The political potential and challenges of the Serbian community in Kosovo: Between institutional isolation and the possibility of transformation

A years-long institutional and political crisis between the central authorities in Pristina and the Serbian community in Kosovo has led to a deep erosion of trust, the creation of a functional vacuum in Serb-majority municipalities, and increasing social fragmentation. Relations between the Government of Kosovo and the Serbian community, particularly in the four northern municipalities, have further deteriorated in recent years, reflecting a long history of mutual mistrust and disputes over political legitimacy.

While the Government of Kosovo interprets its actions as the exercise of sovereign authority and the consolidation of territorial integrity, the Serbian community perceives them as discriminatory and exclusionary—especially when implemented without institutional guarantees, transparency, or consultation with the local population. This divergence in perceptions has created a lasting cycle of alienation and confrontation that undermines society’s capacity for dialogue, compromise, and institutional mediation.

A key turning point occurred in November 2022, when the regional commander of the Kosovo Police in the north was dismissed for refusing to enforce punitive measures against drivers with Serbian license plates.

In response, Serbian representatives—mayors, judges, prosecutors, police officers, civil servants, and political figures—collectively withdrew from Kosovo’s institutions, thereby effectively collapsing the institutional framework established by the First Brussels Agreement of 2013. By doing so, the Serbian community lost its formal mechanisms of political engagement and protection of rights, while local administrations in the four northern municipalities formally passed under the control of legally elected representatives who, however, lacked genuine political legitimacy within the community.

Thereafter, the pressure of unilateral actions directed toward the north gradually increased, contributing to a new wave of emigration—this time predominantly from northern Kosovo, whereas earlier it had been characteristic of southern municipalities. The departure of entire families further aggravated the demographic structure of the Serbian community and accelerated depopulation. In parallel, increasingly frequent confrontations and growing discontent with the decisions of the Kosovo Government have drawn the attention of international actors, particularly regarding the issues of opening the Ibar Bridge, integrating the health and education systems into Kosovo institutions, and closing the remaining structures that had long operated in a hybrid mode.

Discontent has developed in two directions: toward the Kosovo Government, due to the absence of political inclusiveness, institutional equality, and consultation with representatives of the Serbian community; and toward Belgrade and the Serb List, because of the lack of active political engagement on the ground and the limitation of action to passive rhetoric and press releases. This dual frustration further amplifies the sense of political powerlessness and institutional isolation within the community.

Under such circumstances, political processes in Kosovo take place in an environment of limited trust, heightened security risks, and growing international efforts to preserve fragile peace. Although the 2025 local elections opened the possibility of partial political normalization and a return to institutional frameworks, the reintegration process remains fragile and protracted. Its success will depend on the readiness of the future Kosovo government to establish a more inclusive and predictable institutional framework for non-majority communities, as well as on the ability of Serbian political actors to overcome internal divisions, restore citizens’ trust, and formulate a common platform for action.

The international community, although formally present, in practice continues to act predominantly reactively, without clear instruments for enforcing already agreed arrangements or monitoring their implementation. Such a situation heightens the sense of uncertainty within the Serbian community, narrows the space for legitimate political engagement, and deepens perceptions of institutional inequality and political marginalization.

Political Dynamics and Institutional Changes

The rise to power of the Vetëvendosje (Self-Determination) Movement in 2021 marked a turning point in Kosovo’s contemporary political history. This change of government represented a shift toward a centralized and confrontational model of governance based on the idea of national sovereignty and a limited willingness to compromise. This approach resulted in the systemic exclusion of the Serbian community from decision-making processes and the weakening of institutional inclusion of non-majority communities. Consequently, political trust further eroded, while the participation of Serbs in institutions was reduced to formal involvement without real influence over public policy-making.

Unilateral decisions of the Kosovo Government further undermined the spirit of the Brussels Agreement and deepened the institutional and political crisis, calling into question the sustainability of the normalization process with Belgrade. This state of affairs led to growing discontent within the Serbian community, especially in northern Kosovo, due to perceptions of systemic discrimination, disregard for international and domestic obligations, and selective enforcement of laws.

