclusion about what that should be, but it was "the kind of philosophical debate that can be started the same weekend", but if not, "if we are too preoccupied, it must be initiated in the very near future".

“The status of Kosovo should "absolutely be autonomy", which needs to be "a part of an international agreement". After NATO imposed a political solution, it should be viewed as a political solution broader than NATO and beyond Kosovo", he said.

He reminded that he had been a strong supporter of NATO expansion and had not accepted the argument that it would spoil US relations with Russia. "But I believe that the war with Serbia, following such a close NATO expansion, has aroused in Russia and throughout the Slavic world, including Ukraine, the deepest suspicions about the purposes of NATO and the possibilities of future cooperation. Therefore, I believe Russia should play a role in facing a political solution, not a ceasefire", Kissinger pointed out.

He was concerned that the "political path we are now on will end with US forces in Bosnia, US forces in Albania, US forces in Kosovo, and predictably US forces in Macedonia; because we must understand that the autonomy of Kosovo will open the question of Macedonia, where a third of the population is Albanian — and all the surrounding nations have ethnic rights", he said.

Kissinger said that after achieving a ceasefire under the conditions he described, a Balkan conference should take place. "As a historian, I can take the precedent of the Berlin Congress of 1878, which, in a way, redrew the map of the Balkans and calmed it for 30 years, more than anyone else managed to achieve in that region", Kissinger suggested.

He emphasized that US forces should not serve "as a band-aid" everywhere, especially considering other challenges the United States will face worldwide. "Therefore, I think the issue of Bosnia should be dealt with at such a conference. If self-determination is applicable to Kosovo, it should be applicable in Bosnia as well. By that, I mean that perhaps each national group should be allowed to go its own way with an independent state in Bosnia, and with the Serbian-Croatian parts that can join, if they want, their compatriots. That is better than a multi-ethnic state that joins a state broken up on the basis that a multi-ethnic state cannot exist", Kissinger concluded.

He warned senators that, regardless of whether this solution is accurate for Bosnia or a modification of it, it is important that the United States does not become the successor to empires that once governed these territories and eventually found themselves in conflict with the local population whose "passions exceeded the possibility of stability".

A variation of Kissinger's ideas about a conference on Kosovo or the Balkans emerged earlier this year. After a meeting with the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell on June 27, 2023, Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama proposed a conference with the leaders of Serbia and Kosovo, as well as EU and US officials, and suggested that they "not be allowed to leave without an agreement". Borrell supported this idea at a joint press conference.

Continuation tomorrow: The Kosovo precedent that will reach the Urals