Adem Demaci - the "armed prophet" of the Albanian national movement in Kosovo (6)

Writing for Kosovo Online: Dragan Bisenic, journalist

Announcement of the final showdown with Rugova

It is interesting to note that the term "Balkania" in the context of a state entity was first mentioned in Bram Stoker's novel "The Lady of the Shroud", published in 1909. Bram Stoker is known as the author of the novels "Dracula" and "The Prisoner of Zenda", in which he described Southeastern Europe and the Balkans from imperial perspectives. "The Lady of the Shroud" is set in Montenegro, which suddenly acquires a new ruler - a foreigner. In honor of this, a grand aviation meeting is organized, attended by all the countries in the region. During the meeting, the idea of how all these countries could connect, if not unite, in an entity called "Balkania" was developed.

From April 6th to 8th, 1997, I was a part of a group of reporters covering a three-day Serbian-Albanian dialogue organized in New York. It was a meeting held at the Carnegie Foundation and involved representatives from Serbian and Albanian political parties in Kosovo, as well as US hosts. The participants included:

From Serbia - Vuk Draskovic (President of the Serbian Renewal Movement), Vesna Pesic (President of the Civic Alliance of Serbia), Dragoljub Micunovic (President of the Democratic Center), Dusan Mihajlovic (President of New Democratic Party), Miroljub Labus (Vice President of the Democratic Party), and Dusan Janjic (Director of the Forum for Ethnic Relations).

Kosovo Albanians: Adem Demaci (President of the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo), Abdullah Karijehdill (Vice President of the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo), Fehmi Agani and Hidayet Hiseni (Vice Presidents of the Democratic League of Kosovo), Mark Krasniqi (President of the Christian Democratic Party), former President of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Kosovo, Mahmut Bakali, and the chief editor of the daily "Koha", Veton Surroi.

US side: The organizer from the Princeton "Project on Ethnic Relations", Dr. Allen Kassof, and in an observer capacity - Rudolf Perina, David Phillips, Matthew Palmer (State Department), Stephen Berg (Brandeis University), Robert Hayden (University of Pittsburgh), David Hamburg (Carnegie Corporation), John Scanlon (former Ambassador to Belgrade and adviser to Milan Panic).

It was initially planned for representatives of the Socialist Party of Serbia to attend the meeting, but then-Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic decided not to send a delegation because the US hosts did not ensure a meeting with the then-Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, while a meeting with representatives of opposition parties was arranged.

The meeting was organized at the highest level. Participants stayed at the glamorous Waldorf Astoria Hotel, where dinners and receptions were hosted. Journalists were not allowed to follow what was happening behind closed doors, but they could talk to participants during breaks and after sessions.

Most of the participants from Belgrade and Kosovo flew to New York on the same plane from Zurich. There were occasional encounters and conversations during the multi-hour flight. I spoke with Demaci, Agani, and Bakali. They were all optimistic about this meeting and believed that nothing bad would come out of it. They saw it as an opportunity for mutual acquaintance rather than a place and time for negotiations.

During the flight, I asked Demaci about the origin of the name "Balkania" for the confederation project that he had launched. "It's a name that fits and rhymes with all the countries in the region – SerbIA, AlbanIA, MacedonIA. It will make it easier to write songs and verses," he responded humorously.

Then I told him about Stoker's use of his confederation. "Excellent. This means that the British will support the project when I tell them this," Demaci exclaimed, and Mahmut Bakali turned and looked at us curiously.

It's not known whether he actually did that, but right at the New York airport, it was evident that this idea would not be accepted among Albanians.

Upon landing at the New York airport, an impressive scene was witnessed: a whole lineup of nearly 100 US Albanians welcomed the Albanian delegation and warmly greeted them. Demaci, who led the group and was the first among them to approach fellow Albanians at the airport, received particularly enthusiastic applause. It was also his first time in the United States.

Before the New York talks began, on April 4th, the State Department issued a clear and unambiguous statement to both sides, stating the position of the United States.

"The further violation of the basic human rights of Kosovo Albanians, citizens of Serbia, is unacceptable. This represents the main obstacle to improving relations between the US and Serbia. The US does not support separatism or Kosovo's independence. We respect the territorial integrity of Serbia and Montenegro. We encourage Kosovo Albanians to take a role in the political system, both in the political and economic life of Serbia itself. At the same time, we call on the Serbian Government to address the root causes of Kosovo separatism - the brutality of the Serbian Police, acts of discrimination against the Albanians, and the Serbian Government's refusal to engage in a serious dialogue with the people of Kosovo regarding their numerous issues." The dinner for the conference participants was organized on the 4th floor of the western part of the hotel, in the "Conrad" salon, and former Secretary of State and Yugoslav negotiator Cyrus Vance was expected to attend. However, the organizers announced that he would not be able to attend the dinner or the conference the next day due to the flu. The roundtable discussion began at the Carnegie Corporation's headquarters on the 26th floor of the skyscraper at Madison Avenue 437, in super-luxurious office spaces.

