Kosovo facing a new institutional crisis: What will be the West’s approach?

priština
Source: Društvene mreže

The political atmosphere in Pristina is once again heating up due to failures in key institutional processes. While officials from the current government attempt to portray the situation as part of “democratic maturation,” interlocutors speaking to Kosovo Online warn that this is an artificial crisis that could have been avoided. According to them, the approach of the European Union and the United States toward Kosovo is no longer characterized by unconditional understanding, and their officials are unlikely to look favorably upon new political upheavals in Pristina, with potential consequences that could be not only political but also economic.

Written by: Milena Miladinovic

Just as it appeared that Kosovo, after a year of political crisis, was entering a stable four-year period following the outcome of the snap elections of 28 December—in which Albin Kurti’s Self-Determination movement won 51 percent of the vote, followed by the constitution of the assembly and the formation of the government—a new issue emerged on which parliamentary parties in Kosovo failed to reach consensus: the election of the president.

Due to the lack of a quorum in the Kosovo Assembly, a new president was not elected, while Osmani dissolved the parliament the following day.

Assembly Speaker Albulena Haxhiu subsequently addressed the Constitutional Court, which issued an interim measure prohibiting any action by the president related to the decree of 6 March, as well as any activity of the Kosovo Assembly until the court reaches a final decision.

The saga surrounding the presidential election will last at least until 31 March, when the Constitutional Court’s decision expires. Two possible scenarios could unfold after that date—either restarting the session for the presidential election from the beginning or holding early parliamentary elections.

Within its short period of existence, the tenth convocation of the Kosovo Assembly managed to resolve two urgent and important issues: it adopted this year’s budget “at the last minute” and ratified international agreements related to financing under the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans. This, it could be said, is sufficient for a government operating in a technical mandate in the coming months.

Following the failure to elect a president, the European Union stated that it “regrets the latest developments in Kosovo.”

“We are now awaiting the decision of the Constitutional Court,” an EU spokesperson told our portal.

Interlocutors of Kosovo Online assess that the West’s reaction, should Kosovo enter a new institutional crisis, will not be favorable, as “no one needs a crisis.” However, according to them, the focus of diplomats is currently on the Middle East, meaning that the West is unlikely to become deeply engaged in the Kosovo issue, which—according to observers—could have been resolved by political actors if there had been less stubbornness.

Artificial Crisis

Senior fellow at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies’ Foreign Policy Institute, Edward Joseph, emphasized that Kosovo is not in a situation where narrow election results make it difficult to form a government. However, due to the stubbornness of the leadership, it now faces a new political crisis that, in his view, will further worsen relations with Washington and the European Union.

Joseph expressed hope that the Constitutional Court will decide not to dissolve the Kosovo Assembly, although he stressed that the situation in Kosovo is nevertheless unfavorable.

According to him, new elections are in no one’s interest.

“This is an unnecessary crisis. What we must hope for is that the Constitutional Court rules that the Assembly has not been dissolved and that there remains another opportunity for the Assembly to act before Kosovo is forced to hold new elections, which is in no one’s interest. This is not a standard political crisis in which you have close election results and it becomes extremely difficult to form a government, which then requires new elections. In this case, there is every possibility to form a government, but there is refusal and stubbornness on the part of Kosovo’s leadership to recognize that it must proceed with the election of the president,” he said.


According to Joseph, the logical choice would be for Vjosa Osmani to remain president of Kosovo.

“Has the president done anything that would disqualify her? That is the question—not whether you like Osmani or not. The question is whether Osmani has done anything that disqualifies her from a second term. The answer is absolutely not. On the contrary, here in Washington we speak of her as a president who has built the closest relationship with the Trump administration. So the answer is very clear—it is about protecting Kosovo’s interests,” Joseph said.

He also believes that another political deadlock could further strain relations between Pristina, Washington, and the European Union, as no one wants chaos.

Joseph added that new institutional uncertainty could weaken international support for Kosovo from the United States, the EU, and NATO, stressing that Pristina is sending a negative signal by creating artificial crises.

“When you demonstrate that you are in a completely unnecessary, artificial constitutional crisis after a prolonged inability to form a government, what message are you sending? Are you sending the message that you are capable of being a full partner? No. This only provides arguments to Kosovo’s opponents, including those in Serbia. It is the wrong and unnecessary signal. There is a very simple solution. If the Constitutional Court rules that the Assembly has not been fully dissolved and elections are not yet required, then the leadership should come together and support Osmani—if for no other reason than for the sake of Kosovo’s interests and to avoid a crisis,” Joseph stated.


He added that Albin Kurti, as prime minister and leader of the party with the largest number of seats in parliament, clearly plays a key role. Regarding relations between Kurti and Osmani, Joseph noted that they are dynamic but stressed that the priority now should be Kosovo’s interests.