The culmination of these tensions came with the enforcement of unilateral measures in the areas of license plates, personal documents, and institutional control over the north, while the withdrawal of Serbian representatives from Kosovo’s institutions in November 2022 created a deep institutional and security vacuum. Pristina filled this void by deploying special units of the Kosovo Police, composed predominantly of members of the Albanian community. Such actions disrupted the ethnic balance within security structures and violated the principles of proportional representation of non-majority communities guaranteed by Kosovo’s legislation.

Although the Kosovo Government justified these measures as necessary to maintain public safety, their implementation caused a deep erosion of trust, led to frequent protests and sporadic clashes, and raised concerns within the international community. According to many international observers, interethnic relations deteriorated to levels unseen since 1999. Interventions by special police forces became almost a daily occurrence, while the local population faced an increasing sense of insecurity and institutional pressure.

The peak of escalation occurred in spring 2023 during unrest in Zvecan, triggered by the violent entry of special police into the municipal building. The clashes resulted in dozens of injured KFOR members, police officers, and civilians, marking the most serious security incident of the past decade. Only a few months later, the armed confrontation in Banjska further weakened Belgrade’s negotiating position and shifted international pressure toward Serbia. During this period, Pristina continued consolidating control over the north by expanding its network of permanent bases and temporary checkpoints, thereby violating the mechanisms of coordinated security management defined by the Brussels Agreement.

The increased presence of special units further aggravated the atmosphere of fear and mistrust. Reports of verbal and physical harassment—including cases of sexual violence, especially against women and girls—have grown more frequent. The reputation of the Kosovo Police, particularly among young members of the Serbian community, has been reduced to that of a repressive force rather than an institution of protection and public safety.

Beyond the security dimension, the Kosovo Government has implemented a series of administrative and economic measures with profound consequences for the local economy and social cohesion. The abolition of the dinar as legal tender, closure of banking and postal services, interruption of payment channels from Serbia, and bans on imports of goods have further complicated daily life and fueled a new wave of dissatisfaction among Serbs across Kosovo. Demographic erosion and the outflow of young and educated people have added pressure, reducing the long-term viability of the Serbian community and its political capacity.

The Serbian community in Kosovo in recent years has been left without genuine political support and institutional backing. While pressure from Pristina continues to grow through a series of unilateral decisions, Belgrade’s support has become fragmented, conditional, and unpredictable—leaving the community disoriented and without credible representatives capable of influencing decision-making processes. The only officeholder in the Kosovo government, Minister Nenad Rasic, operates without political legitimacy and without any real ability to influence key decisions of the executive, further confirming the marginalized position of Serbs within Kosovo’s institutional system.

Despite repeated warnings by the international community about harmful decisions toward the Serbian community, the caretaker government formed after the early 2025 parliamentary elections has continued with restrictive measures. The absence of institutional dialogue in the Assembly and the continuation of unilateral actions have further deepened political polarization, weakened the rule of law, and damaged relations with international partners.

Caught between intensifying regulatory and security pressure from Pristina and limited, fragmented channels of support from Belgrade, the Serbian community is entering a period of political disorientation, institutional vulnerability, and social demotivation. The effects of the protracted crisis became visible during the October 2025 local elections, which confirmed a decline in confidence in the Serb List—the party that had long maintained a political monopoly. At the same time, local movements are gaining traction but lack resources and support from official Belgrade, limiting their reach and impact. In parallel, interethnic relations and security indicators are worsening to levels unseen since the end of the 1999 conflict. This dynamic creates a “spiral of mistrust”: the weakening of representativeness and legitimacy of local actors reduces the capacity for dialogue and policy implementation, which in turn deepens the institutional vacuum and social resignation.

