Freedom of the seas between sanctions, international law and the new geopolitical reality

Written by Zeljko Sajn for Kosovo Online

The announced agreement between the United States and Iran, which according to officials' statements envisages an end to the conflict, the lifting of the U.S. blockade, and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, could represent one of the most significant geopolitical developments of recent years. A substantial share of global oil and gas transportation passes through this narrow maritime corridor, which is why any instability in the region has direct consequences for the global economy and energy markets.

At the very moment when Washington and Tehran are opening space for diplomacy and a reduction of tensions, the European Union is preparing its 21st package of sanctions against Russia. Among the key issues being discussed within Europe is the so-called “shadow fleet” – a network of tankers that Western countries believe is being used to continue the export of Russian energy resources outside existing restrictions.

This raises a much broader question that extends beyond current political conflicts: where is the boundary between the right of states and international organizations to impose sanctions and the obligation to preserve one of the oldest principles of international law – the freedom of the seas?

As early as 1609, the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius, in his work Mare Liberum, advanced the idea that the high seas could not be owned by any state and that freedom of navigation constituted a common good of humanity. Centuries later, this principle became one of the foundations of the modern international maritime order and was incorporated into the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Under Article 87 of the Convention, the high seas are open to all states and freedom of navigation is guaranteed. Article 110 provides for limited circumstances in which a warship may board and inspect a foreign merchant vessel on the high seas, such as when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting piracy, the slave trade, or situations in which a vessel lacks nationality.

This is why questions are increasingly being raised today regarding the limits of state authority in the implementation of regional sanctions. European Union sanctions are binding on its member states, but actions directed against vessels of third countries on international waters give rise to serious legal and political dilemmas. Any expansion of coercive measures beyond clearly defined international rules may create precedents that could have long-term implications for the stability of the global maritime system.

Terms such as “maritime piracy” are often used in public debates, yet international law draws a clear distinction between acts of piracy and actions undertaken by states. Under Article 101 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, piracy consists of violent acts committed by private actors for private ends. Consequently, measures carried out by states cannot automatically be classified as piracy. Nevertheless, unilateral restrictions on freedom of navigation lacking a broadly accepted legal basis remain the subject of serious international disputes.

From the Black Sea and the Suez Canal to the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, recent developments have demonstrated how crucial the security of maritime routes is for global trade and energy supplies. Maritime history shows that control over sea lanes has for centuries served as an instrument of power for great empires. It was precisely for this reason that the system of international maritime law was developed—to replace the principle whereby the strongest determines the rules.

Under the emerging geopolitical circumstances, particularly if the agreement between Washington and Tehran is confirmed and leads to a lasting easing of the crisis in the Middle East, the European Union may be confronted with the need to seriously reassess its foreign and security policy. If the United States succeeds in stabilizing relations with Iran through dialogue and negotiations, questions may arise in Brussels as to whether a policy that relies predominantly on sanctions remains a sufficiently effective tool for addressing contemporary international crises.

Such a shift in international circumstances could also trigger internal political debates within the European Union, including discussions concerning the responsibility of those who have shaped its current foreign-policy course. As a result, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, could face increased scrutiny, particularly if demands grow among member states for a more pragmatic diplomatic approach and a redefinition of Europe’s role within the emerging global order.

The key question of our time is whether the international order will continue to be based on universal rules that apply equally to large and small states, or whether geopolitical power will once again become the principal arbiter in determining the rules governing the world’s seas.

Freedom of the seas must not become a privilege reserved for the most powerful maritime nations, nor a tool of political pressure. It remains a cornerstone of free global trade, energy security, and international stability. Only seas governed by law can remain seas of peace, while seas governed solely by power relations become spaces of uncertainty for the entire international community.

In a period of profound geopolitical transformation, agreements of this kind demonstrate that international relations, despite numerous conflicts, are once again moving closer to the fundamental principles of the Charter of the United Nations—dialogue, negotiation, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. The new world order taking shape before our eyes remains an arena of intense competition among major powers, often through economic, political, and, regrettably, military instruments. For this reason, the preservation of international law remains the only mechanism capable of guaranteeing smaller and medium-sized states an equal place in a rapidly changing world.