“I know they are dynamic political personalities, regardless of how their relationship began. All political relationships are dynamic. Regardless of whether Kurti was politically above Osmani at the beginning and she later gained political independence, relationships in politics evolve. The point is the president’s record. That is the only question—and avoiding a crisis that harms the country. Whatever misunderstandings, resentment, or disagreements may exist between Kurti and Osmani are irrelevant. What matters is Kosovo’s interest, and that is for the president to remain in office,” Joseph concluded.


No Direct Interference

Director of Strategy at the European Policy Centre in Belgrade, Milos Pavkovic, told Kosovo Online that international actors are not satisfied with the political situation in Kosovo but are unlikely to directly intervene or exert pressure on political actors.

“EU Special Representative for the Dialogue Peter Sørensen recently visited Pristina. Since the government was formed, he has visited twice and expressed the European Union’s expectation that a high-level meeting be organized, which will not happen if the government falls. Therefore, this will certainly not be viewed favorably. In principle, international actors are not particularly satisfied with what is happening, but at the same time I do not expect them to directly interfere or apply pressure on political actors—especially since public attention, particularly that of diplomats, is currently focused on other parts of the world, such as Israel, Iran, and the conflict in the Middle East. It seems there is neither the capacity nor the willingness at this moment to seriously address the institutional crisis in Kosovo,” Pavkovic said.


No Tolerance for the Status Quo

Economics professor Shkumbin Misini believes that representatives of the EU and Washington are disappointed with the leadership process in Kosovo and will no longer tolerate the status quo, which they see as a threat to regional security.

Speaking to Kosovo Online, Misini said that official Pristina risks the absence of new recognitions and the departure of strategic investors.

“Kosovo risks failing to obtain new recognitions and seeing its integration processes into international organizations suspended,” he said.

Different Approaches of the EU and the United States

Security studies researcher Nikola Vujinovic noted that the international community will not look favorably upon a new institutional crisis in Kosovo, but that the approaches of the European Union and the United States may differ.

According to Vujinovic, the EU will insist on an agreement, while the United States may support President Vjosa Osmani for another term.

“They will not view it favorably, but we must make a distinction. The European Union and the United States will likely have somewhat opposing views. It appears that Osmani is the U.S. favorite, and if this electoral crisis helps her secure a new mandate, I believe the United States would support that. Meanwhile, the EU will insist on reaching some form of agreement. I believe EU ambassadors have already advocated this position with Kurti—to avoid new electoral processes because that would delay certain matters,” Vujinovic said.


He emphasized that if Kosovo falls into a new political crisis, it will not be able to seek advice or policy adjustments from the EU or the United States because legitimate institutions will be lacking.

“I believe the European Union will quietly encourage the Constitutional Court—through friendly channels—to adopt a decision that would be more acceptable for institutional stability, while the United States may welcome new electoral processes because Osmani would likely gain additional momentum through their support,” he added.

According to Vujinovic, relations between Kosovo and both the EU and the United States are already strained, meaning that a new crisis would not necessarily worsen them further.

Will the Institutional Crisis Affect EU Financing?

Regarding financing under the EU Growth Plan, interlocutors believe that agreements already adopted will still be implemented. However, if the government operates in a technical mandate, delays may occur in the adoption of future agreements.

According to Professor Misini, funding from the EU Growth Plan could be jeopardized if the political crisis undermines reforms in Kosovo.

“Since implementation and changes require time, the 2024–2027 Growth Plan carries risks regarding the use of financial resources in line with reforms. If institutional disputes undermine strict reform conditions, the funds will remain frozen in Brussels’ accounts even if the agreement is quickly adopted,” Misini concluded.

On the other hand, Milos Pavkovic notes that the tenth convocation of the Kosovo Assembly ratified agreements within a short time frame that secure financial payments to Kosovo, and he does not expect those funds to be halted even if a new political crisis emerges.

“I believe the condition was the ratification of the agreement and the adoption of the reform agenda, which the Assembly managed to accomplish in this short period. I think those conditions have been met. There will certainly be delays in implementing steps for future tranches, but I do not expect problems regarding previously approved funding,” Pavkovic said.

Nikola Vujinovic believes that any economic crisis will not be primarily caused by institutional instability, as the budget has already been adopted, although the arrival of funds from the European Union may remain uncertain.

“That is the main investment momentum of Kosovo’s economy, so some economic imbalances could occur. However, the severity of the crisis will depend more on geopolitical circumstances—particularly the war in the Middle East—than on institutional instability in Kosovo and Metohija,” he said.

Regarding the Growth Plan, Vujinovic stressed that the issue is not whether it will be implemented, but to what extent.

“It will not be implemented in its entirety—some deadlines have already expired, and others are approaching expiration. If institutional instability continues, we can expect certain modifications. EU development funds are always negotiated with the European Commission, so I would not be surprised if adjustments are made, considering that the EU and the European Commission generally view Kosovo favorably as a state—which, in my opinion, is extremely harmful for the region. They may well reach an agreement and revise the Growth Plan accordingly,” Vujinovic concluded.