Political Landscape and Potential of the Serbian Community

The political potential of the Serbian community in Kosovo is largely limited by internal fragmentation, demographic erosion, and dependence on external political factors, although early signs of possible rebalancing can also be observed.
The political arithmetic after the 2025 local elections shows that, despite the deep decline of trust and internal divisions, the Serbs remain organized around the most stable political entity — the Serb List, which once again won a majority in nine out of ten Serb-majority municipalities. Nevertheless, its coalition capacity at the central level has been drastically reduced, while relations with Albanian parties have been almost entirely reduced to formal and technical communication.
This situation confirms the trend of political stagnation and the limited institutional influence of the Serbian community in decision-making processes.

The Serb List retains its dominant position, but its activity is largely conditioned by political decisions made in Mitrovica and Belgrade. Representatives south of the Ibar, where the Serb List exercises complete control, generally follow predetermined political directives, which further restricts their autonomy and ability to represent local interests.
In addition to the Serb List, a significant role is also played by Nenad Rasic, whose political survival depends on the open support of the Prime Minister of Kosovo. His appointment to high positions — first as Deputy Speaker of the Assembly, and later as Minister for Communities and Returns — is closely linked to controversial decisions of the Kosovo Government, which, in the eyes of the Serbian community, has further damaged perceptions of political legitimacy and institutional equality.

A particular political signal was sent by the local elections in the municipality of Klokot, where a citizens’ initiative succeeded in reaching the second round. This is the only municipality in which the Serb List did not achieve a dominant result, indicating the emergence of new political actors and the potential for pluralization within the community.
Regardless of the outcome, the Serb List still remains the single strongest political entity, which, at least in the near term, will continue to control most local and representative bodies. However, absolute dominance in the current political context carries proportional responsibility: under the changed socio-political circumstances — characterized by limited channels of communication with Pristina and reduced international credibility of Belgrade — it is difficult to expect any substantial institutional influence or a change of political paradigm.

Institutional dialogue and the possibility of broader political consensus remain largely conditioned by the behavior of the majority Albanian parties and the configuration of the future Kosovo government. Their willingness to cooperate will depend on the further development of the Vetëvendosje movement’s policy, whose popularity has also been declining.
This political course, based on populist rhetoric, constant pressure on northern Kosovo, and the favoring of certain Serbian actors of questionable legitimacy, further deepens mistrust and strengthens the feeling of institutional insecurity among the Serbs. Such a policy, perceived within the community as destructive and threatening to the survival and security of Serbs in Kosovo, also undermines the broader process of normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina.

Outside the political system, the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) remains the most important and stable social pillar of the Serbian community.
As the institution enjoying the highest level of trust, the SOC holds both a spiritual and a social role, but in recent years it has been continuously exposed to pressure through a series of legal, administrative, and symbolic measures that question its institutional integrity and historical legacy.
The unresolved legal status of the SOC within Kosovo’s legal framework makes it vulnerable to political and administrative decisions that may endanger its continuity and property rights.
Despite this, the SOC still possesses significant potential as a platform for religious dialogue and interethnic connection. Through initiatives promoting mutual respect and cooperation among religious communities, it can play a constructive role in rebuilding trust and stabilizing social relations.

Viewed as a whole, the demographically depleted, politically weakened, and institutionally fragmented Serbian community faces a prolonged social and political crisis.
This trend can hardly be reversed without greater pluralism, stronger local initiatives, and the depoliticization of the Kosovo question.
The possibility of early parliamentary and the upcoming presidential elections, expected in spring 2026, could further fragment the political scene but without substantial progress unless internal adaptation and the establishment of a functional model of cooperation within Kosovo’s institutional system take place.

Structural Vulnerability and Demographic Decline

Amid strained socio-political relations shaped by a series of crises and unilateral decisions taken without adequate consultation with local communities, political representatives, or civil society, the decision was made to conduct the 2024 population census.
This decision — primarily due to the lack of participatory preparation and measures to mitigate risks — was implemented in an environment of heightened tensions, partial boycott, and limited field access, particularly in northern municipalities and certain enclaves of the Mitrovica region.

