Operation "Breakthrough": Enver Hoxha's preparations for the military invasion of Kosovo and the creation of "Greater Albania" after Tito's death (3)

Written for Kosovo Online by Dragan Bisenic, a journalist

The Warsaw Pact and Marshal Kulikov on the planned operation

Tito's illness at the end of 1979 - beginning of 1980 and the seriousness with which the Yugoslav media reacted to this became for Hoxha a confirmation of his long-standing predictions about the fate of Yugoslavia after Tito's departure from the political scene. The situation of possible chaos and inter-ethnic conflicts, as well as the high probability of direct or indirect interference in the internal Yugoslav affairs of the two superpowers, convinced Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu of the necessity of military preparations for upcoming events.

On January 13, 1980, when Tito was already in the hospital in Ljubljana, Hoxha, Shehu, and Llakaj had a conversation in strict secrecy. On it, Hoxha and Shehu tasked Llakaj to prepare a plan for a possible large-scale military operation for the "liberation of Kosovo" within 45 days, i.e. by the end of February.

The urgency and absolute secrecy of this task were dictated by the fact that the leadership of Albania expected the imminent death of Tito and the possible outbreak of an intra-Yugoslav crisis that would follow, during which conditions would be created for the implementation of the plan called Operation "Breakthrough" (Operation "Shperthimi").

According to the Russian historian Artyom Ulinyan, for the first time, the existence of the "Breakthrough" plan was learned from the publication of the former Chief of the General Staff of the Albanian National Army, Veli Llakaj in 2006. In 2010, Llakaj repeated the information about the operation in an interview with the Albanian newspaper "Shekulli". However, in the books from 2006, the former Chief of the General Staff did not mention the "Breakthrough" operation. There is reason to believe that such an operation would be carried out in the event of an unforeseen development of the situation in SFRY. Moreover, a number of experts draw attention to the refusal of Tirana in 1975 to sign the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference, by which the signatory states committed to respect the principle of inviolability of post-war borders. Enver Hoxha explained his refusal to participate in the Helsinki process with ideological reasons, however, some researchers believe that he took such a step, not wanting to recognize the borders with SFRY and, especially, the fact that Kosovo is part of Yugoslavia. In foreign historiography, one of the few references to the "Breakthrough" operation is in O. Schmitt's book "Kosovo - Kurze Geschichte einer zentralbalkanischen Landschaft", Wien, 2008, p. 298 – 299.

The implementation of the plan could seriously disrupt the position of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Part of the operation, the preparation of which was carried out taking into account the Vietnamese experience from the guerilla war and with the use of cartographic material urgently procured from Austria, were possible actions in the direction of Macedonia and Montenegro, where there was a compact Albanian population. At the same time, a topographical map of the settlements of the Albanian population of the SFRY was made, which could become very important in the event of the transition of hostilities to the phase of guerrilla warfare or sabotage.

At the same meeting, on January 13, 1980, Hoxha, as Llakaj stated in 2006, had made a statement about the existence of certain guarantees from the Department of Internal Affairs. This issue is still the least studied. Moreover, in the same interview, referring to his notes, Llakaj stated that a meeting had been held in which he and Shehu allegedly negotiated with Marshal, First Deputy Minister of Defense and Supreme Commander of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact, Marshal Viktor Kulikov that the USSR and The Warsaw Pact had agreed to the Albanian invasion of Kosovo and its annexation to Albania, but in return, Albania had been supposed to return to the Warsaw Pact. Llakaj did not specify the exact date of this meeting, nor the place where it was held. Russian historians, assess that the fact of such "consultations" for "many objective reasons" looks like a hoax, where they refer to the official hostile positions of Hoxha and Shehu towards the USSR and the Warsaw Pact.

Preparations for Operation Breakthrough, which took place in secret against the backdrop of the Albanian party and state leaders' expectations of changes in connection with Tito's departure from the political scene, continued until April 1980, 22 infantry brigades, 12 assault brigades, and six tank brigades were designated for the attack on Kosovo, seven artillery brigades, six anti-tank regiments, 12 air defense regiments, two engineering brigades, ten reconnaissance battalions, three aviation regiments, three military hospitals, two veterinary hospitals, three army control centers with a total number of 200 - 220 thousand people. Of this number, 65 percent of forces and resources were intended for actions on the "Kosovo front", and 35 percent - on the Macedonian and Montenegrin direction. On the Kosovo side, it was assumed that the invasion force would number 30,000 people in the first phase, and 150,000 people in the second. In the Macedonian and Montenegrin direction, in the first stage, the invasion forces would amount to 6,000 and 4,000 people respectively, and in the second stage, they would reach 16,000 people. Then it was necessary to use the reserve of the Supreme Command.

Namely, all the forces and means at the disposal of the Supreme Command, including the reserves, were to be used in combat operations. This turned the operation into a full-scale war in which Albania must not lose under any circumstances because such an outcome could lead not only to the collapse of the regime but also to the loss of statehood.

In the case of a military conflict with Yugoslavia, the balance of forces and means was clearly not in favor of the Albanian side, which could only rely on the situation of internal political conflict (including its military aspect) in Yugoslavia, which would lead to the disintegration of the Yugoslav People's Army, and to the rebel-sabotage activities of armed groups of the Albanian population in Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro.

