With Stalin Against Tito: The Example of Kosovo

Written for Kosovo Online by: Muharem Bazdulj

For decades, a stereotype has persisted in much of Serbian public opinion that the current factual situation regarding Kosovo and Metohija is the result of decades of communist rule.

A recent newspaper headline sums it up succinctly: “Tito and Kardelj, the architects of independent Kosovo.” A younger historian from the region explains this in more detail: “Of the 15 districts that became part of the autonomy, Albanians were the majority in 13. This shows us the main reason for the formation of this autonomous unit and the criterion for determining its borders. This consolidation of part of Serbia where Albanians made up the majority set a major precedent (...) After World War II, communist authorities in Kosovo and Metohija made moves that were a continuation of the fascist occupiers' policy (...) The target continued to be the Serbs who had settled in Kosovo during the agrarian reform of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. These people were among the first to be targeted by the occupiers in 1941, and after the war, the communist government took steps to prevent their return to Kosovo, seize their property, and expel them from the region. The outcome of this endeavor, in which figures like Aleksandar Rankovic, Blagoje Neskovic, and Mosa Pijade were involved, was the confiscation of property and the permanent expulsion of about 40,000 people from Kosovo and Metohija.”

Without delving into the accuracy of some of the details mentioned, it is clear that this reasoning is a result of selective information. From the Albanian perspective, but also from others, Serbian and Yugoslav communists directly discriminated against Albanians from Kosovo.

In this context, the selection of prominent Albanian communists during the time of the Informbiro resolution is significant. This is authoritatively written about by the famous Croatian-American historian Ivo Banac (1947–2020), to whom it would be difficult to ascribe any pro-Serbian sentiment, in his book "With Stalin Against Tito."

Outlining the context of 1948, Banac emphasizes that, practically from its founding, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) had no supporters among the Yugoslav Albanians. Although it is true that at the Dresden conference in 1928, the communist support for "an independent and unified Albania" was emphasized, it was Tito who revised this issue several years later, and party statements began to focus on the struggle for the equality of the “Arnaut minority” in Kosovo, Metohija, and Sandzak.

Despite this, the KPJ was virtually nonexistent among the Albanian masses. In April 1941, when Nazi Germany and its allies divided the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the Communist Party in all of Kosovo and Metohija had 270 members, and of these, only 20 were Albanians, or less than 10%. In this sense, the official policy of the KPJ was always to preserve the Yugoslav-Albanian border as it existed before World War II, even though Albanians on both sides of that border opposed it. Svetozar Vukmanovic Tempo noted that many Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo joined the partisans, “but their readiness to fight could not yield satisfactory results as both groups were few in relation to the Albanian population.”

At the First Congress of the Communist Party of Serbia, to which the party organization of Kosovo belonged, there was only one Albanian out of 43 members of the Central Committee (Xhavid Nimani – Patrija). Additionally, all regional party leaders in Kosovo were Serbs and Montenegrins.

The Informbiro resolution was most enthusiastically and quickly welcomed by Enver Hoxha, who rejoiced in being liberated from Yugoslav tutelage. Albania was the first country to reject all previous agreements with Yugoslavia and carried out a purge of the Titoist faction within its own party ranks. Among the few high-ranking Albanian party officials in Kosovo, those who were most prominent sided with Stalin; among them were: Camil Borovina-Bujku, Faik Pruti-Teli, Xheladin Hana, Xhavid Vokshi, Omer Cerkezi, Nexhat Agoli, and others.

Banac directly concludes: "Thanks to the deep sympathies toward Albania among Albanians in Kosovo as a whole, most of them were, in a certain sense, Informbiro-leaning."

In general, the idea of autonomy was an attempt to integrate the Albanian population into Yugoslav society. In certain years and to a certain extent, it can be said that this policy achieved some positive results, although it probably did not change the most desired option that the majority of Albanians aimed for. However, it is incorrect to simplistically claim that Serbian and Yugoslav communists created a "time bomb" that would inevitably explode in the future. After all, if that were the case, it would be hard to explain the dominant Informbiro-leaning sentiment among Albanians in Kosovo.