What kind of LDK suits Kurti, and could internal turmoil push Kosovo toward new elections?

Abdidžiku i Osmani
Source: Facebook/Vjosa Osmani

Internal turmoil within the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) could send Kosovo back to the polls before the end of the year. However, analysts interviewed by Kosovo Online agree on one point: if the party changes its leadership and current leader Lumir Abdixhiku is replaced, it would effectively end any prospect of an agreement between the LDK and the Self-Determination Movement.

Written by: Veljko Nestorovic

Self-Determination has repeatedly stated that it believes an agreement with the LDK remains possible. However, even if Abdixhiku retains the party leadership, he can no longer count on the support of all LDK MPs in the Kosovo Assembly.

Many also see current Pristina Mayor Përparim Rama as a potential new leader of the LDK. Whether fresh elections would benefit one side more than the other, and whether caretaker Prime Minister Albin Kurti is steering Kosovo toward elections in December, are issues Kosovo Online has examined previously.

According to the Constitutional Court's interpretation, the procedure is clear: the deadline for constituting the Kosovo Assembly is 7 August, after which a 30-day period begins for the formation of a new government and a 60-day deadline for electing a new president. By then, it should also be clear whether the LDK will retain Abdixhiku as leader or elect new leadership.

Acting Speaker of the Kosovo Assembly Albulena Haxhiu announced today that the Assembly's constitutive session will be held on 6 August at 10:00 a.m.

Political analyst Armend Demaku told Kosovo Online that Lumir Abdixhiku and Vjosa Osmani act as Self-Determination's political satellites within the LDK and, through their actions, are weakening the party from within.

According to Demaku, Albin Kurti's objective is to deepen divisions inside the LDK and, through Abdixhiku and Osmani, turn dissatisfaction among party members and supporters into votes for Self-Determination.

"If Lumir Abdixhiku remains at the helm of the LDK, I believe that would be bad news for the party. However, even if he is not re-elected, there is a possibility that he and Vjosa Osmani could launch a new political initiative together. In my opinion, that too would harm the LDK, although less than if he were to remain party leader."

Demaku argues that Abdixhiku currently serves Albin Kurti's political interests more than those of the party he leads.

"The LDK should reassess the current situation as soon as possible and stabilize its ranks. Just as, in my opinion, Vjosa Osmani caused significant political damage to the LDK in the past, Lumir Abdixhiku could inflict similar damage unless the situation is resolved wisely and in a timely manner. The LDK has many experienced, respected, and proven political figures capable of rebuilding and strengthening the party. In my view, however, neither Lumir Abdixhiku nor Vjosa Osmani represents the solution for returning the LDK to the path of political success."

Political scientist Ognjen Gogic believes that what definitely does not suit Kurti is a consolidated LDK.

According to Gogic, Kurti's interests should be viewed from both a short-term and a long-term perspective.

"If the LDK were to elect a leadership capable of restoring the level of support the party once enjoyed, and considering the widespread assumption that some of its former voters shifted to Self-Determination, or that Self-Determination became the second choice for part of the LDK electorate, a consolidated party could regain some of those voters. From a long-term perspective, it is therefore not in Kurti's interest for the LDK to consolidate, but rather to remain in its current state of crisis, which has lasted for several years. In the short term, however, changes in the LDK leadership could eliminate the chances of forming Kosovo's institutions. It appeared that Lumir Abdixhiku and Vjosa Osmani had, to some extent, demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with Albin Kurti and provide the parliamentary votes necessary to elect the President of Kosovo."

Gogic added that it remains highly uncertain whether they would have succeeded in electing the president, as it has become evident that Abdixhiku no longer exercises full control over the LDK parliamentary group and that even his backing might not have secured the required majority.

"In any case, Kurti appeared to be on the verge of reaching an agreement with Abdixhiku. This was probably also the result of political calculations by Abdixhiku and Vjosa Osmani, who may have expected certain positions or political concessions in return, even though that might not have served the party's long-term interests. That, in all likelihood, triggered a turning point within the LDK, because part of the party did not want it to become Kurti's political appendage, which is effectively what would have happened had that plan materialized. Further developments will largely depend on the outcome of the internal contest within the LDK—whether Abdixhiku remains leader or a new leadership takes over. That will determine the party's relationship with Kurti, first regarding the formation of institutions and later in the longer term. The key question is whether the LDK will finally consolidate or continue to be weakened by internal divisions."

Asked whether Kosovo could hold new elections before the end of the year, Gogic said the LDK's internal situation may be one contributing factor, but by no means the decisive one.

"Although Kurti wants to consolidate his authority through the election of a president, he will not do so at any cost. His political survival does not depend on whether new elections are held, and he will not make concessions he is unwilling to make simply to secure the necessary parliamentary votes. It is also highly questionable whether, even if Abdixhiku's line had prevailed, all LDK MPs would have supported Kurti's presidential nominee or even participated in the vote. Therefore, that scenario was never certain. In other words, even without the LDK's internal crisis, there was no guarantee that the party would have delivered all the votes required to elect the president. It can therefore be said that the LDK's internal crisis is only a partial cause of the current political situation. It is more accurate to conclude that Kosovo's broader political crisis has deepened divisions within the LDK, rather than the other way around. There are factions within the party that believe they can represent its interests more effectively and do not have to accept the subordinate role that, in their view, Abdixhiku has accepted."

Gogic also believes that if the LDK elects new leadership, it is highly unlikely to strike any agreement with Kurti before elections are held.

"They want to take over the leadership of the party precisely because they believe they can lead it more successfully in elections, not because they want to provide Kurti with the votes he needs during a transitional period. On the contrary, the objective of the new leadership would be to test its political strength against Kurti in new parliamentary elections. For that reason, it would almost certainly favour early elections as soon as this autumn in order to demonstrate that it can lead the LDK more effectively than the current leadership headed by Abdixhiku," Gogic concluded.