Both the ratio of resources and forces and the level of training of the armed forces of Yugoslavia in relation to the armed forces of Albania, with all the secrecy of the quantitative data, testified to the clear advantages of the Yugoslav side. Llakaj and his associates, who planned the operation, understood this.

In parallel with its development, the "Shebeniku-80" military exercises were carried out, taking into account the planning of the "Breakthrough" operation. When planning the "Shebeniku-80" exercises, Mehmet Shehu had in mind that they could be used as a direct preparation for the invasion of Kosovo and turn into a real military operation. After the prepared materials were handed over to Enver Hoxha and introduced to the members of the Politburo of the Albanian Labor Party Central Committee, Shehu ordered Llakaj that the documents should be kept in the safe of the Chief of the General Staff. In reality, he had taken these materials and they had been in his personal safe until his suicide in December 1981, from where they had been moved several times, and it was still unknown where they are after 1992, Llakaj stated. However, in the spring of 1980, Shehu uttered a phrase that Llakaj remembered for a long time, "Come and spit on my grave if the day does not come when you will need this document!".

Two days after the secret meeting on January 13, on January 15, 1980, Hoxha prepared theses for an editorial in the central party organ, the newspaper "Zeri i popullit", which was published on January 19, 1979, under the title "Soviet-Bulgarian blackmail and threats will not work in the Balkans". In this material, Bulgaria is accused of becoming an instrument of Soviet policy in the Balkans and of actually helping the USSR in "intimidating the people of Yugoslavia." The article called on the "people of fraternal Yugoslavia" to be vigilant, to fight "against the agents of Soviet imperialism, the Ustashe, the Great Serbian [chauvinists] inside and outside" the country. At the same time, the article emphasizes the struggle of Albanians for "freedom and independence".

Both in substance and in form, this article expressed Hoxha's way of thinking and the scenario he envisioned for the "violent" development of the situation. In this context, the Albanian side was presented as speaking from very specific positions in an environment in which Croatian and Serbian nationalists could begin to act actively in the political arena. Secondly, it was assumed that the USSR and Bulgaria were using their influence to bring to power politicians oriented towards their options. In turn, as noted by the Bulgarian ambassador in Belgrade, R. Nikolov, the Yugoslav leadership had positively evaluated the leading article published on January 19, 1980. This was emphasized at a meeting on February 26, 1980, between the president of the Federal Executive Council, Veselin Djuranovic, and the ambassador of Albania, S. Plaka. Djuranovic supported Hoxha's main assessments about the occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet troops, as well as the characterization of Bulgaria by the Albanian side as a "weapon of the USSR in the service of its aggressive policy against the people of Albania, Yugoslavia, and Greece".

In the first half of February 1980, when Tito was already in an extremely difficult condition after the operation, Hoxha came to the conclusion that the USSR would not use armed forces against Yugoslavia, trying to occupy it. According to his scenario, Moscow's action was supposed in the first phase to use the levers of influence and pressure on Belgrade, and then, in the second phase, to isolate the pro-American line and achieve that pro-Soviet (Hoxha's pro-Russian) oriented leaders come to power in Yugoslavia. For their part, the US and the West will also try to influence the situation in the country, so even from Enver Hoxha's point of view, the question of the dominance of foreign forces in Yugoslavia still remains open. The situation in Yugoslavia in the future depended, according to his forecast, on how deeply the contradictions between the republics and the people in the country could intensify. The scenario, which was controversial by its nature, was an attempt by Serbia to achieve a dominant position in the federation, while Croatia would strive to achieve a similar status, which would lead to serious contradictions between them. In return, the Slovenians would support the Croats, as could Vojvodina, and Montenegro would advocate for unification with Serbia. In this situation, according to Hoxha, "Albanians, for their part, will fight for liberation, and Macedonia will be under the predominant influence of Bulgarian-Soviet propaganda."

Hoxha's abandonment of the plan is most likely a consequence of the fact that the development of the situation in Yugoslavia did not correspond to the scenario of the use of force that he expected, and therefore Tirana had no reason for military intervention. But the preparations for the operation, which would have been carried out under different circumstances, continued with wide changes in the army, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of the Interior, as well as the dismissal of Mehmet Shehu.

During the spring and autumn of 1980, preparations for possible events in Yugoslavia, and especially in Kosovo, were intensified in the Albanian armed forces and intelligence bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs - Directorate of State Security and the Ministry of Defense - Directorate for Intelligence Affairs.

The strategic intelligence service was reorganized and focused on obtaining information about the military-political situation in Kosovo. The degree of information on the Albanian side about the situation in the border areas was such that it had information not only about the deployment of military units, forces, and assets of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Yugoslavia and Special Forces but also had updated information about the commanders of the Yugoslav People’s Army units and the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the middle and lower level. At one of the secret meetings held in the summer of 1980 in the village of Shishtevec, which is located at a distance of slightly more than half a kilometer from the border with Kosovo, these materials were shown to the Minister of Defense, whose detailed information surprised him (Gazeta Shqip. 04/01/2010). Enver Hoxha maintained his expectation of the development of "Yugoslav events" in accordance with his settings. In the middle of the 80s, they came, so the predictions of Enver Hoxha became a reality.

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