The process itself became an indicator of a deeper institutional and political crisis.
Beyond the partial boycott, the census entirely ignored displaced persons (estimated to exceed 200,000), while technical unpreparedness and logistical limitations further undermined the reliability of the results.
Officially, 1,586,659 inhabitants were registered, with Serbs constituting only 2.31% (approximately 36,700 persons).
In the north, the number of Serbs was officially reduced to 7,920, a historic low and a drastic decline compared to previous estimates.
This statistical picture — shaped both by methodological shortcomings and political context — produces the effect of “administrative marginalization”: the community is formally represented as negligible, directly influencing public policies and the allocation of resources.
Such a distorted demographic image does not reflect the actual situation on the ground but carries a high risk of political instrumentalization whose consequences, without corrective measures, could prove long-term and damaging.

Institutional consequences are immediate and measurable.
The decrease in recorded population reflects on:

• Political representation (e.g. reduction of the number of councilors in the four northern municipalities from 19 to 15);
• Budgetary transfers and capital programs (allocation formulas linked to population size);
• Access to collective protection mechanisms provided by the Constitution and laws (quotas, language rights, staffing policies in public services).

The cumulative effect of these changes further narrows the institutional and social space of the Serbian community: a smaller number of representatives means a weaker capacity to formulate and implement development policies, while reduced budgets limit financing of public services, infrastructure projects, and population-retention programs.
Consequently, demographic erosion becomes administratively confirmed and then politically reproduced through diminished institutional capacities.

Essentially, the 2024 census functions not merely as a statistical instrument but as a politico-institutional multiplier: methodological flaws and partial boycott have been transformed into permanent inputs for decision-making on resources, representation, and rights.
Without corrective measures — such as revision of methodology, supplementary registries of displaced persons, and protective budgetary formulas — there is a risk that the “statistical margin” will evolve into structural marginalization with lasting consequences for the community’s sustainability.

Mitrovica: A Mirror of Institutional and Social Crisis

Following the 2024 census results, which further confirmed the demographic decline and institutional vulnerability of the Serbian community, Mitrovica emerges as the symbol and most tangible example of these processes on the ground.
In this sense, the city represents not merely a local environment but a mirror of Kosovo’s broader political, demographic, and security conditions — a space where the effects of unilateral decisions, unresolved status issues, and the absence of a coordinated international strategy are most clearly manifested.

Today, Mitrovica functions as a paradigm of political contest between Pristina and Belgrade, where ethnic divisions intertwine with infrastructural, security, and symbolic issues.
Historically divided by the Ibar River — the south with a predominantly Albanian population and the north with a predominantly Serbian one — the city has become a microcosm of the Kosovo conflict, where the politics of sovereignty, identity, and international control collide.
Thus, the dynamics of Mitrovica reflect not only local tensions but also the broader geopolitical patterns of conflict management in the Western Balkans.

Unilateral measures by the Pristina authorities, implemented without consultation with local communities and outside institutional dialogue, have further destabilized interethnic relations.
In this context, Mitrovica has become a symbol of so-called “infrastructural politics,” a practice in which construction, reconstruction, and the opening of bridges serve not as instruments of urban development but as tools of political symbolism and territorial control.
In 2025, attempts to open the main bridge over the Ibar, accompanied by the accelerated construction of two new bridges, provoked concern among both local residents and international actors.
The heightened presence of KFOR, as well as explicit warnings from the European Union and the United States, testify to the growing risk of security breaches and potential violations of the Brussels Agreement.
These moves, perceived by the Serbian community as attempts to alter the ethnic balance and political reality in the north, have deepened feelings of insecurity and isolation.
At the same time, northern Kosovo faces almost irreversible consequences of the Kosovo Government’s unilateral measures: economic stagnation, demographic decline, and institutional disorientation are shaping a gradual erosion of social cohesion.

