Operation "Breakthrough": Enver Hoxha's preparations for the military invasion of Kosovo and the creation of "Greater Albania" after Tito's death (2)

Written for Kosovo Online by Dragan Bisenic, a journalist

"Kosovo Sector" for "Kosovo Republic"

In order to strengthen the influence on Albanians in Yugoslavia and especially in Kosovo, in the structure of the apparatus of the Albanian Central Committee of the Albanian Labor Party, a special Department for Foreign Propaganda was created in 1978 (Sektori te Propagandes me Boten e Koseje) or, as it was unofficially called, the "Kosovo Sector" (Sectori i Kosoves).

Its task was to analyze the situation that was developing in the regions of Yugoslavia inhabited by Albanians and to promote the idea of uniting the Albanians and creating a "Greater Albania", regardless of the existing interstate borders. In this regard, "the state policy towards Kosovo was based in the first stage on a platform based on the request "Kosovo - a republic" within the Yugoslav federation". (Shteti al-Shqiptar nuk i organizoi demonstratat e vitit 81. 29. 3. 2011 // LaimMaqedoni - http:// lajmpress. com/intervista/8402.html).

For the head of the Albanian Labor Party, the "Albanian topic" in this context has become one of the most important from the point of view of the military-political situation in the Balkans. The analysis made by Hoxha was not intended for a wide audience yet, because it could further complicate the relations between Tirana and Belgrade, not only in the political sense but also create conditions for a military confrontation, as well as attract the attention of both the West and the East, which concerns the unequivocal position of Albania's leadership in the near future. At the same time, the national-secessionist factor began to play an increasingly significant role in the so-called massive military-political strategy that was part of the defense policy of the Hoxha regime.

The scenarios of the development of events in Yugoslavia, formulated by Hoxha, were of a confrontational nature. According to Hoxha, after Tito's death, the power struggle should have started between the leadership of Yugoslavia, in which each of the conflicting parties will try to find support abroad and above all in the US and the USSR, which led the respective military blocs - NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The conflict between them could lead to an attempt to use the armed forces of the two opposing military-political pacts and, as Hoxha concluded in June 1978, "in this situation, our country will face the risk of attacks from both sides and not separately from each, but from both sides together".

In the event of a conflict between Albania and the USSR, which would have resorted to intervention against Yugoslavia, Enver Hoxha counted on united actions with the Albanians living in Kosovo, Montenegro, and Macedonia. Preparation for upcoming events actually became an important element in the functioning of the state and party apparatus of communist Albania, and its head himself relied on the "patriotic education" (as he called it) of the Albanian population of the SFRY [8. F. 539]. In order to maintain the combat readiness of the Armed Forces, as well as the Volunteer Self-Defense Forces, in the most dangerous strategic directions from the point of view of a possible invasion, and above all in the neighboring ones, in October 1978, the units of the stationed army were reinforced and exercises were carried out.

For the Albanian side, the degree of combat readiness of the Yugoslav armed forces and the Territorial Defense, to repel possible external aggression, became an important factor. Meanwhile, the close connection of the Yugoslav foreign, internal, and defense policy intensified in the second half of the 70s of the 20th century. This was particularly clearly demonstrated at the congress of the League of Communist of Yugoslavia held on 20-23 June 1978. Foreign analysts drew attention to the so-called "three main pillars of the country's life and stability" that had formed by then - Tito's personality, the armed forces, and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The continuation of the policy of non-alignment and the strengthening of an independent foreign policy was the most important point of reference in the international arena for Belgrade. In this regard, the distribution of forces in the Balkans was of particular importance to the Yugoslav leadership, because from the position of the SFRY on the peninsula and the relations with the Balkan countries - four members of two opposing military-political blocs - the Warsaw Pact (Bulgaria, Romania) and NATO (Greece and Turkey), and Albania, which was not part of any pact, but maintained close relations with the People's Republic of China, depended not only on the international prestige of Yugoslavia, but also on its defense policy as a member state of the Non-Aligned Movement.