Participants arrived by 8:30 when the working breakfast started, and they only left after more than 14 hours of continuous deliberations, around 10 p.m. The next day, a press conference was held to present the jointly adopted statement. I heard that there were occasional heated confrontations during the morning regarding one of the two jointly adopted statements at the end. No one had to explain anything further; the matter was evident from the stern faces of some Albanian representatives and, in black and white, in one sentence of the jointly adopted statement about the shared views, stating that any future agreement on Kosovo must be based, among other things, on "establishing regional stability through adherence to the Helsinki principles concerning borders".

Demaci addressed the assembled journalists in Serbian, saying: "These three days in New York have been very exhausting but also very important. We have established the necessary contact and have said almost everything we thought about one or another policy and one or another stance. But we did not quarrel; we did not lose contact, nor did we lose our composure. This means that we managed to create the atmosphere and climate necessary to solve this extremely difficult Kosovo problem. You are aware of the situation with regard to the Albanians and Serbia... With these two papers we have adopted, a path has been opened for other meetings, regardless of when, how, and who will participate. This is more than I hoped we could achieve at this meeting... Personally, I do not see a solution to the Kosovo problem within Serbia or Yugoslavia, but in the form of a confederation of Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo, which I have called 'Balkania', a project I introduced for discussion in Kosovo and which I recently made known to the Serbian public through 'Nasa Borba'," Demaci said. This time, he did not mention Bram Stoker.

To understand how exhausting, difficult, and conflict-ridden it all was, it was enough to hear Vuk Draskovic's assessment of the talks. "I am surprised by the firm stance of all Albanian participants. On the first day, they uniformly rejected any possibility of resolving the Kosovo problem within Serbia, with none of them wanting to acknowledge Serbia as their state. I believe that such a stance harms the Albanian position in the eyes of the international community. What do they think; how would Americans react if Cubans suddenly declared that they wanted to secede Florida from the US, or if Mexicans announced independence for Southern California?! That's how Washington sees this Kosovo situation... However, I have the impression that they will eventually accept that these discussions should move on to the domestic stage – in Belgrade, Pristina, or Montenegro. It doesn't matter," Draskovic said.

The differences were significant, but at that time, strong diplomacy was still at play. This time, in the education agreement, the Vatican was involved through the Saint’Egidio Community organization, acting on behalf of Monsignor Paglia.

There was a significant thaw in relations between Albania and Serbia during the leadership of Fatos Nano. Pristina journalists wrote that during his five-month tenure, there were more contacts with Belgrade than during the time of Enver Hoxha and Sali Berisha combined. The pinnacle of this opening was the meeting between Milosevic and Fatos Nano in Belgrade. Meanwhile, the coalition of the Socialist Party of Serbia and the Yugoslav Left congratulated the Albanian Socialists on their victory in the June elections. The Yugoslav charge d'affaires was received by the President of Albania, Rexhep Meidani, and the Interior Minister, Paskal Milo.

In September 1996, Rugova and Milosevic separately signed an Agreement on the Normalization of Education in Kosovo, mediated by the Catholic organization Saint’Egidio. This agreement was intended to be an introduction to a later "comprehensive agreement" that would place Kosovo within the framework of the broadest autonomy, almost independence. However, the agreement was soon undermined.

Rugova made a fatal mistake and effectively accepted Milosevic's proposal for autonomy for Kosovo. Albanian negotiators and peacemakers from the G-15 and G-4 groups, after the surprisingly significant success of the Albanians and armed soldiers in the fight against Serbian occupiers, capitulated and agreed to even renounce the “Republic of Kosovo“, which would have been in a confederal relationship with Serbia and Montenegro. Such a thing was expected from the hesitators - stated Demaci when Ibrahim Rugova refused even to consider Demaci's confederation concept. This was the announcement of the final showdown with Rugova and the transition to the side of the Kosovo Liberation Army.

The next serious political challenge Rugova faced occurred in the autumn of 1997 when students from the parallel university, led by Albin Kurti, organized the first mass demonstrations in Pristina since 1989. Although the students, who demanded to return to the University building, chanted slogans against the Serbian regime, these demonstrations largely represented a warning to Rugova that his nonviolent methods were no longer effective, and that new generations were losing patience. Even more than this, the demonstrations practically demolished the education agreement and the prospects for a more or less diplomatic solution to the Kosovo drama that had been emerging. They practically meant a turn towards war and a change in the balance of power within the leadership of the Albanian national movement.

Tomorrow: Rejection of the Hill’s Agreement