Political competition in Mitrovica also highlights the limitations on both sides.
Pristina uses infrastructural and administrative projects as instruments for consolidating control and demonstrating sovereignty, while Belgrade — burdened by internal political crises and a reduced international maneuvering space — fails to articulate a consistent and sustainable policy of support for the Serbian community.
This asymmetry of power is reflected on the ground through the increased presence of special police units, limited communication between communities, and the absence of institutional dialogue, all of which contribute to prolonging the crisis and reinforcing the status quo.

Although the international community remains present through diplomatic missions and aid programs, its role is confined to short-term and reactive interventions focused primarily on preventing escalation.
The lack of a long-term strategy and coordinated approach has resulted in Mitrovica functioning as a “crisis-management zone” rather than a space of political dialogue and interethnic cooperation.
The absence of a development vision, combined with mounting economic and security frustrations, deepens the sense of chronic insecurity among citizens, while the process of normalization between Belgrade and Pristina remains trapped within formal frameworks devoid of genuine operational content.

Overall, Mitrovica stands as a symbol of enduring institutional dysfunction and the limited reach of international mediation.
Without a clear strategy integrating security, economic, and social dimensions, the last urban stronghold of multiethnicity and the administrative center of the Serbian community remain caught between symbolic conflicts and real socioeconomic constraints.
Therefore, the imperative of future efforts lies in the revitalization of this space and the empowerment of the Serbian community through an inclusive and coordinated approach involving all actors — linking local communities, Kosovo institutions, and international partners.
Otherwise, the risk of further deterioration of interethnic relations and prolonged political stagnation will remain extremely high, making Mitrovica a paradigm of the failure of post-conflict transition in Kosovo.

The International Community – From Strategic Mediation to Crisis Management

The political dynamics in Kosovo over the past three years have revealed deep structural weaknesses in the international community’s approach to the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina.
Northern Kosovo, as the most visible area of collision between these policies, has become a symbol of the failure of international mediation and the absence of consistent oversight of the implementation of agreed obligations.
Instead of measurable, conditional, and transparent enforcement of previously reached arrangements, the international framework has been reduced to reactive crisis management and the maintenance of minimal stability.
This approach has resulted in the loss of credibility of the Brussels Dialogue and the erosion of trust in international mediators, particularly regarding the unfulfilled obligation to establish the Community/Community of Serb-majority Municipalities (CSM/ZSO).

The European Union, although formally the main mediator, is facing a decline in trust and a weakening of its leverage.
Restrictive measures imposed on Kosovo after the violence in Zvecan in 2023 demonstrated limited effect; the authorities in Pristina perceive them as unfair, drawing parallels with the events in Banjska and the absence of comparable consequences for official Belgrade.
At the same time, the United States, following a change of administration and a shift of attention toward global priorities, has reduced its direct political engagement in the Western Balkans, effectively relegating Kosovo to a lower position on its foreign policy agenda.

KFOR remains the key international mechanism for maintaining security, yet its role is confined to crisis response without significant political impact.
Similarly, the EULEX mission — based on an advisory and monitoring mandate — has shown limited reach, both due to the lack of executive powers and modest human and logistical resources.
Such a situation prevents systematic monitoring of critical points, including the conduct of special units of the Kosovo Police, indirectly allowing the continuation of unilateral actions by Pristina.

In this environment, the Brussels process has been de facto devalued and reduced to a formal framework lacking real political substance.
The asymmetry of pressure on the parties in dialogue has further deepened mistrust, while the possibility of institutional compromise depends on redefining internal political relations within Kosovo itself.
Despite the limitations, the international factor remains indispensable in creating a political environment in which compromise could become possible — through the restoration of trust, consistent application of agreements, and the gradual reintegration of local institutions into a stable institutional framework.

Civil Society Between the Community and Institutions

Within such an environment, Serbian civil society in Kosovo has assumed one of the key roles in maintaining communication with the international community and other relevant actors following the withdrawal of the Serbian community from northern institutions.
In conditions of institutional vacuum, representatives of civil society have become the primary intermediaries between local communities and international partners: intensifying research work, analytically observing and documenting security incidents, monitoring human rights violations, and providing data essential for targeted interventions.
This has led to a kind of redistribution of information flows — from formal political representatives to independent actors on the ground.

