Regional Interpol Bureau in Belgrade: Serbia’s strategic advantage – A diplomatic challenge for Kosovo?

Interpol
Source: Kosovo Online

While Kosovo has been unable to secure Interpol membership for more than a decade, Serbia has announced that it will apply to host a regional bureau. Experts interviewed by Kosovo Online agree that such a move would strengthen Serbia’s police cooperation and international prestige, but they differ in assessing the potential consequences for Pristina. Some argue that it would not further affect Kosovo’s position, while others warn that Serbia could increase diplomatic and security pressure, placing Kosovo in a disadvantageous position within the regional security framework.

Written by: Petar Rosic

Kosovo’s efforts to join Interpol date back to 2010. At that time, the Executive Committee did not consider the application submitted by Pristina. Kosovo applied again in 2015 and 2016, but the requests were not included on the agenda of the General Assembly, and in 2017 Kosovo withdrew its application due to insufficient support for membership.

Kosovo most recently applied for membership in 2018 during the General Assembly in Dubai. Despite considerable support, the request ultimately failed because it did not secure the required two-thirds majority.

Serbia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior Ivica Dacic, summarizing his participation at last week’s 93rd Interpol General Assembly in Marrakesh, stated that Kosovo again did not submit a membership application this year and announced that Serbia’s Ministry of Interior will apply to open a Regional Interpol Bureau for Southeast Europe headquartered in Belgrade.

“Some may say we are overly focused on this topic, but given that we were already ‘burned’ once—when ‘Kosovo’ applied at the Interpol Assembly in Dubai and we had to make a significant effort to win that vote—it is never wrong to remain vigilant. And I must thank Interpol’s senior leadership for understanding the issue of territorial integrity,” Dacic emphasized.

Following this announcement, Pristina-based media accused Serbia of repeatedly violating the Brussels Agreement by obstructing Kosovo’s participation in regional and international organizations and security mechanisms. The EU also reacted.

“Serbia’s progress on the EU path depends on full implementation of the obligations stemming from the 2023 normalization agreement. By opposing Kosovo’s membership in Interpol in principle, Serbia is violating its commitments under the Ohrid Agreement, Article 4,” the EU spokesperson stated.

Dacic sharply rejected these accusations, saying that the EU violates everything when it comes to Serbia—from territorial integrity to the failure to establish the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities.

“As long as you fail to implement the 2013 Brussels Agreement, which you also signed, and establish the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities, where do you find the boldness to criticize Serbia for defending its territorial integrity?! In any case, so-called Kosovo didn’t even apply for Interpol membership, because it knows it would fail, even with your cheering and pressure on other states to vote, as happened a few years ago,” Dacic told Kosovo Online.

Explaining why Kosovo has not submitted a new application for years, the Dean of the Faculty of Diplomacy and Security in Belgrade, Prof. Dr. Radojica Lazic, reminds that the last application was during the General Assembly in Dubai on 20 November 2018, when Kosovo was unable to secure the required two-thirds majority.

“All this time they haven’t tried again for one simple reason—they know they do not have the necessary support, and according to what I know, that support is decreasing,” Lazic says.

For Serbia, he stresses, the reason to keep Kosovo out of Interpol is clear.

“It is extremely important for Serbia that Kosovo not become part of Interpol for one simple reason—Serbia does not recognize the independence of its southern province, Kosovo and Metohija. Therefore, Belgrade quite reasonably does everything it can to prevent Kosovo’s entry into this international police organization, because this is part of the national security policy of the Republic of Serbia, where Kosovo is part of its territory,” he explains.

Regarding the initiative to open a regional Interpol office in Belgrade, Lazic argues that Serbia has strong arguments.

“Given the geopolitical and geostrategic position of the Republic of Serbia, we must keep in mind that all major international routes intersect here. For these reasons, the request to host a regional center for this crucial international police cooperation is fully justified,” he states.

As for practical implications for Kosovo, should a regional office be opened in Belgrade, he explains that communication would continue through international missions.

“There are so-called police institutions there—UNMIK and EULEX—that in some way indirectly facilitate cooperation with this international police organization. The only way for Kosovo’s provisional institutions to cooperate indirectly with Interpol is through UNMIK and EULEX,” Lazic concludes.

On the other hand, university professor and security expert Kolje Krasniqi believes that Serbia’s expanded role in Interpol would have profound consequences for Kosovo, placing it at a disadvantage within the regional security architecture.

“The lack of direct access to Interpol would significantly slow Kosovo’s police operations and cause delays in coordinating efforts against transnational crime. Second, it would increase the risk of Serbia misusing politically motivated arrest warrants. Such a situation would directly affect the freedom of movement of Kosovo’s citizens—especially former KLA members and public officials—exposing them to potential arrests in states that implement Interpol mechanisms. Third, Serbia would gain increased diplomatic leverage, further limiting Kosovo’s opportunities for integration into international security structures,” he says.

He adds that Serbia, through control of a regional Interpol office, could further intensify diplomatic and security pressure on Kosovo.

“Serbia would likely continue its policy of ‘functional non-recognition’, treating Kosovo’s institutions as non-state structures and avoiding any form of direct institutional cooperation. Through this mechanism, Serbia could obstruct Kosovo’s integration into regional security networks and reinforce the international perception of Kosovo as a ‘disputed territory’ rather than a sovereign and functional state. This would be an important strategic instrument for Belgrade in limiting Kosovo’s diplomatic space and international mobility,” Krasniqi argues.

However, Marko Savkovic from the ISAC Fund tells Kosovo Online that opening a regional Interpol bureau would bring Serbia professional and prestige-related benefits, but would not give Belgrade additional tools to influence Kosovo’s membership prospects.

“From the perspective of the dialogue, voices from Kosovo speak of so-called strategic asymmetry—that Serbia would thereby gain a more favorable position relative to Kosovo,” he says.

Nevertheless, he emphasizes that the benefits for Serbia are mostly professional and important for police cooperation, recognition of expertise, and international standing.

“It is certainly a positive development. In general, we should strive for as many relevant international organizations and their regional bodies as possible to be present, represented, or even headquartered in the Republic of Serbia. We may take as an example the Berlin Process, where out of several regional bodies, only the Transport Community ended up located in Belgrade,” he explains.

He notes that, in the event of opening a regional bureau, Serbia would not gain any special rights enabling it to further complicate Kosovo’s path to Interpol.

“These decisions are made by the General Assembly, so nothing significant would change. This is more important for Serbia in a broader sense, unrelated to Kosovo, and is vital in the context of political cooperation and the fight against cross-border crime, which is extremely important in the Balkans,” he concludes.

Speaking about Interpol membership, he reiterates that it relates to police cooperation to prevent suspects from evading justice, but also serves as confirmation of a political entity’s statehood.

“When it comes to Kosovo, it is entirely clear, because Interpol is one of the most important international organizations. Kosovo has been unable to secure membership for years. More than ten years have passed since the first attempt—indeed, fifteen—but it was first placed on the agenda ten years ago,” he says.

He explains that the procedure is demanding because admission requires a two-thirds majority, and that Serbia, at a decisive moment when Kosovo was close to membership, managed to block its entry.

“In one day, through Serbia’s lobbying, around ten countries withdrew their support. A small number still wish to see Kosovo join, but for now it does not appear realistic. The positions of countries opposed to Kosovo’s admission have not changed in recent years. Serbia’s lobbying remains effective, and such an outcome seems unacceptable at this moment,” Savkovic says.