Turkey’s role in Sudan’s recognition of Kosovo

Sudan’s recognition of Kosovo came in the wake of major changes in the Arab world, which culminated late last year with the meteoric fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Since then, Syria has become the geopolitical epicenter where new power dynamics in the region are being determined and influence among major powers is being redistributed.

Written by: Habib al Hadi for Kosovo Online

The most significant external actor and driving force of change in Syria is Turkey. It can be said that the recently elected Syrian government is a manifestation of the pro-Turkish faction in the country. Turkey had two strong reasons to independently engage in the Syrian conflict and bring about the fall of the Damascus regime. The first was a long-term goal to control the Syrian Kurds and prevent their secession, which could become the foundation of Kurdish statehood—in essence, to block the creation of a “Syrian Kosovo.”

The second reason is the millions of refugees in Turkey, which it is eager to send back to Syria by any means.

By establishing control over Syria, Turkey’s influence in the region skyrocketed—especially in Sudan.

The conflict in Sudan, ongoing since April 2023, pits the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) under General Burhan against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by General Dagalo, with foreign involvement including Turkey, which supports SAF with Bayraktar TB2 drones, while the UAE and Israel are accused of backing the RSF.

The Bayraktar TB2 drones, developed by the Turkish company Baykar (owned by President Erdoğan’s son-in-law), have proven effective in previous conflicts such as Nagorno-Karabakh. These drones have been critical in SAF’s recent successes. Despite evidence of drone sales, Turkish officials have denied providing military support to Sudan, claiming neutrality and non-interference.

Turkey’s use of drones in Sudan is part of a broader strategy of “drone diplomacy,” where military support strengthens bilateral ties. This approach has seen success in Azerbaijan and Ukraine, and is now expanding into Africa. Turkey’s involvement in Sudan is driven by a combination of strategic, geopolitical, and economic interests, as well as broader ambitions in Africa and the Middle East.
The Horn of Africa, where Sudan is located, is strategically important due to its proximity to the Red Sea, a critical global shipping route, but is also plagued by long-standing internal and interstate conflicts. Turkey has expanded its influence in this region as part of its wider “Africa Opening Plan” launched in 2003. Sudan serves as a gateway for Turkey to deepen political and military influence in this geopolitically sensitive area, where it competes with powers like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel, and Egypt.

The UAE and Israel are accused of supporting the RSF. Turkey’s support for SAF aligns with its aim to counter the influence of these rival powers, particularly the UAE, with whom Turkey has tense relations due to ideological and regional competition (e.g., in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean). By backing SAF, Turkey seeks to undermine the UAE’s regional ambitions and position itself as a key player in Sudan’s future.

Turkey has reportedly supplied SAF with TB2 drones worth over $120 million since late 2023, including eight TB2 units and hundreds of munitions. These drones were instrumental in SAF’s recent military victories, such as the recapture of Khartoum.

Sudan has become a testing ground for Turkish drones, enhancing their global reputation. The TB2 has already proven effective in conflicts such as the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the Tigray War in Ethiopia. Success in Sudan further recommends these drones to other countries, boosting the export of Turkey’s defense industry—a key sector of its economy.

Turkey had cultivated ties with Sudan under Omar al-Bashir, who was ousted in 2019. During his rule, Turkey had an agreement to develop Suakin Island in Sudan as a military and economic hub, although this plan was derailed by Bashir’s downfall. Despite the political upheaval, Turkey has maintained a multi-sectoral presence in Sudan, demonstrating persistence in its strategy.

Turkey portrays itself as a supporter of Sudan’s legitimate government, the SAF, against the RSF, which is often labeled a “terrorist” or “militia” group. This fits Turkey’s narrative of supporting stability and sovereignty in African nations, a stance that resonates with some regional actors.

Turkey’s actions in Sudan, much like its interventions in Syria, reveal its willingness to act independently of NATO constraints. While NATO influences Turkey due to its strategic location between Europe and the Middle East, Turkey leverages this position to pursue its own agenda, including military interventions in Africa.

Turkey’s involvement in Sudan is also linked to its complex relations with Russia and Iran, both of which have stakes in the region. Turkey has participated in mediation efforts like the Astana process for Syria, which includes Russia and Iran, and has agreed to mediate indirect negotiations between SAF and RSF along with Libya. This reflects Turkey’s effort to balance its regional power role while maintaining diplomatic ties with multiple actors.

By supporting SAF, Turkey aims to secure a foothold in post-war reconstruction, potentially gaining access to resources, trade opportunities, and political influence. This mirrors Turkey’s strategy in countries like Somalia, where it has established a significant presence through military bases and infrastructure projects.

Sudan’s strategic location and resources—including fertile land and potential oil reserves—make it an attractive partner for Turkey. A stable Sudan under military control could open the door for Turkish investment and trade, aligning with Ankara’s economic goals in Africa. Control over parts of Sudan’s Red Sea coast, such as the Suakin Island project, would give Turkey a strategic maritime presence, enhancing its power projection in the region and securing shipping routes.

These are the circumstances that led to Sudan’s decision to recognize Kosovo. Sudan is a country with an extremely high secessionist potential, having endured a decades-long conflict in Darfur, the outcome of which is closely watched by other provinces looking to raise their own claims. Ultimately, Sudan is the only country in the world that has paid the price of secession, with the separation of South Sudan. For this reason, Sudan had long been one of the staunchest opponents of recognizing Kosovo’s independence.

Turkey, as the leading promoter of Kosovo’s independence in the Islamic world, had made several attempts to discreetly introduce the topic of Kosovo into the agenda of the Arab League, but was each time firmly rejected—primarily by Sudan.

Now, however, the circumstances have changed. President Erdoğan has positioned Turkey as a leader of the Muslim world and a champion of anti-imperialist causes. Supporting the SAF against what Turkey calls “terrorists” supported by the UAE and Israel fits this narrative, appealing to Erdoğan’s domestic base and reinforcing his image as a regional strongman.

It is likely that during meetings in Antalya, Sudanese leaders were presented with a fait accompli, as their survival at home directly depends on Turkish military assistance, leaving them little room to consider the norms of international law.

With this move, Turkey aims to strengthen its position in the Balkans, particularly in Kosovo. Thus, it should come as no surprise if Syria is soon expected to follow the same path.

One more thing must be said: Turkey has gained a decisive role in Syria and Sudan at the expense of Russia, which had to withdraw from both countries due to recent events. However, Turkey is now in a new position that enables further strengthening of its influence in the Middle East and the Arab world.