In this way, the civil sector partially mitigates the consequences of limited institutional access by mediating in the provision of legal aid, public advocacy, and systematic documentation of discrimination cases.
However, without executive authority, civil society cannot — nor should it — replace institutional functioning.
Nonetheless, it remains a crucial source of verified information and contextualized analyses, enabling international partners to better understand local socio-political dynamics and design more precise interventions.

At the same time, this sector operates under multiple pressures — from campaigns of discreditation and institutional obstruction to financial insecurity — deepening the atmosphere of stigmatization toward individuals and NGOs, alongside attempts through targeted campaigns to silence critical voices within the community.
Despite this, civil society, together with independent media and civic initiatives, remains one of the few cohesive factors linking Pristina and northern Kosovo.
Its role will be indispensable in the upcoming period for creating space for local dialogue, mediating in the strengthening of political pluralism within the Serbian community, and supporting reintegration processes.
By further strengthening professional capacities and involving young activists, this sector can become one of the pillars of the future social and political development of the Serbian community in Kosovo, as well as a credible, independent, and constructive actor in reconciliation and institutional integration processes.

Key Conclusions and Recommended Courses of Action

Politically, the period following the central and local elections in Kosovo will be marked by the efforts of the Serbian community to overcome the long-standing institutional vacuum and boycott consequences through reintegration into local institutional structures.
This process remains long-term and complex, unfolding in an environment of permanently damaged trust toward institutions in Pristina and growing fragmentation within the Serbian political scene itself.
Its further course and intensity will largely depend on the political configuration and readiness of the future Kosovo government to open space for a more inclusive dialogue, restore institutional trust, and provide effective mechanisms for the protection of the rights of non-majority communities.

After years of crisis and disrupted relations between the central authorities and the Serbian community, the priority must be its revitalization, based on clearly defined goals: restoration of institutional presence of Serbs in local structures, political consolidation, and the establishment of coordination through the Community/Community of Serb-majority Municipalities (ZSO) as a framework for collective protection and long-term stability.
In parallel, dialogue with institutions in Pristina must be intensified — with the mediation of international actors — to ensure stability and predictability of the political process.
Additionally, targeted economic interventions, especially infrastructural investments and employment programs, will be a key precondition for transforming electoral results into sustainable socio-economic effects.
Progress in these areas must be measurable and transparent, through regular evaluations and reporting, thereby reducing the risk of escalation and strengthening long-term stability.

Such a process requires a series of essential steps toward establishing a favorable environment for progress, including the following:

1. Reintegration and Restoration of Institutional Trust

Election results provide a basis for the gradual return of Serbian representatives to local structures of governance and administration.
The main challenge lies in rebuilding functional municipal administrations, with adherence to legal procedures, professional standards, and bilingualism in institutional work.
Reintegration must be accompanied by coordination among Belgrade, Pristina, and international partners, with clear guarantees for the protection of the rights of the Serbian community.
This process should not be viewed as a mere technical act but as a tool for restoring citizens’ trust and strengthening the legitimacy of local authorities.

2. Political Implications and the Need for Consolidation

Although the Serb List once again won the majority in Serb-majority municipalities, indicators of political fragmentation and increased competitiveness were observed, particularly in the municipality of Klokot.
Such development may contribute to long-awaited pluralism but simultaneously raises the risk of additional pressure on independent political actors.
Therefore, it is crucial to consolidate the Serbian political scene through inclusive dialogue, professionalization of local leaders, and strengthening of their political position vis-à-vis central institutions.
Belgrade’s role in relations with the international community remains relevant for ensuring political support and protecting local interests during the reestablishment of institutional trust.

3. Strategic Priorities for Sustainable Progress

Long-term stabilization and progress of Serbian municipalities in Kosovo require a strategic approach that transcends short-term political cycles and focuses on building functional, economically sustainable, and socially balanced local communities.
Within this framework, development priorities should include strengthening institutional capacities, improving the local economy, and fostering an environment that promotes inter-municipal and interethnic cooperation.

