Less: Good Friday Agreement cannot be directly applied to the Kosovo case, circumstances are different

Timothy Less, a professor at the Center for Geopolitics at the University of Cambridge, says for Kosovo Online that the Northern Ireland case demonstrates the possibility for groups previously in conflict over territory to eventually reach a compromise and settle their differences. However, as he emphasizes, the Good Friday Agreement, which brokered a compromise between Catholics and Protestants and resolved the question of Northern Ireland's statehood, cannot be directly applied to the Kosovo case due to different circumstances.

The Good Friday Agreement of 1998 was recently mentioned by the UK Special Envoy for the Western Balkans, Stuart Peach, citing it as a good example for the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue.

According to our interlocutor, the agreement, which ended 30 years of violence, formally designates Northern Ireland as a region within the United Kingdom, enjoying a significant degree of self-governance, akin to Scotland and Wales, with power shared between Catholics and Protestants, formerly warring factions.

"Northern Ireland is subject to 'joint sovereignty,' meaning it is formally part of the United Kingdom, but the Republic of Ireland has a say in the internal affairs of Northern Ireland. There is also an open border between Northern Ireland and the Republic, allowing for the free movement of people and goods between the two," Less notes.

Protestants, he says, were satisfied with the 1998 agreement as Northern Ireland did not unify with the Republic, while Catholics, under the agreement, can effectively live as citizens of the Republic of Ireland while physically residing in Northern Ireland.

"The Northern Ireland case suggests a solution where northern Kosovo could become an autonomous region within Kosovo, maintaining strong ties and an open border with Serbia. However, it is important to note that the circumstances of northern Kosovo and Northern Ireland are different, and the Good Friday Agreement cannot be directly applied to the Kosovo case," Less says.

He highlights key differences between the Kosovo situation and the Northern Ireland case, noting that Britain has always recognized the independence of the Republic of Ireland, while Serbia does not recognize Kosovo, "the party with which it should negotiate the status of northern Kosovo," which would complicate any agreement based on the idea of joint sovereignty.

Another difference, he says, is the status of the disputed territory. Northern Ireland, he explains, is part of the United Kingdom, its parent state, while northern Kosovo is "part of the state of Kosovo that seceded, not the parent state of Serbia."

"There is a third difference, perhaps the most important, concerning the demographics of northern Kosovo. In Northern Ireland, there were two groups of roughly equal size sharing the same space but unable to agree on which state to be part of, a problem resolved through joint sovereignty and autonomy, or in other words, living simultaneously in the United Kingdom and in Ireland. But this is not the case in northern Kosovo, which has a homogenous Serbian population that wants northern Kosovo to be part of Serbia. This means that the idea of shared governance applied in Northern Ireland is not relevant here, and if some arrangement of shared governance were to be implemented between Serbs and Albanians, it would surely complicate matters rather than solve them. Therefore, when considering these differences, the Good Friday Agreement offers only limited lessons for Kosovo," Less says.

He believes that another, earlier, solution for Northern Ireland from the early 20th century, involving the separation of Northern Ireland from the Republic, is more relevant for the status of northern Kosovo. However, Less doubts that the Kosovo issue, or the status of northern Kosovo, will ultimately be resolved in this way.

"This solution was a response to Dublin's demand for independence, which London eventually accepted after a period of struggle. This was opposed by the predominantly Protestant population in the north, which wanted to remain part of the United Kingdom, and London's solution at the time was the division of the Irish island. According to this analogy, if this approach were applied to Kosovo, then Kosovo would also be divided, with the north remaining part of Serbia while Serbia, in return, would recognize the predominantly Albanian south. This was the solution pushed by the Trump administration during the period 2017-2020, and which Serbian and Kosovo leaders apparently accepted at the time, but I doubt British diplomats have this in mind when discussing Northern Ireland as a solution for the Kosovo issue because they consistently rejected the idea of division. Instead, they are pushing for another attempt to resolve the issue of Northern Ireland, namely the Good Friday Agreement," Less concludes.