Trump preparing Kosovo scenario for Ukraine

The war in Ukraine could be brought to an end through an agreement that leaves the final status of the annexed territories unresolved. Russia would retain de facto control over part of the occupied Ukrainian territory that it has also formally annexed, while Kyiv would not accept any change to its territorial integrity but would undertake to resolve the dispute by peaceful means. This separation between territorial control and formal recognition reflects the political logic of the Kosovo scenario.

Territory under Russian control would not legally become Russian simply as a result of a ceasefire. Ukraine could maintain its territorial claims while separating their pursuit from the use of military force. Acceptance of a ceasefire line may constitute a temporary security decision, whereas recognition of annexation carries different political and legal consequences. Trump’s potential success would therefore be measured by his ability to secure a framework in which the parties can live with an unresolved dispute while providing sufficiently credible protection against a renewed war.

The latest round of diplomacy indicates that elements of such an arrangement are being discussed, although no agreement has yet been reached. Steve Witkoff met Volodymyr Zelenskyy and European representatives in Oslo on October 20, with Jared Kushner participating online, before meeting Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg the following day.

On October 23, Zelenskyy confirmed that a meeting of the Ukrainian, US and Russian negotiating teams was being planned for the first half of November, while insisting that Europe be involved and that the key issues be discussed by the leaders themselves. According to Reuters, he is also seeking robust security guarantees and ten years of funding for the Ukrainian military.

The political appeal of a broader package is understandable. If Kyiv were to receive long-term security and reconstruction funding, while Moscow obtained certain economic benefits from ending the war, both sides would have greater incentives to accept a painful compromise. A negotiator can broaden the scope for bargaining by introducing different interests into the dispute.

The weakness of this approach emerges when economic incentives are expected to compensate for disagreements over Ukraine’s sovereignty and freedom of action. If the Kremlin links Russia’s future security to restrictions on Ukraine’s military and foreign-policy choices, the prospect of trade with the West is unlikely, in itself, to resolve the dispute. Reuters reporting on this latest round of diplomacy indicates that Moscow continues to demand the entire Donetsk region and the exclusion of Ukrainian membership in NATO.

The issue of recognition, moreover, is not the same for Kyiv and Washington. Reuters reported as early as April 2025 that the US proposal at the time envisaged US legal recognition of Russian control over Crimea and de facto acceptance of Russian control over other occupied territories. That was an earlier negotiating document, not evidence of what current proposals contain. Nevertheless, it demonstrates why Ukraine’s non-recognition, US recognition and the positions of European countries must be distinguished from one another. One party may retain its legal claim even if other states abandon it politically or legally. For Ukraine, the consequences of such a development would extend far beyond the ceasefire itself, as the issue has largely been presented so far.

The Kosovo parallel is most useful in illustrating how relations can be regulated without agreement on final status. European agreements on the normalization of relations have consistently proceeded from the differing positions of Belgrade and Pristina on status, while at the same time providing for practical regulation of relations and the settlement of disputes exclusively by peaceful means. Such an approach allows the parties to maintain divergent legal positions for years while assuming concrete obligations governing their day-to-day relations. In the Ukrainian case, similar logic could allow Kyiv to present an end to the fighting as a means of protecting its population and statehood without signing a document declaring Russia’s territorial gains legitimate. Its sustainability would depend on the precision of the commitments and their implementation.

The comparison with Kosovo is already present in international expert debate. Edward Joseph has proposed an interim arrangement modeled on UN Security Council Resolution 1244, under which the final status would be deferred while negotiations focused on international administration and a security presence. Paul Hockenos raised the same issue in January 2026 in an article titled “Ukraine’s Answer Might Be Kosovo.”

The analogy, however, has a clear legal limit. Kosovo was not annexed by a neighboring state, whereas Russia has declared the annexation of Ukrainian regions. In Resolution ES-11/4, the UN General Assembly condemned the attempted illegal annexation of those territories and called on states not to recognize any change in their status. Similarities between possible negotiating techniques therefore do not make the legal foundations of the two cases equivalent. Deferring a decision on status may help bring the war to an end, but it does not automatically provide legal justification for territorial conquest. It is precisely this distinction that could enable Ukraine to accept a ceasefire while retaining its internationally recognized territorial claim.

Written for Tanjug by Stefan Surlic, Associate Professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade