Pupin Initiative: Messages from the U.S. House of Representatives do not reflect reality; Serbia has fulfilled the majority of its obligations
The Pupin Initiative has assessed that claims made during a hearing of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs—according to which the Western Balkans “will not stabilize until Serbia is normalized”—represent a one-sided interpretation of regional developments and do not reflect realities on the ground. The Initiative points out that Serbia has implemented approximately 80 percent of its obligations under the Brussels Dialogue, while Pristina’s key obligation—the establishment of the Community of Serb-majority Municipalities (CSM)—remains unfulfilled.
The Pupin Initiative recalls that the hearing before the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs focused on issues of regional stability in the Western Balkans, with particular emphasis on Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the influence of Russia and China, and the strategic interests of the United States in Southeast Europe.
They note that several statements made during the discussion portrayed Serbia as the primary generator of instability encouraging malign external influence. For this reason, the Initiative published a response on its website intended solely as an analytical reply to those claims. The response, they say, clarifies Serbia’s regional role, its foreign policy orientation, and its cooperation with the United States and the European Union in the Western Balkans.
In its response, the Pupin Initiative stressed that claims voiced during the hearing that the Western Balkans “will not stabilize until Serbia is normalized” are based on an overly unilateral reading of regional dynamics.
“Stability in the Western Balkans is a multilateral outcome shaped by unresolved institutional arrangements, credibility gaps in international mediation, and the asymmetric implementation of agreements. Serbia has implemented or partially implemented nearly all of its commitments (around 80 percent) under the Brussels Dialogue, including the dissolution of Serbian security structures in northern Kosovo and the integration of police and judicial systems. At the same time, the Community of Serb-majority Municipalities (CSM), an EU-endorsed and legally binding obligation, remains unimplemented by Pristina more than a decade later, indicating a structural imbalance in the application of agreements that undermines trust and diminishes incentives for further concessions. Portraying Serbia as the sole or primary obstacle simply does not correspond to realities on the ground,” the response states.
They add that unsubstantiated claims made during the hearing risk obscuring the reality of Serbia’s significant progress in strengthening regional stability and fostering constructive relations with the international community.
Relations with Neighbors
The Pupin Initiative also points out that claims suggesting Serbia actively fuels instability among its neighbors are insufficiently supported by evidence. They emphasize that Serbia is a committed participant in regional cooperation frameworks (all supported by the EU and the U.S.), including the Berlin Process, Open Balkan, and CEFTA, positioning itself as a regional economic anchor rather than a disruptive actor.
By contrast, they note, the Belgrade–Pristina dialogue represents a far more acute challenge, yet during the hearing responsibility for instability was attributed almost exclusively to Belgrade—an attribution which, they stress, is not supported by observable political signals.
“Pristina, particularly under the leadership of Albin Kurti, has on multiple occasions acted as a non-constructive actor, as evidenced by the suspension of strategic dialogue with the United States, explicit characterizations of Kurti as obstructive even during the hearing itself, and continued pressure from the U.S. Embassy for equal and meaningful participation of Serbs in Kosovo’s political life. These signals are unambiguous. In a process where obstruction is clearly identified, pressure is directed at the obstructing party. The fact that such pressure has been directed at Pristina rather than Belgrade strongly indicates where responsibility for the stagnation in normalization lies and undermines claims that Serbia is the primary destabilizing actor in this bilateral relationship,” the response states.
Unverified Claims at the Hearing
The Pupin Initiative also drew attention to unverified claims made during the hearing, including the assertion that “Kosovo has established special minority-protection mechanisms that exceed those of EU member states.”
While Kosovo’s Constitution provides for legal mechanisms to protect minority rights, the Initiative notes that the 2024 civil society human rights report on Kosovo documents that minority communities—including Serbs, Roma, and Ashkali—continue to face significant practical challenges in exercising their rights.
“The report highlights numerous cases in which constitutional and legal guarantees are not consistently implemented in practice, such as unequal access to justice, insufficient availability of information and services in minority languages, and barriers to minority participation in political life and public service. These findings demonstrate that, despite formal protective mechanisms, the effective implementation of rights and minority inclusion in Kosovo remain unresolved issues,” the response states.
