Radulovic: The tri-border area of Kosovo, Albania, and North Macedonia is the strongest stronghold for the recruitment of radical Islamists

The problem of accelerated radicalization of Islam in the Western Balkans has existed for many years, and currently, the strongest stronghold for recruiting radical Islamists in the Balkans is the tri-border area of Kosovo, Albania, and North Macedonia, said Vlade Radulovic from the Center for Geostrategic Research and Terrorism.

"We have been dealing with the issue of accelerated radicalization for several years now, and I would say that this matter became a serious concern for the public in the Balkans in general with the emergence of the Islamic State, especially at its peak in 2014 and 2015," Radulovic said in an interview for Kosovo Online, noting that the turning point in the Balkans on this issue was at the end of 1991 and the beginning of 1992 with the arrival of the El Mujahideen unit, or Mujahideen, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, primarily in the Tesanj area.

He emphasized that this is the root and core of the problem of radical Islamism in the Balkans, which, as he added, was further exacerbated by the fact that official Sarajevo, although obliged to after the Dayton Agreement, did not resolve the issue of the Mujahideen unit.

He pointed out that more than 700 members of that unit, from Algeria, Palestine, Iran, and various parts of the Islamic world, stayed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, married, changed their names, and obtained Bosnian citizenship.

"When you look at it, from then until today in Europe, and even with the 'Twin Towers' attack, it's a fact that, in some way, individuals from Bosnia and Herzegovina were linked to certain terrorist attacks. Either individuals connected to Osama Bin Laden were at some point on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or weapons used in some terrorist attack came from Bosnia," he said.

He added that one of the largest actions of the Austrian police, Operation "Palmira," showed that the two key people coordinating and managing the situation and organizing the Wahhabi movement, primarily in the Balkans, were in fact two individuals from Tutin.

He also mentioned that research conducted by the Center for Geostrategic Research and Terrorism indicated that although Serbia may not be as "popular" for potential terrorist attacks as Germany, France, Belgium, or the United Kingdom, we certainly cannot be complacent, and the danger still exists.

"A different issue is Kosovo and Metohija, after 1999, following the withdrawal of Serbian police and the Yugoslav army. At that time, there was a significant influx of radical imams, the construction of mosques directly supported by money from questionable Gulf countries, and they began to build their network. I'm talking about more than 800 mosques built to date, and then between 2012 and 2015, at least two operations by the Kosovo police confirmed and showed that certain individuals from Kosovo were heavily involved in the Islamic State network," Radulovic said.

He also stated that those operations revealed that certain imams were recruiting and providing logistical transport for Kosovo Albanians from Kosovo to the Syrian-Iraqi battlefield.

"When you have such a situation, and the fact that some of those individuals who were taken there or were formed there have returned to the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, while Pristina has done almost nothing or imposed minimal sentences on returnees who have been proven to have been on the territory of the Islamic State, the situation becomes clear. Then it is not surprising why weapons are found in a vehicle near the Visoki Decani monastery, why individuals are arrested who are confirmed to have had plans for poisoning water supplies, planned bomb attacks in North Mitrovica in some local establishments, or planned attacks in central Serbia, more specifically in Belgrade," he said.

Radulovic points out that the third issue indicating the problem is the accelerated radicalization, mainly within the Roma and Ashkali communities in central Serbia, including Belgrade, Nis, Smederevo, and several other cities.

Regarding the main strongholds for recruitment, he explains that the tri-border area of Kosovo, Albania, and North Macedonia is the most problematic.

"The notorious Kacanik and that region – Kosovska Kamenica, Djakovica, Gnjilane… There are various forces of these groups or organizations that exist throughout Kosovo and Metohija. Srbica as well, although, truthfully, somewhat less so, as expected, in the north of Kosovo and Metohija," he states.

He points out that it is precisely the Islamic communities themselves that must work against radical Islamism, as no one else can fight for them.

However, he doubts that there is a genuine desire in Kosovo to combat radical Islamism because, as he says, there have been no punishments for returnees, Islamic State fighters, and the head of the Islamic Community of Kosovo is still a person who was arrested in one of the Kosovo Police operations and for whom there are well-founded suspicions that he leads a network of radical imams.

"When you consider all this, it becomes clear that, essentially, nothing is happening on the ground, and if we look at individuals from North Macedonia of Albanian nationality, who have been involved in incidents in Western Europe over the past year and a half or two, it's clear that officials say one thing, but there are no substantial changes on the ground, or at least I personally do not see them," he adds.

Radulovic also points out that it is difficult to create a clear profile of those who are recruited.

He says that a few years ago they were able to identify certain characteristics, but there is still no clear pattern.

"It was previously a common belief that these were mostly individuals with lower education, people from closed circles, mainly from rural areas, in poor economic situations… However, then we had the opportunity to see that these were young individuals with good academic success at the time or who had finished school with excellent results, coming from relatively well-off families, from urban areas. So, it's very difficult to create a single profile because people have different motivations and beliefs that lead them to make certain decisions or take certain actions," he explains.

However, he notes that based on the past ten years, it can be said that regardless of the background these individuals come from, they are mostly between the ages of 20 and 30.

In addition to the consistent fact that these are young people, what is concerning, according to Radulovic, is that in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a woman was arrested for this reason, and two girls from Novi Pazar joined the Islamic State.

Another problem in Serbia, according to Radulovic, is the emergence of converts, i.e., individuals who convert from Orthodoxy to radical Islam.

As an example, he recalls the case of Goran Pavlovic, the leader of the Wahhabi movement in Belgrade, who took his family, wife, and daughter to Syria, where they perished.

"There have been similar situations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the Federation part, where Serbs, Orthodox Christians, converted to radical Islam. We also had a recent case involving an individual who attempted to kill a member of the Serbian Gendarmerie, a guard at the Israeli embassy, who was also a person who had converted from Orthodoxy to Islam," he adds.

He says that this again introduces a new pattern, but he remains convinced that these are exceptions and that such a trend does not exist.

Regarding the political goals of radical Islamists, Radulovic says there are often disputes.

In their messages and statements, he says, we frequently hear that their goal is to create a Caliphate, the victory of Islam as they perceive it – death to infidels and everything else that follows that narrative.

On the other hand, he adds, it is often heard in the Balkans and around the world that certain radical circles use this religious foundation for secessionism, to create their own states or territories that would be under their control, with Sharia law as the constitution and the overarching legal framework.

"When you look at research from various organizations, you often find embedded classic political messages that are present in the modern world, but colored and masked in a way that, on the surface, they appear to be religious. I'll give you one example – the Islamic State, which was destroying cultural monuments in Palmyra and elsewhere, had no problem selling oil on the black market and taking money for it. So, they had no problem with that, and I think that says enough," Radulovic concluded.