The establishment of such a strategic framework requires coordinated action by local governments, central institutions, Belgrade, and international actors.
It is crucial to link political processes with development goals and ensure that local initiatives are supported by sustainable financial and infrastructural programs.

Key measures:

• Economic development and employment: focus on capital investments, infrastructure improvements, and entrepreneurship to mitigate the effects of depopulation and social insecurity.
• Local dialogue and interethnic cooperation: develop institutional mechanisms for communication with the Albanian side, with international mediation, to reduce ethnic tensions and prevent incidents.
• Transparency and performance measurement: establish systems for monitoring the results of local administrations through periodic reports on service quality, respect for language rights, and implementation of budget plans.
• Human capital preservation: introduce mechanisms to prevent demographic depletion of Serbian communities through housing support programs, youth employment, and digital economy initiatives, with special emphasis on women and educated professionals as carriers of social stability.

4. A More Stable Institutional Interaction with Pristina

The desired evolution of relations between the Serbian community and institutions in Pristina implies a transition toward stable institutional interaction based on mutual recognition of roles and competencies, strict adherence to legal guarantees, and operationalized sectoral partnerships in areas of common interest.
Instead of periodic political confrontations, the focus should shift to structured sectoral dialogue at the level of local governments, line ministries, and public services to ensure consistent implementation of laws, equal access to public resources, and full respect of constitutionally and legally guaranteed rights.

Key elements of this relationship should include:

• Establishment of permanent, thematically organized dialogue formats between the Serbian community and institutions in Pristina, including representatives of local governments, ministries, regulatory bodies, and international mediators, creating a predictable institutional channel for discussing sectoral issues and monitoring agreed measures.
• Transformation of relations with Pristina toward the concept of functional coexistence, where each side respects the other as an institutional partner in solving concrete problems.
• Open and regular communication with international partners, Pristina, and Belgrade, with equal participation of local Serbian representatives in all phases of dialogue.

5. The Future Model of Cooperation Between Belgrade and the Serbian Community

The future relationship between official Belgrade and the Serbian community in Kosovo should rest on the principles of sustainability, responsibility, and mutual trust.
It is necessary to abandon the approach that views the Serbian community solely through a political lens and shift toward a development-oriented model of cooperation, in which Belgrade acts as a guarantor of institutional support but also as a partner in strengthening local capacities, social resilience, and political pluralism.

Recommended measures:

• Establish permanent coordination mechanisms with local structures to exchange information and monitor implementation of the Brussels Agreement.
• Reduce institutional and media pressure on political opponents, especially in small communities where fear and dependence on public resources shape political behavior.
• Develop permanent two-way and transparent communication forums between Belgrade, local leaders, and international missions aimed at resolving contentious issues.

6. International Actors and the Serbian Community

To enhance trust, predictability, and effectiveness of international presence, future relations must be based on principles of mutual respect, co-creation of locally owned policies, and shared responsibility for results.
This framework should include two-way communication, procedural accessibility, and continuous monitoring and adjustment mechanisms for programs implemented in cooperation with international partners, focusing on:

• Establishing support formats for local actors as drivers of local dialogue, including independent media and civil society organizations, to reduce the gap between political and social levels of dialogue.
• Reconfiguring international assistance programs by transitioning from short-term grant models to multiannual institutional arrangements aimed at strengthening community resilience and promoting greater interethnic cooperation.

The Serbian community in Kosovo, demographically depleted, politically weakened, and divided, faces a continuing crisis that demands urgent intervention.
Without a strategic shift toward inclusive solutions and the restoration of trust, the risk of lasting instability remains high.
The recommended steps outlined above offer a pathway toward stabilization, but their success will depend on the collective engagement of all actors involved.

Written by Miodrag Milicevic, Executive Director of NGO Aktiv, for the Bulletin of the Working Group for Chapter 35 of the National Convention on the EU.