They also reacted to the claim that Kosovo “fears Serbian influence through the Community of Serb-majority Municipalities, the so-called CSM, and therefore has not fully implemented CSM policies.” They note that while Pristina frequently cites fear of Serbian influence as justification for slow or partial implementation, this obligation is legally binding and was accepted by Kosovo authorities as part of the 2013 Brussels Agreement.
“Including Serbs as equal and substantive participants in political and social processes in Pristina builds trust between communities and contributes to dismantling dangerous stereotypes that portray them as actors of malign influence,” the Pupin Initiative states.
Serbia’s Foreign Policy Orientation
The Initiative also assesses that claims portraying Serbia as remaining “firmly within Russia’s orbit” are not supported by empirical indicators. They point out that more than 65 percent of Serbia’s total trade is conducted with the EU, while over 70 percent of total foreign direct investment originates from EU member states.
“In particular, U.S. companies are among the fastest-growing investors in Serbia’s ICT sector, energy services, and manufacturing. In the field of energy policy, Serbia has accelerated diversification via Bulgaria and Greece, including access to the LNG terminal in Alexandroupolis, with strategic documents explicitly prioritizing the reduction of dependence on a single supplier, in line with EU and U.S. energy security objectives,” the response states.
Regarding security, they recall that since 2017 Serbia has conducted more joint military exercises with NATO member states (44 with the United States alone) than with Russia (6), actively participates in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, and maintains defense cooperation agreements with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Germany.
They further note that since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Serbia has not conducted a single joint military exercise with Russia, while maintaining strong cooperation with NATO partners.
“Moreover, Serbia’s conduct since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine further complicates claims of firm alignment with Moscow. According to reporting by the Financial Times, since 2022 Ukrainian forces have received more than €800 million worth of Serbian artillery shells and ammunition—a level of contribution difficult to reconcile with narratives of strategic loyalty to Russia,” they state.
They also recall that in 2024 Serbia undertook a political commitment to procure French Rafale multirole fighter aircraft, and in 2025 decided to expand cooperation with Israel through the acquisition of Hermes 900 unmanned aerial vehicles and artillery support capabilities from the Elbit Systems portfolio.
“Taken together, these decisions structurally bind the modernization, training, and maintenance of Serbia’s armed forces to Western and EU defense ecosystems, rather than to Russian platforms,” the Pupin Initiative emphasizes.
Military Neutrality
They further stress that Serbia’s policy of military neutrality has contributed to predictability rather than destabilization along NATO’s southern periphery, noting that Serbia hosts no foreign military bases, does not challenge NATO borders, and closely cooperates with NATO partners in migration management, counterterrorism, and humanitarian assistance.
“Viewed together with operational cooperation with NATO member states and the absence of any joint military activities with Russia since 2022, Serbia’s defense posture positions it as a net stabilizing actor, rather than a disruptive factor, within the regional security environment,” the Initiative states.
The Role of China
The response also notes that it is “analytically inaccurate” to portray China as a deeply entrenched actor in Serbia’s strategic sectors in 2025.
“China’s engagement in Serbia remains largely confined to construction and heavy industry, while critical infrastructure, energy diversification (with the current exception of NIS, though mitigating measures are already under way), telecommunications, cybersecurity, and advanced technologies are predominantly—or increasingly—under the influence of EU and U.S. frameworks, standards, and financial institutions. Serbia has not adopted Chinese digital governance models, nor has China gained control over security-sensitive systems,” the response states.
Strategic Message for U.S. Policymakers
In conclusion, the Pupin Initiative emphasizes that portraying Serbia as the central destabilizing actor in the Western Balkans is analytically weak and strategically counterproductive. Such an approach, they add, risks undermining reform incentives, reinforcing zero-sum narratives, and creating obstacles to further strategic alignment.
“A more effective U.S. approach recognizes Serbia as the largest economy in the Western Balkans, an indispensable partner for energy diversification, transport corridors, and security cooperation, and a state whose long-term trajectory depends on credible integration pathways and balanced implementation of agreements, rather than public attribution of blame. In this context, Washington’s announced intention to open a strategic dialogue with Serbia signals recognition that sustained engagement, rather than pressure, is key to integrating Serbia into a broader cooperative regional and transatlantic framework. Stability will not emerge from isolated pressure on Serbia, but from consistent, structured engagement that treats Serbia as a strategic actor rather than a conditional problem,” the Pupin Initiative concludes.
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