Kostic: New Spanish government could take a tougher stance toward Pristina
Mijat Kostic of the New Third Way organization says that if the People’s Party and Vox form a new government following the elections in Spain, it could take a somewhat tougher stance toward Pristina than the current Socialist government, in the sense that, in addition to not recognizing Kosovo, it could also block its membership in certain international organizations.
Kostic said that more than 40 percent of polls indicated that the November 29 elections in Spain would result in a change of government and that projections showed the People’s Party and Vox winning a combined 190 seats, more than enough for a majority.
Regarding the position on Kosovo, Kostic told Kosovo Online that there was a general consensus in Spanish society, due to the country’s problems with separatism, particularly in Catalonia, against supporting any form of secession.
“The current government has said that it will not recognize Kosovo, but also that it will not prevent it from joining certain international organizations. It is quite possible that a new People’s Party-Vox government would take a somewhat tougher stance, particularly given Vox’s policies, which are highly critical of separatism and migration in general and favor a hard-line approach. It is therefore possible that, under the influence of Vox politicians, Spain’s position toward Pristina would become even tougher and that Kosovo’s accession to certain international organizations would be blocked, which would represent a departure from the Socialist government’s policy. However, the general consensus among all parties in Spain is that they will not recognize Kosovo,” Kostic stressed.
Given that Kosovo Prime Minister and Self-Determination leader Albin Kurti and Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez have maintained a certain degree of communication through the Socialist International, to which their parties belong, and that Sanchez is projected to move into opposition after the elections, Kostic said this would leave the authorities in Pristina with one fewer avenue for conducting diplomatic activities through international party organizations, particularly the Socialist International.
“They will still be able to meet with representatives of the Spanish Socialist Party, who would then be in opposition, so they could lobby through the opposition, but they would no longer have that direct channel to the new Spanish government,” Kostic noted.
He pointed out, however, that relations between a potential new government in Madrid and Pristina would also be influenced by relations between Spain and the United States.
He said that the parties likely to take power in Madrid had announced somewhat closer cooperation with Washington and greater cooperation within NATO, which would represent a departure from the previous government’s approach, given that Sanchez had opposed Trump, particularly over the attacks on Iran, and had also blocked the possibility of the United States using military bases in Spain.
At the same time, Kostic noted that despite Trump’s apparent policy discontinuity with the Democratic Party, he continued to maintain good relations with Kosovo, particularly direct relations with former Kosovo President Vjosa Osmani, and had wanted Kosovo to be part of the International Stabilization Force in Gaza.
“Relations between the United States and Kosovo have been strained over the past year, primarily because of the suspension of the strategic dialogue with Kurti. However, if Trump’s policy is in some way cooperative toward Kosovo, it is not out of the question that Spain could also cooperate directly with the authorities in Pristina, with the caveat, of course, that it will never recognize Kosovo’s independence. The dynamics between a new Spanish government and Pristina will depend to a large extent on its relationship with Donald Trump or any US administration, and Spain may shape some of its other international relations under the influence of its bilateral relationship with the United States,” Kostic said.
He added that there were two competing dynamics. On the one hand, a potential new Spanish government would advocate a common EU defense and security policy, which could suggest that it would expect Serbia to align itself with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, particularly regarding Russia.
“On the other hand, that does not mean it will take a favorable position toward Kosovo or that its position toward Serbia will change significantly. It will certainly support the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue and the normalization of relations,” Kostic concluded.
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