Somaliland – Resettlement of Palestinians and challenges of international recognition of independence (2)

Somalilend
Source: Research Gate

Written for Kosovo Online by Habib al Hadi

The government of Somaliland has publicly denied any involvement in the proposed resettlement plan. The President of Somaliland, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Irro,” dismissed reports of ongoing talks, stating that his government would only consider any U.S. proposal if it were formally presented.

The mere suggestion of such an arrangement has sparked significant debate, both within Somaliland and in regional and international diplomatic circles. The issue raises not only key questions about Somaliland’s foreign policy strategy but also about its standing in the Arab and Muslim world, and the broader geopolitical consequences of its alleged alignment with U.S. and Israeli policies—particularly at a time when, following the Saudi–Pakistani Defense Pact, the Arab and Muslim world appears to be turning its back on Israel. Considering Somaliland’s historical ties with the Arab world, its strategic location along the Red Sea, and its weak but persistent diplomatic contacts with African and Western nations, the controversy highlights the delicate balancing act Somaliland must perform between its aspirations for statehood and the geopolitical realities it faces.

Additional uncertainty came with an interview given by Somaliland’s newly elected president to The Guardian in May this year. Without mentioning Gaza or any resettlement initiatives, he stated that “international recognition of Somaliland is imminent.”

He declared that his country was “on the brink of international recognition,” a step that would heighten tensions in the already volatile Horn of Africa.

President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi said it was “likely” that Somaliland would finally gain recognition of its right to self-determination, which has eluded it since it declared independence from Somalia 34 years ago. “Recognition is around the corner,” Abdullahi announced.

Such a move would enrage Somalia, which would see it as an attack on its sovereignty, alarm regional powers on the strategic peninsula, and raise wider concerns about setting a precedent for secessionist movements across Africa.

Despite relative stability and regular democratic elections, Somaliland—home to about six million people—has yet to be recognized as independent by a single nation.

“It is a question of when, not if, and who will lead the recognition of Somaliland,” Abdullahi said.

Citing Somaliland sources, The Guardian reported that the goal “has never been closer, amid signs that U.S. President Donald Trump might become the first leader to recognize the self-proclaimed republic in exchange for building a military base near the port of Berbera, a strategic location in the Gulf of Aden.”

Abdullahi revealed that U.S. military officials, including the top officer in the Horn of Africa, recently visited Hargeisa. Another Washington delegation is expected to “assess the facilities and the port of Berbera.”

The key U.S. military base, Camp Lemonnier, is located in neighboring Djibouti, but concerns are growing about China’s influence there as Beijing continues to strengthen its ties with Africa. “Project 2025,” the alleged plan for Trump’s second presidency, proposed recognizing Somaliland as “a safeguard against the U.S. losing ground in Djibouti.”

In April, U.S. aircraft carriers off the coast of Somaliland played a role in U.S. bombings of Yemen in response to disruptions of Red Sea shipping routes by Houthi rebels.

The U.S. has yet to announce any formal agreement with Somaliland, but Abdullahi said they are involved in efforts to secure global maritime trade.

“We are a security partner. We are a partner in the fight against terrorism. We are a partner in ensuring safe sea lanes for global trade,” said Abdullahi, who was sworn in as president nine months ago. In that time, he said, the U.S. ambassador to Somalia has visited him six times.

The Trump administration remains divided over its approach to Somalia, which continues to view Somaliland as part of its territory.

The Guardian made no mention of Palestinians or Gaza, but it is hard to imagine that such discussions could be taking place without reference to that option—an idea circulating since Trump’s inauguration and regularly reported by global agencies in March and May this year, before resurfacing again in August and this September.

The implications of Somaliland’s alleged involvement in the Gaza resettlement plan are manifold, with potential diplomatic, economic, and security consequences that will inevitably affect broader regional dynamics. In particular, Somaliland’s position in this controversy could draw it into conflict with the Arab and Islamic world and jeopardize its relations with key players such as the United States, Israel, the Gulf states, and the African Union.

The stakes for Somaliland are high, potentially leading to the paradoxical situation where an unrecognized territory seeking recognition might reject it, even if offered. Such an outcome warrants full attention.

In response to these rumors, the government of Somaliland issued a formal and unequivocal denial of any involvement in the proposed resettlement plan for the Gaza region, stressing its commitment to Palestinian rights and its determination to remain neutral in the ongoing Israeli–Palestinian conflict. In a statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the government of Somaliland asserted: “We categorically reject any participation in the proposed resettlement plan for a conflict-affected region. Somaliland firmly supports Palestinian self-determination and the right to a sovereign state.” Despite this denial, the mere suggestion that Somaliland might have considered such an idea has already generated significant diplomatic ripples, placing the country’s international relations under intense scrutiny. Whether the rumors are true or not, the fact that they have gained traction highlights the vulnerabilities of Somaliland’s unrecognized status on the global stage.

This possibility puts Somaliland’s fragile position at the crossroads of two major geopolitical currents: the pursuit of international recognition and the need to maintain strong regional alliances. On one side, the United States and Israel represent powerful global actors seeking to expand their influence in the Horn of Africa. For Somaliland, aligning with these countries could bring significant diplomatic and economic benefits. U.S. assistance—including foreign aid, technology transfer, and the potential for formal recognition—could be on the table if Somaliland were to support a resettlement plan for the conflict-affected region. Such cooperation would undoubtedly enhance Somaliland’s standing in the eyes of the West and potentially pave the way toward greater international legitimacy.

On the other hand, the risks of cooperating with the U.S. and Israel on this matter are considerable. Somaliland’s position in the Horn of Africa is shaped by its strategic importance to Arab and African states, which have been its most consistent and vocal supporters in its quest for international recognition. The Gulf countries in particular have been key to Somaliland’s economic development, providing crucial investments in infrastructure and trade, especially through the strategic port of Berbera. These ties are not merely economic but are reinforced by a shared cultural and religious identity. For these nations—especially key regional players—any move by Somaliland to openly support Israeli policy, particularly regarding Palestine, would be seen as a betrayal of the Palestinian cause and the values of solidarity that define the Arab and Muslim world. This could lead to the severing of essential diplomatic and economic ties, including the withdrawal of investment and aid, which would be disastrous for Somaliland’s already fragile economy.

(To be continued tomorrow)