The worsening of relations between Tirana and Beijing had had a double meaning, as noted by foreign experts, who quite accurately determined the assessment of Albanian-Chinese relations from the Yugoslav side, from the point of view of Belgrade's foreign policy and defense interests.  On the one hand, for Yugoslavia, the increased isolation of Albania was a positive fact, because it dealt a serious blow to Enver Hoxha's regime. However, on the other hand, the Yugoslav side feared that the leadership of Albania could make a compromise with the Kremlin, which could "increase the danger for Yugoslavia, taking into account the 1.5 million Albanians living in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro”. Along with the sharpening of the Bulgarian-Yugoslav conflict over Macedonia, the deterioration of Albanian-Yugoslav relations over Kosovo could have harmful consequences for the future of Yugoslavia after Tito's disappearance from the political scene [...] That is why one of the arguments used by Yugoslav commentators regarding the conflict between Beijing and Tirana was that now Albania is not only against Yugoslavia and China but also against the Soviet Union.

Hoxha's reaction to Tito's report read at the 11th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (June 20-23, 1978) was unequivocally negative. It testified about the potential conflict between the two countries on the issues of Albanians in Kosovo and Yugoslavia and the Albanian leader's plans for the unification of all Albanians and the creation of a "Greater Albania". On June 22, 1978, Hoxha recorded in his diary, "The fact is that even after liberation, they were not allowed to declare themselves and act as they wanted, and they were united by force into a federation that was later renamed the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." One of those people, which did not get any opportunity for self-determination, are the Albanians of about two million people who live on their own land. The Albanian population, which, I repeat, lives on its own territories in Yugoslavia, outnumbers the population of Macedonia and Montenegro. Therefore, demanding and supposedly fighting for the self-determination of other people at a time when you are in your own country and in accordance with your supposedly socialist theory, you do not allow this, then all this, I emphasize, is a bluff."

These plans and expectations of Tito's death led to the intensification of Albania's military preparations towards Yugoslavia. This was clearly demonstrated during Hoxha's inspection visit to the Central Command Post on June 24, 1978, which is located northeast of Tirana, near the village of Linze. He arrived there together with Mehmet Shehu, Kapo, and Veli Llakaj.

During a tour of the underground facilities of the Central Control Center, as well as control test connections via telephone and telegraph communication lines with the military command of the country's capitals and regional party leaders, the head of the Albanian Labor Party was interested in the degree of readiness of the facility and the availability of backup communication lines. The soldiers present, who were responsible for the construction of the building, had an impression that clearly testifies to the atmosphere of anticipation of war - Hoxha and his entourage were preparing to repel an attack on Albania. Therefore, the words of the First Secretary of the Albanian Labor Party that "we are on the eve of war", as well as statements about the need to purchase foreign defense equipment, were taken as proof of the seriousness of the events. The situation became particularly alarming for Hoxha after the Albanian side received an official note from the Chinese government on July 7, 1978. The document not only announced the final termination of economic and military-technical aid to Tirana but also contained accusations against the Albanian authorities of sabotaging the receipt of aid and indicated its large volume in recent years. The very next day, Hoxha drew up theses of a possible answer and ordered an urgent meeting of the Politburo.

At the Politburo meeting on July 11, 1978, dedicated to considering the current situation in Albanian-Chinese relations, Hoxha referred to the recommendations of the Chinese side to conclude a military alliance with Yugoslavia and Romania but stated that Albania immediately abandoned that plan. Hoxha again appealed to the Albanians in Yugoslavia, but warned that if someone (i.e. Yugoslavia) "participates in Chinese intrigues against the Albanians, socialist Albania", then "all Albanians everywhere will reject them as a whole and march victoriously against them". 

Particular attention was drawn to the response of the Albanian side, published on July 30, 1978, in "Zeri i popullit" in which the Chinese proposal on the expansion of military cooperation between Albania, Yugoslavia, and Romania was published, which the Albanian leadership called the "Tirana-Belgrade-Bucharest Axis" plan.

In late January - early February 1979, military exercises "Biza" (named after the mountain peak east of Tirana) were held in Albania. Their idea was for the armed forces (with the involvement of reservists) to perform a maneuver in the mountainous terrain in the winter period, on the border with Montenegro. The exercise produced disastrous results, and as it turned out later, the commanders were in a hurry to finish it in order to watch FC Dinamo's game in Tirana.

Against the backdrop of the intensification of military exercises, the situation in Yugoslavia was for Hoxha a crucial issue of foreign and defense policy.

(To be continued...)